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

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EPICTETUS,

Which are now Extant ;

CONSISTING OF
His DISCOURSES, preserved by ARRIAN,
IN FOUR BOOKS,
The ENCHIRIDION, and FRAGMENTS.

Translated from the Original GREEK,
By ELIZABETH CARTER.

WITH
An INTRODUCTION, and NOTES, by the Translator.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

THE THIRD EDITION.

L O N D O N :

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M.DCCCLXVIII.





The TRANSLATOR of EPICTETUS owes the Permission of inserting the following ODE entirely to the Friendship of the Writer of it; who, when she favoured her with it, had no Thought of its ever appearing in Print.

AN IRREGULAR ODE.

To E. C. who had recommended to me the Stoic Philosophy, as productive of Fortitude, and who is going to publish a Translation of EPICTETUS.

I.

COME, EPICTETUS! Arm my Breast
With thy impenetrable Steel,
No more the Wounds of Grief to feel,
Nor mourn by others' Woes deprest.
Oh teach my trembling Heart
To scorn Affliction's Dart;
Teach me to mock the Tyrant Pain!
For see around me stand
A dreadful murd'rous Band,
I fly their cruel Power in vain!
Here lurks *Distemper's* horrid Train,
And *There* the *Passions* lift their flaming Brands;
These with full Rage my helpless Body tear,
While *Those* with daring Hands
Against the immortal Soul their impious Weapons rear.

AN IRREGULAR ODE.

II.

Where-e'er I turn, fresh Evils meet my Eyes ;
Sin, Sorrow, and Disgrace,
Pursue the Human Race !
There on the Bed of Sicknefs *Virtue* lies !
See *Friendship* bleeding by the Sword
Of base *Ingratitude* !
See baleful *Jealousy* intrude,
And poison all the Blifs that *Love* had stor'd !
Oh ! seal my Ears against the piteous Cry
Of Innocence distressed !
Nor let me shrink, when Fancy's Eye
Beholds the guilty Wretch's Breast
Beneath the torturing Pincers heave :
Nor for the num'rous Wants of Mis'ry grieve,
Which all disposing Heav'n denies me to relieve !

III.

No longer let my fleeting Joys depend
On social, or domestic Ties !
Superior let my Spirit rise,
Nor in the gentle Counsels of a Friend,
Nor in the Smiles of Love, expect Delight :
But teach me in *myself* to find
Whate'er can please or fill my Mind.
Let inward Beauty charm the mental Sight ;
Let God-like Reason, beaming bright,
Chase far away each gloomy Shade,
Till Virtue's heavenly Form display'd

And

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And her divinest Love possess me whole!
Alone shall captivate my Soul,

IV.

But, ah! what means this impious Pride,
Which heav'nly Hosts deride!
Within *myself* does Virtue dwell?
Is all serene, and beauteous there?
What mean these chilling Damps of Fear?
Tell me, *Philosophy*! Thou Boaster! Tell:
This God-like all-sufficient Mind,
Which, in its own Perfection blest,
Defies the Woes, or Malice of Mankind
To shake its self-possessing Rest,
Is it not foul, weak, ignorant, and blind?
Oh Man! from conscious Virtue's Praise
Fall'n, fall'n!—what Refuge can'st thou find!
What pitying Hand again will raise
From native Earth thy groveling Frame!
Ah, who will cleanse thy Heart from Spot of sinful Blame?

V.

But, See! what sudden Glories from the Sky
To my benighted Soul appear,
And all the gloomy Prospect cheer?
What awful Form approaches nigh?
Awful: Yet mild as is the southern Wind
That gently bids the Forest nod.
Hark! Thunder breaks the Air, and Angels speak!
"Behold the Saviour of the World! Behold the Lamb of
Ye Sons of Pride, behold his Aspect meek! [God!"
The Tear of Pity on his Cheek!

AN IRREGULAR ODE.

See in his Train appear
Humility and Patience sweet,
Repentance, prostrate at His sacred Feet, [Hair!
Bedews with Tears, and wipes them with her flowing

VI.

What Scenes now meet my wond'ring Eyes!
What hallow'd Grave,
By mourning Maids attended round,
Attracts the SAVIOUR'S Steps? What Heart-felt Wound
His spotless Bosom heaves with tender Sighs?
Why weeps the SON belov'd, Omnipotent to save?
But, lo! He waves his awful Hand!
The sleeping Clay obeys His dread Command.
Oh Lazarus! come forth!—"Come forth and see
"The dear Effects of wond'rous Love!
"He, at whose Word the Seas and Rocks remove,
"Thy Friend, thy Lord, thy Maker, weeps for Thee!"

VII.

Thy Walls, *Jerusalem*, have seen thy King
In Meekness clad, lament thy hapless Fate!
Unquench'd His Love, though paid with ruthless Hate!
O lost, relentless *Sion*! Didst Thou know
Who thus vouchsafes thy Courts to tread,
What loud *Hosannas* wouldst thou sing!
How eager crown His honour'd Head!
Nor see unmov'd His kind paternal Woe!
Nor force His Tears, His precious Blood, for thee to flow!

VIII.

AN IRREGULAR ODE.

VIII.

No more repine, my coward Soul !

The Sorrows of Mankind to share,
Which He, who could the World controul,
Did not disdain to bear !
Check not the Flow of sweet fraternal Love,
By Heav'n's high King in Bounty given,
Thy stubborn Heart to soften and improve,
Thy Earth-clad Spirit to refine,
And gradual raise to Love divine
And wing its soaring Flight to Heaven !

IX.


Northou, ELIZA, who from early Youth
By Genius led, by Virtue train'd,
Hast sought the Fountain of eternal Truth,
And each fair Spring of Knowledge drain'd ;
Nor Thou, with fond Chimeras vain,
With Stoic Pride, and fancied Scorn
Of human Feelings, human Pain,
My feeble Soul sustain !
Far nobler Precepts should thy Page adorn.
O rather guide me to the sacred Source
Of real Wisdom, real Force,
Thy Life's unerring Rule !
To Thee, fair Truth her radiant Form unshrouds,
Though, wrapp'd in thick impenetrable Clouds,
She mock'd the Labours of the Grecian School.

M. H.





INTRODUCTION.

§. 1. HE Stoic Sect was founded by *Zeno*, about three hundred Years before the Christian Æra: and flourished in great Reputation, till the Declension of the *Roman* Empire. A complete History of this Philosophy would be the Work of a large Volume: and nothing further is intended here, than such a summary View of it, as may be of Use to give a clearer Notion of those Passages in *Epictetus*, a strict Professor of it, which allude to some of its peculiar Doctrines.

§. 2. That the End of Man is to live conformably to Nature, was universally agreed on amongst all the Philosophers: but, in what that Conformity to Nature consists, was the Point in Dispute. The *Epicureans* maintained, that it consisted in Pleasure; of which they constituted Sense the

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Judge (a). The Stoics, on the contrary, placed it in an absolute Perfection of the Soul. Neither of them seem to have understood Man in his mixed Capacity ; but while the first debased him to a mere Animal, the last exalted him to a pure Intelligence ; and both considered him as independent, uncorrupted and sufficient, either by Height of Virtue, or by well-regulated Indulgence, to his own Happiness. The Stoical Excess was more useful to the Public, as it often produced great and noble Efforts towards that Perfection, to which it was supposed possible for human Nature to arrive. Yet, at the same time, by flattering Man with false and presumptuous Ideas of his own Power and Excellence, it tempted even the Best to Pride : a Vice not only dreadfully mischievous in human Society, but, perhaps of all others, the most insuperable Bar to real inward Improvement.

§. 3.

(a) *Sensibus ipsis judicari voluptates.* Cic. de Fin. L. II. By Pleasure the *Epicureans* sometimes explained themselves to mean, only Freedom from Uneasiness : but the Philosophers of other Sects in general, as well as *Cicero*, insist, producing their own Expressions for it, that they meant sensual Delights. This, indeed, was more explicitly the Doctrine of *Aristippus*, the Father of the *Cyrenaics* : a Sect, however, which sunk into the *Epicureans* ; whose Notions plainly led to the Dissoluteness so remarkable in the Lives of most of them.

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§. 3. *Epicletus* often mentions Three Topics, or Classes, under which the whole of Moral Philosophy is comprehended. These are, the *Desires* and *Aversions*, the *Pursuits* and *Avoidances*, or the Exercise of the active Powers, and the *Affents* of the Understanding.

§. 4. The *Desires* and *Aversions* were ορεξεις considered as simple Affections of the εμμελιστικ. Mind, arising from the Apprehension, that any thing was conducive to Happiness, or the contrary. The first Care of a Proficient in Philosophy was, to regulate these in such a manner, as never to be disappointed of the one, or incur the other: a Point no otherwise attainable, than by regarding all Externals as absolutely indifferent. *Good* must always be the Object of Desire, and *Evil* of Aversion. The Person then, who considers Life, Health, Ease, Friends, Reputation, &c. as *Good*; and their Contraries as *Evil*, must necessarily *desire* the one, and be *averse* to the other: and, consequently, must often find his *Desire* disappointed, and his *Aversion* incurred. The Stoics, therefore, restrained *Good* and *Evil* to *Virtue* and *Vice* alone: and excluded all Externals from any Share in human Happiness, which they made entirely dependent on a right Choice. From this Regulation of the *Desires* and *Aversions* follows that Freedom from Perturbation, Grief,

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Anger, Pity, &c. and in short, that universal Apathy, which they every-where strongly inculcate.

§. 5. The next Step to Stoical Perfection *Ἀφορμας*, was, the Class of *Pursuits* and *Avoidances* *ὀφθαί*

(b). As the *Desires* and *Aversions* are simple Affections, the *Pursuits* and *Avoidances* are Exertions of the active Powers towards the procuring or declining any thing. Under this Head was comprehended the whole System of moral Duties, according to their incomplete Ideas of them: and a due Regard to it was supposed to ensure a proper Behaviour in all the social Relations. The constant Performance of what these point out, naturally followed from a Regulation of the *Desires* and *Aversions* in the first Topic: for where the Inclinations are exerted and restrained as they ought, there will be nothing to mislead us in Action.

§. 6. The last Topic, and the Completion of the Stoic Character, was that of the *Assents* (c).

As

(b) The Stoics define these Terms: the one, a Motion, by which we are carried toward some Object; the other, a Motion, by which we strive to shun it. The original Words, by a Happiness in the Greek Language, are properly opposed to each other; which the *English* will not admit. I have chosen the best I could find, and wish they were better.

(c) It seems strange, that the Stoics generally put the *Assents* last: since both the Affections and Will should be governed.

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As the second was to produce a Security from Failure in Practice, *this* was to secure an Infallibility in Judgment, and to guard the Mind from ever either admitting a Falshood, or dissenting from Truth. A wise Man, in the Stoic Scheme, was never to be mistaken, or to form any Opinion. Where Evidence could not be obtained, he was to continue in Suspence. His Understanding was never to be misled, even in Sleep, or under the Influence of Wine, or in a Delirium. In this last Particular, however, there is not a perfect Agreement: and some Authors are so very reasonable, as to admit it possible for a Philosopher to be mistaken in his Judgment, after he hath lost his Senses (*d*).

§. 7.

governed by the Understanding; which, therefore, should be rectified, in order to do its Office well. *Epidetus* seems to be of this Opinion in B. I. c. 17. But, perhaps, they thought common Sense, or natural Logic, sufficient for this Purpose; and artificial Logic, which they meant, but did not express clearly, by the Word *Assents*, necessary as a Guard only against Sophistry. Yet their mentioning it, as a Guard also against being misled, when they were in Drink, and even in their Dreams, leaves but little Room for this Conjecture.

(*d*) Και μὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρυσίππος ἀποδίδηται, Κλεανθὴς δὲ ἀναποδίδηται· ὁ μὲν, ἀποδίδηται διὰ μεθῆναι καὶ μελαγχολίας· ὁ δὲ, ἀναποδίδηται, διὰ βέλους καταλαψῆς. DIOG. LAERT.
in ZENO.

• Nemo

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§. 7. The Subjects of these several *Παθησίων* Classes of philosophic Exercise are, the *Appearances* of Things (*e*). By these *Appearances* the Stoics understood the Impressions (*f*) made on the Soul, by any Objects, presented either to the Senses, or to the Understanding. Thus a House, an Estate, Life, Death, Pain, Reputation, &c. (considered in the View, under which they are presented to the preceptive Faculties) in the Stoical Sense are, *Appearances*. The Use of *Appearances* is common to Brutes, and Men: an *intelligent* Use of them belongs only to the latter: a Distinction, which is carefully to be observed in reading these Discourses.

§. 8. That Judgment, which is formed by the Mind concerning the *Appearances*, the Stoics termed *Principles*: and these Principles give a Determination to the Choice.

§. 9.

Nam si argumentaberis, sapientem multo vino inebriari, & retinere rectum tenorem, etiam si temulentus sit: licet colligas, nec veneno poto moriturum, &c. SEN. *Epist.* 83.

(*e*) The original Word is of peculiar Signification among the Stoics: and I wish it could have been rendered into *English*, in a manner less ambiguous, and more expressive of its Meaning. But the Stoic Language perished with the Stoic Sect: and scarcely any of its technical Terms can now be rendered intelligible, except by a Paraphrase, or a Definition.

(*f*) *Τυττωσις* ἢ ψυχῇ. DIOG. LAERT. L. VII. §. 45,

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§. 9. The *Choice*, among the Stoics, προαιρέσις
signified, either the Faculty of Will-
ing; or a deliberate Election made of some Ac-
tion, or Course of Life.

§. 10. As the Appearances respect
particular Objects, the *Pre-conceptions* προληψις
are general innate Notions, such as they sup-
posed to take original Possession of the Mind,
before it forms any of its own (*g*). To adapt
these *Pre-conceptions* to particular Cases, is the
Office of Reason: and is often insisted on by
Epietetus, as a Point of the highest Importance.

§. 11. By the Word, which throughout ευτυχία
this Translation is rendered *Prosperity*,
the Stoics understood the internal State of the
Mind, when the Affections and active Powers
were so regulated, that it considered all Events as
happy: and, consequently, must enjoy an unin-
terrupted Flow of Success: since nothing could
fall out contrary to its Wishes (*b*).

These, which have been mentioned, are the
technical Terms of the greatest Consequence in
the Stoic Philosophy: and which, for that Rea-
son,

(*g*) Επε. βιβ. ii. προληψις, νοοία φυσική των καθ' ἑαυτ.

DIOG. LAERT. L. VII. §. 54.

(*b*) I am sensible, that *Prosperity*, in common Use, re-
lates wholly to external Circumstances: but I could find no
better Word to express the internal good Condition of
the Mind, which the Stoics meant by *ευτυχία*. There is an
Instance of the like Use, 3 *John* ver. 2.

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son, are, except in a very few Places, always rendered by the same *English* Word, There are other Words used in a peculiar Sense by this Sect: but, as they are not of equal Importance, they are neither so strictly translated, nor need any particular Definition.

§. 12. The Stoics held Logic in the highest Esteem: and often carried it to such a trifling Degree of Subtilty, as rendered their Arguments very tedious and perplexed. The frequent References to logical Questions, and the Use of syllogistical Terms, are the least agreeable Part of the Discourses of *Epiſtetus*: since, however well they might be understood by some of his Hearers, they are now unintelligible to the greatest Part of his Readers. Indeed, with all his Strength and Clearness of Understanding, he seems to have been hurt by this favourite Science of his Sect. One is sometimes surpris'd to find his Reasoning incoherent and perplexed: and his Scholars rather silenced by Interrogatories, which they are unable to comprehend, than convinced by the Force of Truth; and then given up by him, as if they were hopeless and unteachable. Yet many a well-meaning Understanding may be lost in a Wood by the Confusion of dialectical Quibbles, which might have been led, without Difficulty, to the Point in view, if it had been suffered to follow the Track of common Sense.

§. 13.

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§. 13. The Stoic Scheme of Theology, as it is explained in *Cicero*, and other antient Writers, appears, in many Parts of it, strangely perplexed and absurd. Some however of this seeming Absurdity may possibly arise from the Use of strong Figures; and the infinite Difficulty of treating a Subject, for which no human Language can supply proper and adequate Terms (*i*). The Writings of the first Founders of the Stoic Philosophy, who treated expressly on Physiology and Metaphysics, are now lost: and all that can be known of their Doctrine is from Fragments, and the Accounts given of them by other Authors. By what can be collected from these, and particularly by the Account which *Diogenes Laertius* gives of the Stoics, they appear to have held, that there is one supreme God, incorruptible, unoriginated (*k*), immortal, rational, and perfect in Intelligence and Happiness: unsusceptible of all Evil: governing the World, and every thing in it, by his Providence: not however of the human Form; but the Creator of the Universe: the Father

(*i*) *Quicquid de Deo dixeris, quicquid tacitæ mentis cogitatione conceperis, in humanum transilit, et corrumpitur, sensum: nec habet propriæ significationis notam, quod nostris verbis dicitur, atque ad humana negotia compositis.*

ARNOB. *adv. Gentes*, L. III. p. 111. Ed. *Ludg. Bat.* 1651.

(*k*) Αφθαρτος και αινωτος. DIOG. LAERT. L. VII. §. 137.

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ther likewise of all (*l*): and that the several Names of *Apello*, *Minerva*, *Ceres*, &c. only denote different Exertions of his Power in the different Parts of the Universe (*m*). It would be well, if they had stopt here: but they plainly speak of the World, as God, or of God as the Soul of the World, which they call his Substance (*n*): and I do not recollect any Proof, that they believed Him to exist in the extramundane Space. Yet they held the World to be finite (*o*), and corruptible: and that, at certain Periods, it was to undergo successive Conflagrations, and then all Beings were to be resorbed into God, and again reproduced by Him (*p*). What they intended by being resorbed into God, as I do not comprehend, I will not attempt to explain: but I fear they understood by it, a Loss of separate personal Existence. Yet some of the later Stoics departed from

(*l*) Θεὸν ὅν πᾶσι Ζῶνι ἀθάνατον, λογικόν, τελείον, ἢ παρὸν ἐν ὕδασι πάντα, κακὸν πάντων ἀντικειμένον, προσηπτικῶν καὶ κακοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ· μὴ εἶναι μέντοι ἀνθρωπομορφόν· εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν δημιουργόν τῶν ὅλων, ὡς περὶ καὶ πατέρα πάντων. Ib. §. 147.

(*m*) Πολλὰι προσφωρίαι· προσσημαζέται κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις. Ib.

(*n*) Οὐσίαν δὲ Θεοῦ Ζῶντι μὲν φησὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὰς ἀρκάς. Ib. §. 148.

(*o*) Ὁ μὲν οὖν κόσμος· σπιπρασμένῳ· 171. Ib.

(*p*) Κατὰ χρόνῳ ποίας περιόδου ἀναλίσκων εἰς αὐτὸς αἰσῶν τῶν ὡσίων, καὶ πάλιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίνων. Ib. §. 137.

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from this Doctrine of the Conflagration, and supposed the World to be immortal (q). Indeed there is often so much Obscurity, and Appearance of Contradiction, in their Expressions, that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to form any precise Idea of their Meaning. They who, with Impartiality, read what the antient Philosophers, of all Sects, have written on the Nature of God, will often find Cause to think, with the utmost Veneration and Gratitude, on the only Book, in which this important Article is explained, so far as is necessary to be known, in a manner perfectly agreeable to the Principles of simple, unperverted Reason. For what it graciously teaches more than Reason could, it confirms by such Evidences of its Authority, as Reason must admit, or contradict itself.

§. 14. The Stoics sometimes define God to be an intelligent, fiery Spirit, without Form, but passing into whatever Things it pleases, and assimilating itself to all (r): sometimes active operative Fire (s). It might be hoped, that these were only metaphorical Phrases, if they did not expressly

(q) See PHILO JUDÆUS, of the Incorruptibility of the World, p. 947. Ed. Par.

(r) Θεός ἐστι πνεῦμα νοερόν καὶ πυρῶδες, οὐκ ἔχει μορφήν, μεταβάλλων δὲ εἰς αὐ βούλεται καὶ συνιξομοιούμενον πᾶσι. POSIDONIUS.

(s) Πῦρ τεχνικόν. PLUT. *de Platit. Philosoph.* L. I. c. 7.

expressly speak of God as corporeal; which is objected to them by *Plutarch* (1). Indeed they defined all Essence to be Body (u). An Error of which, probably, they did not discover the ill Tendency, any more than *Tertullian*; who inconsiderately followed them in this very unphilosophical Notion, that what is not Body, is nothing at all (w). His Christian Faith secures him from the Imputation of Impiety: and the just and becoming Manner, in which the Stoics, in many Instances, speak of God, should incline one to form the same favourable Judgment of them: and those Authors seem guilty of great Injustice, who represent them, as little better than Atheists.

§. 15. They held the Eternity of Matter, as a passive Principle; but that it was reduced into Form by God; and that the World was made, and is continually governed by Him (x). They sometimes

(1) Ουτοι τον Θεον, αρχην οντα, Σωμα νοιον, και νουν εν ὅλῃ ποιουντας, ου καθαρον, ουδε απλουν ουδε ασυνθετον, αλλα εξ ἑτερου, και δι' ἑτερου αποφαινουσι. PLUT. *de communibus notitiis adv. Stoicos*, p. 1085.

(u) Σωμα δι' εστι, κατ' αυτους, ἡ ουσια. DIOG. LAERT. L. VII. §. 150.

(w) *Adv. Praxeam*, c. 7. Yet, *De Anima*, c. 7. he says, Omne corporale passibile est; which he certainly did not think God was.

(x) Δοκει δ' αυτοις αρχας ειναι των ολων δυο, το ποιουν και το πασχον· το μιν ουν πασχον ειναι την απειρον ουσιαν, την ὕλην. Το δε ποιουν, τοι εν αυτη λογον, τον Θεον. DIOG. LAERT. L. VII. §. 134.

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sometimes represent him, as modelling the Constitution of the World with supreme Authority (*y*): at others, as limited by the Materials, which He had not the Power to change (*z*). *Epicætetus* may be thought to incline to this latter Opinion (*a*): yet his Words are capable of a different Turn. And there are, perhaps, more Arguments, in the Writings of the Stoics, to prove their Belief of the uncontrollable Power of the Deity in the Formation of Things, than those, which some unguarded Expressions appear to furnish against it.

§. 16. Of all the Philosophers the Stoics were the clearest and most zealous Assertors of a particular Providence (*b*): a Belief, which was treated with the utmost Contempt by the *Epicureans* (*c*). As this Principle is, of all others, the most conducive to the Interest of Virtue, and lays the Foundation

(*y*) Deus ista temperat, quæ circumfusa Rectorem sequuntur & Ducem. Potentius autem est quod facit, quod est Deus, quam materia patiens Dei. SEN. *Epist.* 65.

Nulli igitur est naturæ obediens, aut subiectus Deus. Omnem ergo regit ipse naturam. CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* L. II. §. 30. Ed. *Daw.*

(*z*) Non potest artifex mutare materiam. SEN. *de Provid.* c. 8.

(*a*) B. I. c. 1.

(*b*) Non universo Hominum Generi, solum, sed etiam singulis, &c. CIC. *de Nat. Deor.* L. III.

(*c*) Anus fatidica. Ib. L. I.

Foundation of all true Piety, the Stoics are intitled to the highest Honour for their steady Defence of it; and their utter Rejection of the idle, and contemptible Notion, of Chance (*d*).

§. 17. By *Fate* they seem to have understood a Series of Events, appointed by the immutable Counsels of God: or, that Law of his Providence, by which he governs the World (*e*). It is evident by their Writings, that they meant it in no Sense, which interferes with the Liberty of human Actions. *Cicero* allows, that *Chrysippus* endeavoured to reconcile Fate with Free Will: and that it was contrary to his Intention, that, by a perplexed Way of arguing, he confirmed the Doctrine of Necessity (*f*). Whenever they speak of God, as subject to *Fate*, which it must be owned they sometimes do in a very strong and unguarded manner, their Meaning seems to be, that his own eternal Will is his Law: that he cannot change; because

(*d*) Nec sine Ratione, quamvis subita, accidere. SEN. de Provid. c. 1.

(*e*) Δογμα, καὶ οὐ ἡ κοινὴ διαγγραφή. DIOG. LAERT. L. VII. §. 149.

(*f*) *Chrysippus*—Applicat se ad eos potius, qui necessitate motus Animos [Animorum. *Dav.*] liberatos volunt. Dum autem verbis utitur suis, delabatur in eas Difficultates, ut necessitatem Fati confirmet *invitus*. CIC. de Fato, §. 17. *Dav.* *Chrysippus* autem, cum & necessitatem improbaret, &c. §. 18.

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because He always ordains what is best (*g*): and that, as Fate is no more than a connected Series of Causes, God is the First Original Cause, on which all the rest depend (*b*).

§. 18. They imagined the whole Universe to be peopled with Gods, Genii, and Demons: and among other inferior Divinities reckoned the Sun, Moon, and Stars, which they conceived to be animated and intelligent; or inhabited by particular Deities, as the Body is by the Soul, who presided over them, and directed their Motions (*i*).

§. 19. The Stoics held both the above-mentioned Intelligences, and the Souls of Men, to be Portions of the Essence of God (*k*), or Parts of the Soul of the World (*l*): and to be corporeal (*m*), and perishable (*n*). Some of them indeed maintained, that human Souls subsisted after Death: but that they were, like all other Beings, to be consumed at the Conflagration. *Cleanthes* taught, that all Souls lasted till that Time: *Chrysippus*,

(*g*) SEN. *de Beneficiis*, L. VI. c. 23.

(*b*) Ib. L. IV. c. 7.

(*i*) CIC. *de Natura Deorum*, L. II. c. 15.

(*k*) EPIC. B. I. c. 14, &c.

(*l*) Ἡς μὲν καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς Ζωοῖς. DIOG. LAERT. L. VII. §. 156.

(*m*) Τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς καὶ Σώματος. Ib.

(*n*) Τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ θάνατον ἀκίμων, φθαρτὴ δ' ἐστίν. Ib.

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sippus, only those of the Good (*o*). *Seneca* is perpetually wavering: sometimes speaking of the Soul as immortal; and, at others, as perishing with the Body. And indeed there is nothing but Confusion, and a melancholy Uncertainty, to be met with among the Stoics, on this Subject.

§. 20. There is, I think, very little Evidence to be found, that they believed future Rewards or Punishments, compared with that which appears to the contrary (*p*): at least the Reader will observe, that *Epietetus* never asserts either. He strongly insists, that a bad Man hath no other Punishment, than being such; and a good Man, no other Reward (*q*): and he tells his Disciple, that, when Want of Necessaries obliges him to go out of Life, he returns to the Four Elements, of which he was made: that there is no *Hades*, nor *Acheron*, nor *Pyriphlegethon* (*r*): and he clearly affirms

(*o*) Κλεισθης πασας, επιδαμνουν φασι, μηχρ επιφυρωσις. Χρυσωπ. δι, τας των Σοφων μοιων. Ib. §. 197.

(*p*) *Lactantius*, indeed, L. VII. c. 7. says: *Esse inferos Zenon Stoicus docuit, & sedes piorum ab impiis esse discretas: & illos quidem quietas & delectabiles incolere Regiones; hos vero luere poenas in tenebrosis locis, atque in coeni voraginibus horrendis.* But I know not that any other Author relates this of him.

(*q*) See B. I. c. 12. p. 59. B. III. c. 7. p. 33. Id. c. 24. p. 116. B. IV. c. 9. §. 2, 3. Id. c. 10. §. 2. c. 12. §. 4.

(*r*) B. III. c. 13. p. 52.

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a

Providence,

(5) B. III. c. 24. p. 126.

(r) The only Passage, that I can recollect, in which any Intimation seems to be given of a future Reward, is in the XVth Chapter of the *Enchiridion*: and, probably, even there, he means only a Happiness to be enjoyed in the present Life, after due Improvement in Philosophy; though he expresses it by the very strong Figures of partaking the Feasts and Empire of the Gods. For, doubtless, the wise Man, like his Kindred Deities, feasted upon every Thing that happened; and, by willing as *Jupiter* did, reigned along with Him. Besides, *Epicetus* says there, of *Diogenes*, and *Heraclitus*, or *Hercules*, not that they *are*, but that they *were* divine Persons: which must refer to something which had ceased when he wrote; and, consequently, to their Felicity before, not after their Deaths. At least, he doth not intimate any thing concerning their second Life: and if that was to be short, as it might be (and it could not reach beyond the Conflagration), and was not very certain neither, the Hope of it would be a very insufficient Counterbalance to vehement Appetites and Passions.

(u) L. 4. §. 21. These Expressions, *diffused* and *kindled*, allude to the Stoic Doctrine, that Souls are Portions of the Deity, separated for a Time, and that His Essence is Fire.

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Providence, on the Hypothesis, that the Souls of the Good are extinguished by Death (*w*).

§. 21. The Stoics thought, that every single Person had a tutelary Genius assigned him by God, as a Guardian of his Soul, and a Superintendent of his Conduct (*x*): and that all Virtue and Happiness consist in acting in concert with this Genius, with Reference to the Will of the supreme Director of the whole (*y*). Sometimes, however, they make the Genius to be only the ruling Faculty of every one's own Mind (*z*).

§. 22. A very slight Examination of their Writings is sufficient to convince any impartial Reader how little the Doctrines of this Sect were fitted to influence the Generality of Mankind. But indeed, about the Generality of Mankind, the Stoics do not appear to have given themselves any kind

(*w*) L. 12. §. 5.

(*x*) Είναι τινες δαίμονες ἀνθρώπων συμπάσιαν ἐχούτας, σκοπούτας τῶν ἀνθρώπων πραγμάτων. *DIOG. LAERT. L. VII. §. 151.*

*Scit Genius, natalē comes qui temperat Astrum,
Naturæ Deus humanæ, mortalis in unum*

Quodcumque caput. HOR. L. I. Ep. II. v. 186, &c.

See Epict. B. I. c. 14. p. 46.

(*y*) Είναι δ' αὐτο τοῦτο τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν ευροίαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν Συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ' ἡμῶν δαίμονος, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ οὐλοῦ Διοικητοῦ βούλησιν. *DIOG. LAERT. L. VII. §. 88.*

(*z*) See *M. Antoninus, L. II. c. 13, 17. L. III. c. 3, 5. L. V. c. 27.*

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kind of Trouble. They seemed to consider All (except the few, who were Students in the Intricacies of a philosophic System) as very little superior to Beasts: and, with great Tranquillity, left them to follow the Devices of their own ungoverned Appetites and Passions. How unlike was this to the diffusive Benevolence of the Divine Author of the Christian Religion, who adapted his Discourses to the Comprehension, and extended the Means of Happiness, to the Attainment of all Mankind!

§ 23. There seem to be only two Methods, by which the present Appearances of Things are capable of being reconciled to our Ideas of the Justice, Wisdom, and Goodness of God: the one is the Doctrine of a *future* State; the other, the Posuion, that Virtue alone is sufficient to human Happiness in *this* (a). The first, which was the Method chosen by *Socrates*, solves every Difficulty, without contradicting either Sense or Reason:

a 2

son :

(a) Condonanda tamen sententia, Stoice, vestra est.

Nam si post obitum, neque præmia sint, neque poenæ,
Heu, quo perventum est! Heu, quid jam denique restat!
Scilicet humanas gerit aut Res numen inique,
Aut nil curat iners, aut, si bene temperat orbem,
Nemo bonus miser est, nemo improbus esse beatus
In vita possit, Gens ut sibi Stoica fingit.

J. HAWKINS BROWNE.

I have a singular Pleasure in quoting these Lines, from a Poem, which does Honour to our Country.

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son : the latter, which was unfortunately maintained by the Stoics, is repugnant to both.

§. 24. That there is an intrinsic Beauty and Excellency in moral Goodness ; that it is the Ornament and Perfection of all rational Beings ; and that, till Conscience is stifled by repeated Guilt, we feel an Obligation to prefer and follow, so far as we perceive it, in all Cases ; and find an inward Satisfaction, and generally receive outward Advantages from so doing, are Positions, which no thinking Person can contradict : but it doth not follow from hence, that in such a Mixture, as Mankind, it is its own sufficient Reward. God alone, infinitely perfect, is happy in, and from Himself. The Virtue of *finite* Beings must be defective : and the Happiness of *created* Beings must be dependent. It is undeniable Fact, that the natural Consequences of Virtue in some, may be interrupted by the Vices of others. How much are the best Persons liable to suffer from the Follies of the Unthinking ; from the Ill-nature, the Rage, the Scorn of the Malevolent ; from the cold and the penurious Hard-heartedness of the Unfeeling ; from Persecutions, for the sake both of Religion and Honesty ; from ill Returns to conjugal, to paternal, to friendly Affection ; and from an innumerable Train of other Evils, to which the most amiable Dispositions, are usually the most sensible. It is no less undeniable,

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niable, that the natural Consequences of Virtue are interrupted by the Struggles of our own Passions; (which we may overcome rewardably, though very imperfectly; or, if we live to overcome more perfectly, we may not live to enjoy the Victory;) by Sickness, Pain, Languor, Want; and by what we feel from the Death; or the Sufferings of those, with whom we are most nearly connected. We are often indeed afflicted by many of these Things, more than we ought to be. But Concern for some, at least our own Failings, for Instance, is directly a Duty; for others, it is visibly the Instrument of moral Improvement; for more still, it is the unavoidable Result of our Frame: and they who carry it too far, may, on the whole, be good Characters; and even they who do not, in any considerable Degree, may however be extremely wretched. How then can Virtue be its own Reward to Mankind in general, or indeed a proportionable Reward to almost any Man? Or how, unless the View be extended beyond such a Scene of Things, the certain Means of Happiness? The originally *appointed* Means of Happiness it undoubtedly is: but that it should be an effectual and infallible Means to Creatures so imperfect, passing through such a disordered World, is impossible, without a State of future Reward; and of this the Gospel alone gives us full Assurance.

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§. 25. By rejecting the Doctrine of Recompences in another Life, the Stoics were reduced to the Extravagance of supposing Felicity to be enjoyed in Circumstances, which are incapable of it. That a good Man stretched on a Rack, or reposing on a Bed of Roses, should enjoy himself equally, was a Notion which could gain but few Profelytes : and a sad Experience, that Pain was an Evil, sometimes drove their own Disciples from the thorny Asperities of the Portico, to the flowery Gardens of *Epicurus*.

§. 26. The absolute Indifference of all Externals, and the Position, That Things independent on Choice are nothing to us, the grand Point on which their Arguments turned, every one, who feels, knows to be false: and the Practice of the Wisest and Best among them, proved it in Fact to be so. It is remarkable, that no Sect of Philosophers ever so dogmatically prescribed, or so frequently committed, Suicide, as those very Stoics, who taught that the Pains and Sufferings, which they strove to end by this Act of Rebellion against the Decrees of Providence, were no Evils. How absolutely this horrid Practice contradicted all their noble Precepts of Resignation and Submission to the Divine Will, is too evident to need any Enlargement. They professed indeed in Suicide to follow the divine Will: but this was
a lamen-

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a lamentably weak Pretence. Even supposing Sufferings to be Evils, they are no Proof of a Signal from God to abandon Life ; but to show an exemplary Patience, which he will Reward : but, supposing them, as the Stoics did, not to be Evils, they afford not so much as the Shadow of a Proof.

§. 27. As the Stoics by the Permission of Suicide, plainly implied, that external Inconveniencies were not indifferent in the Extremity ; it follows, that they must proportionably be allowed not to be indifferent in the inferior Degrees : of which *Zeno* seemed to be perfectly well convinced by hanging himself when his Finger ached. And where was the Use of taking so much Pains to say, and believe what they knew to be false ? It might, perhaps, be thought to be of some Benefit, in the Time of the later Stoics, to the great Men of *Rome*, whom the Emperors frequently butchered at their Pleasure : and this is the Use, to which *Epictetus* is perpetually applying it. Yet, even in this Case, the Stoic Doctrine, where Men could bring themselves to act upon it, made them absurdly rough, as appears by the History of *Helvidius Priscus* : and hindered the Good, they might otherwise have done. And, if a Man, taught thus to despise Tortures and Death, should happen at the same time to be wrong-headed, for which he had no small Chance, he would, in one Respect, be a more terrible wild Beast, than

an Enthusiast of any other Sect; as he would not think his Sufferings Evils: though in another he would be less so, as he would not hope to be rewarded for them hereafter.

§. 28. The Stoics are frequently, and justly, charged with great Arrogance in their Discourses, and even in their Addresses to God. They assert however the Doctrine of Grace, and the Duty of Praise and Thanksgiving for the divine Assistance in moral Improvements (*b*). But there doth not, I think, appear any Instance of a Stoic, or perhaps any other Heathen Philosopher, addressing his Repentance to God, and begging Pardon for his Failings, or directing his Disciples to do it. Indeed nothing can excuse their Idolatry of human Nature: which they proudly, and inconsistently supposed perfect and self-sufficient. *Seneca* carried the Matter so far, as by an impious Antithesis, to give his wife Man the Superiority to God (*c*). *Epicletus* indeed was attentive enough to the Voice of Conscience to own himself not perfect (*d*): and he sometimes tells his Hearers, that they cannot

(*b*) B. II. c. 18. §. 3, 4. B. III. c. 21. p. 72, 186, 187. See likewise *M. Antoninus*, L. I. §. 17. L. IX. §. 4. L. XII. §. 14.

(*c*) Est aliquid, quo sapiens antecedit Deum. Ille naturæ beneficio, non suo, sapiens est: ecce res magna, habere inæbilitatem hominis, securitatem Dei. SEN. *Epist.* 53.

(*d*) B. IV. c. 1. §. 17. B. IV. c. 8. p. 230.

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cannot be perfect yet (e). But even He at other times informs them, that they are not inferior to the Gods (f). The Stoical Boasting will, however, imply less of personal Arrogance, if we can suppose, that those Speeches, which so ill become human Imperfection, were always uttered, as perhaps in part they often were, in the Character of their Idol, the perfectly wise and good Man, which they owned to be merely an ideal Being (g). At least, it may be affirmed with Truth, that they frequently mention themselves with Decency and Humility, and with an express Confession of their Deviation from this faultless Exemplar.

§. 29. But then where was the Use of their favourite Doctrine, that a wise Man must always be happy? Might not a Person, determined to follow his own Inclinations, very reasonably object, “What is that to me, if I am not, or to
“any body else, if no one ever was, a *wise Man*?
“But, suppose I were one; which is the better
“grounded Argument? *You must always be happy, and therefore Externals are no Evils: or,*
“*These Things are Evils, and therefore I am not*
“*happy.*—But *Epicætetus* will say, You have a
a 5 Remedy:

, (e) B. I. c. 15. p. 67. B. IV. c. 12. §. 4.

(f) B. I. c. 12. p. 60.

(g) Quis sapiens sit, aut fuerit, nec ipsos Stoicos solent dicere. CIC. *Acad.* L. IV.

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“ Remedy: the Door is open; go, with great
 “ good Humour and Thankfulness, and hang
 “ yourself: and there will be an End of your
 “ Pain and you together.—A fine Scheme of
 “ Happiness indeed! and much to be thankful
 “ for! Why, is it not the shorter and merrier
 “ Way, instead of studying this crabbed Philoso-
 “ phy, to indulge myself, in whatever I like, as
 “ long as I can, (it may chance to be a good
 “ while) and hang myself thankfully, when I
 “ feel Inconveniencies from that? The Door is
 “ just as open in one Case, as in the other; and
 “ nothing beyond it, either pleasing or terrible
 “ in either.”—Such, alas! is the Conclusion
 too commonly drawn; and such must be the
 Consequence of every Doctrine, not built upon
 solid Foundations.

§. 30. *Epicætetus* often lays it down as a Maxim,
 that it is impossible for one Person to be in Fault,
 and another to be the Sufferer. This, on the
 Supposition of a future State, will certainly be
 made true at last; but in the Stoical Sense, and
 System, is an absolute Extravagance. Take any
 Person of plain Understanding, with all the Feel-
 ings of Humanity about him, and see whether
 the subtlest Stoic will ever be able to convince
 him, that while he is insulted, oppressed, and tor-
 tured, he doth not *suffer*. See what Comfort it
 will

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will afford him, to be told, that, if he supports his Afflictions and ill Treatment with Fortitude and Patience, Death will set him free, and then he and his Persecutor will be equally rewarded; will equally lose all personal Existence, and return to the Elements. How different are the Consolations proposed by Christianity, which not only assures its Disciples, that they shall *rest from their Labours in Death*, but that *their Works shall follow them*; and, by allowing them to *rejoice in Hope*, teaches them the most effectual Way of becoming *patient in Tribulation*.

§. 31. The Stoical Doctrine, that human Souls are literally Parts of the Deity, was equally shocking, and hurtful: as it supposed Portions of his Being to be wicked and miserable; and, by debasing Mens Ideas of the divine Dignity, and teaching them to think themselves essentially as good as He, nourished in their Minds an irreligious and fatal Presumption. Far differently the Christian System, represents Mankind, not as a Part of the Essence, but a Work of the Hand of God: as created in a State of improveable Virtue and Happiness: Fallen, by an Abuse of Free Will, into Sin, Misery, and Weakness (*b*); but redeemed from them by an Almighty Saviour; furnished with additional Knowledge and Strength;

a 6

commanded

(*b*)—Cito nequitia subrepat: virtus difficilis inventu est, rectorem, ducemque desiderat. Etiam sine magistro vitia discuntur. SEN. *Natural. Quest.* L. III. c. 30.

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commanded to use their best Endeavours ; made sensible, at the same time, how wretchedly defective they are ; yet assured of endless Felicity on a due Exertion of them. The Stoic Philosophy insults human Nature, and discourages all our Attempts, by enjoining and promising a Perfection in this Life, of which we feel ourselves incapable. The Christian Religion shows Compassion to our Weakness, by prescribing to us only the practicable Task of aiming continually at further Improvements : and animates our Endeavours, by the Promise of a divine Aid, equal to every Trial.

§. 32. Specifying thus the Errors and Defects of so celebrated a System, is an unpleasing Employment : but in an Age, fond of preferring the Guesses of human Sagacity before the unerring Declarations of God, it seemed on this Occasion necessary to observe, that the Christian Morality is agreeable to Reason and Nature : that of the Stoics, for the most part, founded on Notions, intelligible to few ; and which none could admit, without Contradiction to their own Hearts. They reasoned, many times, admirably well, but from false Principles : and the noblest of their practical Precepts, being built on a sandy Basis, lay at the Mercy of every strong Temptation.

§. 33. Stoicism is indeed, in many Points inferior to the Doctrine of *Socrates* : which did not teach,

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teach, that all Externals were indifferent : which did teach a future State of Recompence ; and, agreeably to that, forbid Suicide. It doth not belong to the present Subject to show, how much even this best System is excelled by Christianity. It is sufficient just to observe, that the Author of it died in a Profession, which he had always made, of his Belief in the popular Deities, whose Superstitions, and impure Worship was the great Source of Corruption in the Heathen World : and the last Words he uttered, were a Direction to his Friend, for the Performance of an idolatrous Ceremony. This melancholy Instance of Ignorance and Error, in the most illustrious Character for Wisdom and Virtue, in all Heathen Antiquity, is not mentioned as a Reflection on his Memory, but as a Proof of human Weakness in general. . Whether Reason could have discovered the great Truths, which in these Days are ascribed to it, because now seen so clearly by the Light of the Gospel, may be a *Question* ; but that it never did, is an undeniable *Fact* : and that is enough to teach us Thankfulness for the Blessing of a better Information. *Socrates*, who had, of all Mankind, the fairest Pretensions to set up for an Instructor and Reformer of the World, confessed, that he knew nothing, referred to Tradition, and acknowledged the Want of a superior Guide : and there is a remarkable Passage in *Epic-
tetus*,

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task, in which he represents it, as the Office of his supreme God, or of One deputed by him, to appear among Mankind, as a Teacher and Example (g).

§. 34. Upon the whole, the several Sects of Heathen Philosophy serve, as so many striking Instances of the Imperfection of human Wisdom; and of the extreme Need of a divine Assistance, to rectify the Mistakes of depraved Reason, and to replace natural Religion on its true Foundation. The Stoics every-where testify the noblest Zeal for Virtue, and the Honour of God: but they attempted to establish them on Principles, inconsistent with the Nature of Man, and contradictory to Truth and Experience. By a direct Consequence of these Principles, they were liable to be seduced, and in Fact, often were seduced into Pride, Hard-heartedness, and the last dreadful Extremity of human Guilt, Self-murder.

§. 35. But however indefensible the Philosophy of the Stoics in several Instances may be, it appears to have been of very important Use, in the Heathen World: and they are, on many Accounts, to be considered in a very respectable Light. Their Doctrine of Evidence and fixed Principles, was an excellent Preservative from the Mischiefs, that might have arisen from the Scepticism of the Academics and Pyrrhonists, if un-

opposed:

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opposed : and their zealous Defence of a particular Providence, a valuable Antidote to the atheistical Scheme of *Epicurus*. To this may be added, that their strict Notions of Virtue in most Points, (for they sadly failed in some) and the Lives of several among them, must contribute a good deal to preserve luxurious States from an absolutely universal Dissoluteness ; and the Subjects of arbitrary Government, from a wretched and contemptible Pusillanimity.

§. 36. Even now, their Compositions may be read with great Advantage, as containing excellent Rules of Self-government, and of social Behaviour ; of a noble Reliance on the Aid and Protection of Heaven, and of a perfect Resignation and Submission to the divine Will : Points, which are treated with great Clearness, and with admirable Spirit, in the Lessons of the Stoics ; and though their Directions are seldom practicable on their Principles, in trying Cases, may be rendered highly useful in Subordination to Christian Reflections.

§. 37. If, among those, who are so unhappy as to remain unconvinced of the Truth of Christianity, any are prejudiced against it by the Influence of unwarrantable Inclinations : such Persons will find very little Advantage in rejecting the Doctrines of the New Testament for those of the *Pertico* ; unless they think it an Advantage to be
laid

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laid under moral Restraints, almost equal to those of the Gospel, while they are deprived of its Encouragements and Supports. Deviations from the Rules of Sobriety, Justice and Piety, meet with small Indulgence in the Stoic Writings: and they, who profess to admire *Epictetus*, unless they pursue that severely virtuous Conduct which he everywhere prescribes, will find themselves treated by him, with the utmost Degree of Scorn and Contempt. An immoral Character is indeed, more or less, the Out-cast of all Sects of Philosophy: and *Seneca* quotes even *Epicurus*, to prove the universal Obligation of a virtuous Life (*b*). Of this great Truth, *God never left himself without Witness*. Persons of distinguished Talents and Opportunities seem to have been raised, from time to time, by Providence, to check the Torrent of Corruption, and to preserve the Sense of moral Obligations on the Minds of the Multitude, to whom the various Occupations of Life left but little Leisure to form Deductions of their own. But then they wanted a proper Commission to enforce their Precepts: they intermixed with them

(*b*) Eo libentius Epicuri egregia dicta commemoro, ut istis, qui ad illa confugient, spe mala inducti, qua velamentum seipso suorum vitiorum habituros existimant, probem, quocunque ierint, honeste esse vivendum. SEN. *Epist.*

21. It was hard indeed to reconcile this with some of his other Doctrines.

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them through false Reasoning, many gross Mistakes; and their unavoidable Ignorance, in several important Points, entangled them with Doubts, which easily degenerated into pernicious Errors.

§. 38. If there are others, who reject Christianity, from Motives of Dislike to its peculiar Doctrines: they will scarcely fail of entertaining more favourable Impressions of it, if they can be prevailed on, with Impartiality, to compare the holy Scriptures, from whence alone the Christian Religion is to be learned, with the Stoic Writings; and then fairly to consider, whether there is any thing to be met with in the Discourses of our blessed Saviour, in the Writings of his Apostles, or even in the obscurest Parts of the prophetic Books, by which, equitably interpreted, either their Senses, or their Reason are contradicted, as they are by the Paradoxes of these Philosophers: and if not, whether Notices from above, of Things, in which, though we comprehend them but imperfectly, we are possibly much more interested, than at present we discern, ought not to be received with implicit Veneration; as useful Exercises and Trials of that Duty, which finite Understandings owe to infinite Wisdom.

§. 39. Antiquity furnishes but very few Particulars of the Life of *Epictetus*. He was born at *Hierapolis*, a City of *Phrygia*: but of what Parents, is unknown: as well as by what Means he

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he came to *Rome*, where he was the Slave of *Epaphroditus*, one of *Nero's* Courtiers (*i*). It is reported, that when his Master once put his Leg to the Torture, *Epictetus*, with great Composure, and even smiling, observed to him; "You will certainly break my Leg:" which accordingly happened; and he continued, in the same Tone of Voice—"Did not I tell you, that you would break it (*k*)?" This Accident might, perhaps, be the Occasion of his Lameness: which, however, some Authors say he had from his early Years (*l*); and others attribute to the Rheumatism (*m*). At what Time he obtained his Liberty doth not appear. When the Philosophers, by a Decree of *Domitian*, were banished from *Rome*, *Epictetus* retired to *Nicopolis* (*n*), a City of *Epirus*, where he taught Philosophy; from which he doth not seem to have derived any external Advantages, as he is universally said to have been extremely poor. At least, he was so when he lived at *Rome*: where his whole Furniture consisted of a Bed (*o*), a Pipkin, and an Earthen Lamp (*p*); which last was purchased for about a hundred Pounds after his

(*i*) SUIDAS in VOC.

(*k*) ORIG. contra CELS. L. VII. §. 53.

(*l*) SUIDAS in VOC.

(*m*) SIMPLIC. Com. p. 102.

(*n*) A. GELL. L. XV. c. 11.

(*o*) SIMPLIC. Com. p. 102.

(*p*) Id. Ib.

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his Death, by a Person whom *Lucian* ridicules for it, as hoping to acquire the Wisdom of *Epicætetus* by studying over it. His only Attendant was a Woman, whom he took in his advanced Years, to nurse a Child, whom, otherwise, one of his Friends would have exposed to perish (q): an amiable Proof of the poor old Man's Good-nature, and Disapprobation, it is to be hoped, of that shocking, yet common Instance of Heathen Blindness and Barbarity.

In this extreme Poverty, a Cripple, unattended, and destitute of almost every Convenience of Life, *Epicætetus* was not only obliged by the Rules of his Philosophy to think himself happy, but actually did so, according to the Distich of which *Aulus Gellius* affirms him to have been the Author (r).

*A Slave, in Body maim'd, as Irus (s) poor;
Yet to the Gods was Epicætetus dear.*

He is said to have returned to *Rome* in the Reign of *Adrian*, and to have been treated by him with a high Degree of Familiarity (t). If this be true, he lived to a great Age. But that he should continue alive, to the Time of *M. Antoninus*, as
Themistius

(q) SIMPLIC. Com. p. 272.

(r) A. GELLIUS, L. II. c. 18.

(s) The Name of a Beggar in *Homer*.

(t) ÆLII. Spart. ADRIAN. c. 17.

xxxvi INTRODUCTION.

Themistius (*u*), and *Suidas* (*w*) affirm, is utterly improbable (*x*), as the learned *Fabricius* observes; to whose Life of *Epictetus* (*y*) I am greatly indebted. When, or where, he died, is, I think, nowhere mentioned. All Authors agree in bearing Testimony to the unblemished Conduct of his Life, and the Usefulness of his Instructions. The last-named Emperor expresses much Obligation to a Friend, who had communicated his Works to him (*z*): and in another Place, he ranks him, not only with *Chrysippus*, but with *Socrates* (*a*). *A. Gellius* calls him the greatest of the Stoics (*b*): *Origen* affirms, that his Writings had done more Good than *Plato's* (*c*): And *Simplicius* says, perhaps by way of indirect Opposition to an infinitely better Book, that he who is not influenced by them, is reclaimable by nothing but the Chastisements of another World (*d*). In what manner he instructed his Pupils, will be seen in the following Treatise.

§. 40.

(*u*) Orat. Conf. ad. *Jovian.* Imp.(*w*) In Voc.(*x*) The Reign of *Nero* began A. D. 54. of *Adrian*, 117. of *M. Antoninus*, 161.(*y*) *Bibl. Gr.* Vol. III. p. 257.(*z*) L. I. §. 7.(*a*) L. VII. §. 19.(*b*) *Noct. Att.* L. I. c. 2.(*c*) *Contra Cels.* L. VI. §. 2.(*d*) *Com.* p. 2.

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§. 40. There are so many of the Sentiments and Expressions of Christianity in it, that one should be strongly tempted to think, that *Epicletus* was acquainted with the New Testament, if such a Supposition was not highly injurious to his Character. To have known the Contents of that Book, and not to have been led by them into an Enquiry, which must have convinced him of their Truth, would argue such an Obstinacy of Prejudice, as one would not willingly impute to a Mind, which appears so well disposed. And, even passing over this Consideration, to have borrowed so much from Christianity as he seems to have done, without making the least Acknowledgement from whence he received it, would be an Instance of Disingenuity, utterly unworthy of an honest Man, and inconsistent with his Practice in other Respects: for he often quotes, with great Applause, the Sentences of many Writers, not of his own Sect. Possibly indeed he might, like the other Heathens in general, have a peculiar Contempt of, and Aversion to, Christian Authors, as akin to the *Jews*, and Opposers of the established Worship, notwithstanding those Parts of them, which he must approve. But still I hope, his Conformity with the sacred Writings may be accounted for, without supposing him acquainted with Christianity, as such. The great Number of its Professors, dispersed through the *Roman Empire*,

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pire, had probably introduced several of the New Testament Phrases into the popular Language : and the Christian Religion might by that Time have diffused some Degree of general Illumination ; of which many might receive the Benefit, who were ignorant of the Source from whence it proceeded : and *Epiſtetus* I apprehend to have been of this Number. Several striking Instances of this Reſemblance between him and the New Testament, have been obſerved in the Notes ; and the attentive Reader will find many, which are not mentioned ; and may perceive from them, either that the Stoics admired the Chriſtian Language, however they came to the Knowledge of it ; or that treating a Subject practically, and with a Feeling of its Force, leads Men to ſuch ſtrong Expreſſions, as we find in Scripture, and ſhould find oftener in the Philoſophers, if they had been more in earneſt : but however, they occur frequently enough to vindicate thoſe, in which the Scriptures abound, from the Contempt and Ridicule of light Minds.

§. 41. *Arrian*, the Diſciple of *Epiſtetus*, to whom we are obliged for theſe Diſcourſes, was a *Greek* by Birth, but a Senator and Conſul of *Rome* ; and an able Commander in War (*m*). He imitated *Xenophon*, both in his Life and Writings ; and particularly, in delivering to Poſterity the Converſations

(*m*) *FABRICII Bibl. Gr.* Vol. III. L. IV. c. 8. p. 269, &c.

INTRODUCTION. xxxix

one of his Master. There were originally Twenty Books of them, besides the *Enchiridion*, which seems to be taken out of them, and an Account of his Life and Death. Very little Order or Method is to be found in them, or was from the Nature of them to be expected. The Connexion is often scarcely discoverable: a Reference to particular Incidents, long since forgotten, at the same time that it evidences their Genuineness, often renders them obscure in some Places; and the great Corruption of the Text, in others. Yet, under all these Disadvantages, this immethodical Collection is perhaps one of the most valuable Remains of Antiquity; and they, who consult it with any Degree of Attention, can scarcely fail of receiving Improvement. Indeed it is hardly possible to be inattentive to so awakening a Speaker as *Epicetus*. There is such a Warmth and Spirit in his Exhortations; and his good Sense is enlivened by such a Keeness of Wit, and Gaiety of Humour, as render the Study of him, a most delightful as well as profitable Entertainment.

§. 42. For this Reason it was judged proper, that a Translation of him should be undertaken; there being none, I believe, but of the *Enchiridion*, in any modern Language, excepting a pretty good *French* one, published about a hundred and fifty Years ago, and so extremely scarce, that I was unable to procure it, till Mr. *Harris* obligingly lent it
me,

me, after I had published the Proposals for printing this : which, notwithstanding the Assistance given me in the Prosecution of it, hath still, I am sensible, great Faults. But they, who will see them the most clearly, will be the readiest to excuse, as they will know best the Difficulty of avoiding them. There is one Circumstance, which, I am apprehensive, must be particularly striking, and possibly shocking to many, the frequent Use of some Words in an unpopular Sense : an Inconvenience, which, however, I flatter myself, the Introduction and Notes will, in some Degree, remove. In the Translation of technical Terms, if the same *Greek* Word had not always been rendered in the same manner, at least, when the Propriety of our Language will at all permit it, every new Expression would have been apt to raise a new Idea. The Reader, I hope, will pardon, if not approve, the Uncouthness, in many Places, of a Translation pretty strictly literal : as it seemed necessary, upon the whole, to preserve the original Spirit, the peculiar Turn and characteristic Roughness of the Author. For else, taking greater Liberties would have spared me no small Pains.

I have been much indebted to Mr. *Upton's* Edition : by which, many Passages, unintelligible before, are cleared up. His Emendations have often assisted me in the Text ; and his References furnished me with Materials for the Historical Notes.



A R R I A N

T O

L U C I U S G E L L I U S

Wisheth all Happiness.

Neither composed the Discourses of *Epictetus* in such a manner, as Things of this Nature are commonly composed: nor did I myself produce them to public View, any more than I composed them. But whatever Sentiments I heard from his own Mouth, the very same I endeavoured to set down in the very same Words, as far as possible, and preserve as Memorials for my own Use, of his Manner of Thinking, and Freedom of Speech.

These Discourses are such as one Person would naturally deliver from his own Thoughts, *extempore*, to another; not such as he would prepare to be read by Numbers afterwards. Yet, notwithstanding this, I cannot tell how, without

either my Consent or Knowledge, they have fallen into the Hands of the Public. But it is of little Consequence to me, if I do not appear an able Writer : and of none to *Epicletus*, if any one treats his Discourses (a) with Contempt ; since it was very evident, even when he uttered them, that he aimed at nothing more than to excite his Hearers to Virtue. If they produce that one Effect, they have in them what, I think, philosophical Discourses ought to have. And should they fail of it, let the Readers, however, be assured, that when *Epicletus* himself pronounced them, his Audience could not help being affected in the very Manner he intended they should. If by themselves they have less Efficacy, perhaps it is my Fault, or perhaps it is unavoidable.

Farewel.

(a) He means the Composition, not the Subject-matter of them.



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O N

SEVERAL OCCASIONS.





THE
DISCOURSES
OF
EPICTETUS.



BOOK I.



CHAP. I.

*Of the Things which are, and of those which are not,
in our own Power.*

§. 1.



F other Faculties, you will
find no one that contemp-
lates, or consequently ap-
proves or disapproves, itself.
How far does the contempla-

tive Power of Grammar extend?

As far as the Judging of Language.

Of Music?

As far as Judging of Melody.

B

Does

Does either of them contemplate itself, then?

By no means.

Thus, for Instance, when you are to write to your Friend, Grammar will tell you what to write: but whether you are to write to your Friend at all, or no, Grammar will not tell you. Thus Music, with regard to Tunes: but whether it be proper or improper, at any particular Time, to sing or play, Music will not tell you.

What will tell, then?

That which contemplates both itself and all other Things.

And what is that?

The *reasoning Faculty*: for that alone is found to consider both itself, its Powers, its Value, and likewise all the rest. For what is it else that says, Gold is beautiful? (for the Gold itself does not speak) Evidently that Faculty, which judges of the Appearances of Things (*a*). What else distinguishes Music, Grammar, the other Faculties, proves their Uses, and shows their proper Occasions?

Nothing but this.

§. 2. As it was fit then, this most excellent and superior Faculty alone, a right Use of the Appearances of Things, the Gods have placed in our own Power; but all other Matters, not in our Power. Was it because they would not? I rather

(*a*) See Introduction, §. 7.

ther think, that if they could, they had granted us these too : but they certainly could not. For, placed upon Earth, and confined to such a Body, and to such Companions, how was it possible that, in these Respects, we should not be hindered by Things without us ?

§. 3. But what says *Jupiter* ? “ O *Epicteetus*,
 “ if it were possible, I had made this little Body
 “ and Property of thine free, and not liable to
 “ Hindrance. But now do not mistake : it is
 “ not thy own, but only a finer Mixture of Clay
 “ (b). Since, then, I could not (c) give thee this,
 “ I have given thee a certain Portion of myself :
 “ this Faculty of exerting the Powers of Pursuit
 “ and Avoidance (d), of Desire and Aversion,
 “ and, in a Word, the Use of the Appearances
 “ of Things. Taking Care of this Point, and
 “ making what is thy own to consist in this, thou
 “ wilt never be restrained, never be hindered ;
 “ thou wilt not groan, wilt not complain, wilt not
 “ flatter any one. How then ! Do all these Ad-
 B 2 “ vantages

(b) The Sacred Writers also mention Man as made of Clay, *Gen.* ii. 7. *Job* x. 9. xxxiii. 6. Η συ λαβων γην πηλον, επλασας ζωον, xxxviii. 14.

(c) One would hope, from the Context, that *Epicteetus* is here speaking only of a moral, not a natural Impossibility ; an Impossibility arising merely from the present Constitution of Things. See Introduction, §. 17. See likewise B. II. chap. v. §. 5.

(d) See Introduction, §. 5.

“vantages seem small to thee? Heaven forbid!

“Let them suffice thee then, and thank the Gods.”

§. 4. But now, when it is in our Power to take Care of *one* Thing, and to apply to *one*, we chuse rather to take Care of *many*, and to incumber ourselves with *many*; Body, Property, Brother, Friend, Child, and Slave; and, by this Multiplicity of Incumbrances, we are burdened and weighed down. Thus, when the Weather doth not happen to be fair for sailing, we sit screwing ourselves, and perpetually looking out.—Which Way is the Wind?—North.—What have we to do with’ that?—When will the West blow?—When itself, Friend, or *Æolus* pleases; for *Jupiter* has not made *You* Dispenser of the Winds, but *Æolus*.

§. 5. What then is to be done?

To make the best of what is in our Power, and take the rest as it naturally happens.

And how is that?

As it pleases God.

What, then, must *I* be the only one to lose my Head?

Why, would you have all the World, then, lose their Heads for your Consolation? Why are not you willing to stretch out your Neck, like *Lateranus* (e), when he was commanded by *Nero*

to
(e) *Plautius Lateranus*, a Consul elect, was put to Death by the Command of *Nero*, for being privy to the Conspiracy

to be beheaded? For, shrinking a little, after receiving a weak Blow, he stretched it out again: And before this, when *Epaphroditus* (f), the Freedman of *Nero*, interrogated him about the Conspiracy; “If I have a Mind to say any thing,” replied he, I will tell it to your Master.”

§. 6. What then should we have at hand upon such Occasions? Why what else but—what is *mine*, and what not *mine*; what is permitted me, and what not.—I must die: and must I die *groaning* too?—Be fettered. Must it be *lamenting* too?—Exiled. And what hinders me, then, but that I may go smiling, and chearful, and serene?—“Betray a secret”—I will not betray it; for this is in my own Power.—“Then I will fetter you.”—What do you say, Man? Fetter *me*? You will fetter my *Leg*; but not *Jupiter* himself can

B 3

get

Conspiracy of *Piso*. His Execution was so sudden, that he was not permitted to take Leave of his Wife and Children; but was hurried into a Place appropriated to the Punishment of Slaves, and there killed by the Hand of the Tribune *Statius*. He suffered in obstinate Silence, and without making any Reproach to *Statius*, who was concerned in the same Plot for which he himself was punished. TACITUS, *L. xv. c. 60.*

(f) *Epaphroditus* was the Master of Requests and Freedman of *Nero*, and the Master of *Epictetus*. He assisted *Nero* in killing himself; for which he was condemned to Death by *Domitian*. SUTONIUS in *vitâ Neronis*, c. 49. *Domit. c. 14.*

get the better of my *Choice* (g). “ I will throw you into Prison: I will behead that paltry Body of yours.” Did I ever tell you, that I alone had a Head not liable to be cut off?—These Things ought Philosophers to study; these ought they daily to write; and in these to exercise themselves.

§. 7. *Thraseas* (h) used to say, “ I had rather be killed To-day, than banished To-morrow.” But how did *Rufus* (i) answer him? “ If you prefer it as a heavier Misfortune, how foolish a Preference! If as a lighter, who has put it in your Power? Why do not you study to be contented with what is allotted you?”

§. 8. Well, and what said *Agrippinus* (k), upon this Account? “ I will not be a Hindrance to myself.”

(g) See Introduction, §. 9.

(h) *Thraseas Patus*, a Stoic Philosopher, put to Death by *Nero*. He was Husband of *Arria*, so well known by that beautiful Epigram in *Martial*. The Expression of *Tacitus* concerning him is remarkable: *After the Murder of so many excellent Persons, Nero at last formed a Desire of cutting off Virtue itself, by the Execution of Thraseas Pætus and Barea Soranus.* L. xvi. c. 21.

(i) *Rufus* was a *Tuscan*, of the Equestrian Order, and a Stoic Philosopher. When *Vespasian* banished the other Philosophers, *Rufus* was alone excepted. UPTON.

(k) *Agrippinus* was banished by *Nero*, for no other Crime than the unfortunate Death of his Father, who had been causelessly killed by the Command of *Tiberius*: and this had furnished a Pretence for accusing him of hereditary Disloyalty. TACITUS, L. xvi. c. 28, 29.

“self.” Word was brought him, “Your Cause
“is trying in the Senate.”—“Good Luck attend
“it.—But it is Eleven o’Clock” (the Hour when
he used to exercise before bathing): “Let us go
“to our Exercise.” When it was over, a Mes-
senger tells him, “You are condemned.” To
Banishment, says he, or to Death? “To Banish-
“ment.”—What of my Estate?—“It is not
“taken away.” Well then, let us go as far as
Aricia (l), and dine there.

§. 9. This it is to have studied (m) what
ought to be studied; to have rendered our De-
sires and Aversions incapable of being restrained,
or incurred. I must die: if instantly, I will die
instantly; if in a short Time, I will dine first;
and when the Hour comes, then I will die. How?
As becomes one who restores what is not his own.

(l) *Aricia*, a Town about sixteen Miles from Rome,
which lay in his Road to Banishment.

(m) This chearful Readiness for Death, whenever ap-
pointed by Providence, is noble in a Christian, to whom
dying is taking Possession of Happiness. But in Stoics,
who seem to form no Hope beyond the Grave, it had surely
more Insensibility than true Bravery, and was indeed con-
trary to Nature.

C H A P. II.

In what Manner, upon every Occasion, to preserve our Character.

§. I. **T**O a reasonable Creature, that alone is insupportable which is unreasonable : but every thing reasonable may be supported. Stripes are not naturally insupportable.—“ How so ? ”—See how the *Spartans* (a) bear whipping, after they have learned that it is a reasonable Thing. Hanging is not insupportable : for, as soon as a Man has taken it into his Head that it is reasonable, he goes and hangs (b) himself. In short we shall find by Observation, that no Creature is oppressed so much by any thing, as by what is unreasonable ; nor, on the other hand, attracted

(a) The *Spartans*, to make a Trial of the Fortitude of their Children, used to have them publickly whipt at the Altar of *Diana* ; and often with so much Severity, that they expired. The Boys supported this Exercise with so much Constancy, as never to cry out, nor even groan. UPTON from Cicero, &c.

(b) The Supposition made by *Epictetus*, that it may be reasonable, sometimes, for Persons to kill themselves, is a strong and alarming Instance of the great Necessity of being careful, not only in *general* to form just and distinct Ideas of reasonable and unreasonable, but to apply them properly to *particular* Subjects ; since such a Man as He, failed in so important a Case, at the very Time when he was giving Cautions to others.

attracted to any thing so strongly, as to what is reasonable.

§. 2. But it happens that different Things are *reasonable* and *unreasonable*, as well as good and bad, advantageous and disadvantageous, to different Persons. On this Account, chiefly, we stand in need of a liberal Education, to teach us, to adopt the Preconceptions of reasonable and unreasonable to particular Cases, conformably to Nature. But to judge of reasonable, and unreasonable, we make use not only of a due Estimation of Things without us, but of what relates to each Person's particular Character. Thus, it is reasonable for one Man to submit to a dirty (c) disgraceful Office, who considers this only, that if he does not submit to it, he shall be whipt, and lose his Dinner; but if he does, that he has nothing hard or disagreeable to suffer: whereas to another it appears insupportable, not only to submit to such an Office himself, but to bear with any one else who does. If you ask me, then, whether you shall do this dirty Office or not, I will tell you, it is a more valuable Thing to get a Dinner, than not; and a greater Disgrace to be whipt, than not to be whipt: so that, if you measure yourself by these Things, go and do your Office.

B 5

“ Ay,

(c) The Translation here gives only the general Sense, as a more particular Description would be scarcely supportable in our Language.

“ Ay, but this is not suitable to my Character.”

It is *You* who are to consider that, not *I*: for it is you who know yourself, what Value you set upon yourself, and at what Rate you sell yourself: for different People sell themselves at different Prices.

§. 3. Hence *Agrippinus* (*d*), when *Florus* was considering whether he should go to *Nero's* Shows, so as to perform some Part in them himself, bid him go.—“ But why do not *you* go then ?” says *Florus*. “ Because, replied *Agrippinus*, I do not “ deliberate about it.” For he who once sets himself about such Considerations, and goes to calculating the Worth of external Things, approaches very near to those who forget their own Character. For, why do you ask me whether Death or Life be the more eligible ? I answer, Life. Pain or Pleasure ? I answer, Pleasure.—“ But if I do not act a Part, I shall lose my “ Head.”—Go and act it then, but *I* will not.—“ Why ?”—Because you esteem yourself only as one Thread of many that make up the Piece.—“ What then ?”—You have nothing to care for, but how to be like the rest of Mankind, as one Thread desires not to be distinguished from the

(*d*) *Nero* was remarkably fond of Theatrical Entertainments; and used to introduce upon the Stage the Descendants of noble Families, whom Want had rendered venal. TACITUS, *L. xiv. c. 14.*

the others. But *I* would be the Purple (*e*), that small and shining Thing, which gives a Lustre and Beauty to the rest. Why do you bid me resemble the Multitude then? At that Rate, how shall I be the Purple?

§. 4. This *Priscus Helvidius* (*f*) too saw, and acted accordingly: for when *Vespasian* had sent to forbid his going to the Senate, he answered, "It is in your Power to prevent my continuing a Senator; but while I am one, I must go."—"Well then, at least be silent there."—"Do not ask my Opinion, and I will be silent."—"But I must ask it."—"And I must speak what appears to me to be right."—"But if you do, I will put you to Death."—"Did I ever tell you that I was immortal? You will do your Part, and I mine: It is yours to kill, and mine to die intrepid; yours to banish me, mine to depart untroubled."

§. 5. What Good, then, did *Priscus* do, who was but a single Person? Why, what Good does

B 6

the

(*e*) An Allusion to the Purple Border, which distinguished the Dress of the *Roman* Nobility.

(*f*) *Helvidius Priscus* was no less remarkable for his Learning and Philosophy, than for the Sanctity of his Manners and the Love of his Country. He behaved however with too much Haughtiness, on several Occasions, to *Vespasian*, who sentenced him to Death with great Reluctance, and even forbade the Execution, when it was too late. SUTTON. in *Vesp.* §. 15.

the Purple do to the Garment? What, but the being a shining Character in himself (g), and setting a good Example to others? Another, perhaps, if in such Circumstances *Cæsar* had forbidden his going to the Senate, would have answered, "I am obliged to you for excusing me." But such a one he would not have forbidden to go: well knowing, that he would either sit like a Statue; or, if he spoke, he would say what he knew to be agreeable to *Cæsar*, and would overdo it, by adding still more.

§. 6. Thus acted even a Wrestler, who was in Danger of Death, unless he consented to an ignominious Amputation. His Brother, who was a Philosopher, coming to him, and saying, "Well, Brother, what do you design to do?" "Let us cut away this morbid Part, and return again to the Field." He refused, and courageously died.

§. 7. When it was asked, whether he acted thus as a Wrestler, or a Philosopher? I answer, As a *Man*, said *Epietetus*; but as a Man who had been proclaimed a Champion at the Olympic Games; who had been used to such Places, and not exercised merely in the School of *Bato* (b).

Another

(g) *Αὐτὸς* in the Original refers to *μαρτυρία*; but the Figure would have appeared harsh in the Translation.

(b) *Bato* was a famous Master of the Olympic Exercises.
UPTON.

Another would have had his very Head cut off, if he could have lived without it. This is that Regard to Character, so powerful with those who are accustomed to introduce it, from their own Breasts, into their Deliberations.

§. 8. "Come now, *Epiſtetus*, take off your "Beard (i)."—If I am a Philoſopher, I answer, I will not take it off.—"Then I will take off "your Head."—If that will do you any Good, take it off.

§. 9. It was asked, How ſhall each of us perceive what belongs to his Character? Whence, replied *Epiſtetus*, does a Bull, when the Lion approaches, perceive his own Qualifications (k), and expoſe himſelf alone for the whole Herd? It is evident, that with the Qualifications, occurs, at the ſame time, the Conſciouſneſs of being indued with them. And in the ſame manner, whoever of Us hath ſuch Qualifications, will not be ignorant of them. But neither is a Bull, nor a gallant-ſpirited Man, formed all at once. We are to exerciſe and qualify ourſelves, and not to run raſhly upon what doth not concern us.

§. 10.

(i) *Domitian* ordered all the Philoſophers to be baniſhed. To avoid this Inconveniencé, thoſe who had a Mind to diſguiſe their Profeſſion, took off their Beards. UFTON.

(k) This Term was uſed, among the Stoics, to expreſs the natural or acquired Powers neceſſary to the Performance of any Action.

§. 10. Only consider at what Price you sell your own Will and Choice, Man (*l*): if for nothing else, that you may not sell it for a Trifle. Greatness indeed, and Excellence, perhaps belong to others, to such as *Socrates*.

Why then, as we are born with a like Nature, do not all, or the greater Number, become such as he?

Why, are all Horses swift? Are all Dogs sagacious? What then, because Nature hath not befriended me, Shall I neglect all Care of myself? Heaven forbid! *Epictetus* is inferior to *Socrates* (*m*); but if superior to — this is enough for me. I shall never be *Mila*, and yet I do not neglect my Body;

(*l*) See Introduction; §. 9.

(*m*) This is a difficult Place. The Text, as it stands now, is ΕΠΙΚΤΗΤΟΣ ΚΡΕΙΣΣΩΝ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥ ΟΥΚ ΕΣΤΙΝ· ΕΙ ΔΕ ΜΗ, ΟΥ ΧΕΙΡΩΝ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΜΟΙ ΙΚΑΝΟΝ ΕΣΤΙΝ. Which must be translated, *Epictetus is not superior to Socrates: But if not, he is not inferior; and this is enough for me.* By a Change in the Pointing, it might perhaps be translated, *but if he is not inferior, this is enough for me.* And sometimes the Stoics considered themselves as not inferior to the Deity. See Lib. I. c. xii. §. 2. But neither of these Renderings makes a proper Connexion: I have therefore adventured to suppose, that ΚΡΕΙΣΣΩΝ and ΧΕΙΡΩΝ have changed Places; that ΟΥΚ hath arisen from a casual Repetition of the two last Letters of ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥ; and that ΜΗ ΟΥ is the Remainder of some proper Name: perhaps Μελιτου, as he was one of the Accusers of *Socrates*: which cannot now be known. This will give the Sense which I have expressed, and it is the only unexceptionable one that I can find.

Body; nor *Cræsus*, and yet I do not neglect my Property: nor, in general, do we omit the Care of any thing belonging to us, from a Despair of arriving at the highest Degree of Perfection.

C H A P. III.

How, from the Doctrine that God is the Father of Mankind, we may proceed to its Consequences.

§. 1. **I**F a Person could be persuaded of this Principle as he ought, that we are all originally descended from God, and that he is the Father of Gods and Men; I conceive he never would think meanly or degenerately concerning himself. Suppose *Cæsar* were to adopt you, there would be no bearing your haughty Looks: and will you not be elated on knowing yourself to be the Son of *Jupiter*? Yet, in fact, we are not elated. But having two Things in our Composition, intimately united, a Body in common with the Brutes, and Reason and Sentiment in common with the Gods; many incline to this unhappy and mortal Kindred, and only some few to the divine and happy one. And, as of Necessity every one must treat each particular Thing, according to the Notions he forms about it; so those few, who suppose, that they are made for Fidelity, Decency, and a well-grounded Use of the Appearances of Things,

2

never

never think meanly or degenerately concerning themselves. But with the Multitude the Case is contrary: "For what am I? A poor contemptible Man, with this miserable Flesh of mine!" Miserable indeed. But you have likewise something better than this paultry Flesh. Why then, overlooking *that*, do you pine away in Attention to *this*?

§. 2. By means of this [animal] Kindred, some of us, deviating towards it, become like Wolves, faithless, and insidious, and mischievous: others, like Lions, wild, and savage, and untamed: but most of us Foxes, and Wretches even among Brutes. For what else is a slanderous and ill-natured Man, than a Fox, or something yet more wretched and mean? See then, and take heed, that you do not become such Wretches.

C H A P. IV.

Of Improvement.

§. 1. **H**E who is entering on a State of Improvement, having learnt from the Philosophers, that the Object of Desire is Good, or Aversion, Evil; and having learnt too, that Prosperity and Ease are no otherwise attainable by Man, than in not being disappointed of his Desire, nor incurring his Aversion: such an one removes totally
from

from himself, and postpones Desire (a), and applies Aversion only to Things dependent on Choice. For if he should be averse to Things independent on Choice; he knows, that he must sometimes incur his Aversion, and be unhappy. Now if Virtue promises Happiness, Prosperity, and Ease; then, an Improvement in Virtue is certainly an Improvement in each of these. For to whatever Point the Perfection of any thing absolutely brings us, Improvement is always an Approach towards it.

§. 2. How happens it then, that when we confess Virtue to be such, yet we seek, and make an ostentatious Show of Improvement in other Things? What is the Business of Virtue?

A prosperous Life.

Who is in a State of Improvement then? He who hath read the many Treatises of *Chrysippus* (b)? Why, doth Virtue consist in having read *Chrysippus* through? If it doth, Improvement is confessedly nothing else than understanding a great

(a) See *Enchiridion*, c. ii. Note (b).

(b) *Chrysippus* is called, by *Cicero*, the most subtle Interpreter of the Stoic Dreams, and the Support of the Portico. He composed 705 Volumes; which is not very wonderful, as he was so fond of Quotations, that in one of his Pieces he transcribed almost an entire Play of *Euripides*. His chief Study was Logic, which he carried to a trifling Degree of Subtilty. There is nothing now remaining of his Works but some of their Titles. He died about 200 Years

great deal of *Chrysippus*: otherwise we confess Virtue to produce one Thing; and declare Improvement, which is an Approach to it, to be quite another Thing.

§. 3. This Person, says one [of you], is already able to read *Chrysippus*, by himself. — “Certainly, Sir, you have made a vast Improvement! What Improvement? Why do you ridicule him? Why do you withdraw him from a Sense of his Misfortunes? Why do not you show him the Business of Virtue, that he may know where to seek Improvement?—Seek it there, Wretch, where your Business lies. And where doth your Business lie? In Desire and Aversion; that you may neither be disappointed of the one, nor incur the other; in exerting the Powers of Pursuit and Avoidance, that you may not be liable to fail; in Assent and Suspense, that you may not be liable to be deceived. The first and most necessary is

Years before the Christian Æra, and was honoured by the *Athenians* with a Statue in the *Ceramicus*. His Death is said to have been occasioned by an immoderate Fit of Laughing, at seeing an *Ass* eat Figs. *Chrysippus* desired the *Ass* might have a Glass of Wine to wash them down; and was so diverted with his own Conceit, that it cost him his Life. He is said to have been a very copious and laborious Writer, but obscure and immoral; though one would be inclined to think, from the Respect with which he is mentioned by *Epictetus*, that this latter Accusation was groundless.

is the first Topic (c). But if you seek to avoid incurring your Aversion, trembling and lamenting all the while, at this Rate how do you improve ?

§. 4. Show me then your Improvement in this Point. As if I should say to a Wrestler, Show me your Shoulders ; and he should answer me, " See my Poisers."——Do you and your Poisers look to that : I desire to see the Effect of them.

" Take the Treatise on the Subject of *the active* Powers, and see how thoroughly I have perused it."

I do not enquire into this, Wretch : but how you exert those Powers ; how you manage your Desires and Aversions, how your Intentions and Purposes ; how you are prepared for Events, whether conformably or contrary to Nature. If conformably, give me Evidence of that, and I will say you improve : if contrary, go your way, and not only comment on these Treatises, but write such yourself ; and what Service will it do you ? Do not you know that the whole Volume is sold for Half a Crown ? Doth he who comments upon it, then, value himself at more than Half a Crown ? Never look for your Business in one Thing, and for Improvement in another.

Where is Improvement, then ?

If any of you, withdrawing himself from Externals, turns to his own Faculty of Choice, to exercise, and finish, and render it conformable to Nature; elevated, free, unrestrained, unhindered, faithful, decent: if he hath learnt too, that whoever desires, or is averse to, Things out of his own Power, can neither be faithful nor free, but must necessarily be changed and tossed up and down with them; must necessarily too be subject to others, to such as can procure or prevent what he desires or is averse to: if, rising in the Morning, he observes and keeps to these Rules; bathes and eats as a Man of Fidelity and Honour; and thus, on every Subject of Action, exercises himself in his principal Duty; as a Racer, in the Business of Racing; as a public Speaker, in the Business of exercising his Voice: this is he, who truly improves; this is he, who hath not travelled in vain. But if he is wholly intent on reading Books, and hath laboured that Point only, and travelled (*d*) for that: I bid him go home immediately, and not neglect his domestic Affairs; for what he travelled for, is nothing. The only real Thing is, studying how to rid his Life of Lamentation, and Complaint, and *Alas!* and *I am undone*, and Misfortune, and Disappointment; and to learn what Death, what Exile, what a Prison,

(*d*) An Allusion to the antient Custom among Philosophers, of travelling into foreign Countries, for Improvement.

Prison, what Poison is : that he may be able to say in a Prison, like *Socrates*, “ My dear *Crito* ; “ if it thus pleases the Gods, thus let it be ; ” and not — “ Wretched old Man, have I kept “ my grey Hairs for this ! ” Who speaks thus ? Do you suppose I will name some mean and despicable Person ? Is it not *Priam* who says it ? Is it not *Oedipus* ? Nay, how many Kings say it ? For what else is Tragedy, but the Sufferings of Men, struck by an Admiration of Externals, represented in that Kind of Poetry ? If one was to be taught by Fictions, that Externals independent upon Choice, are nothing to us ; I, for my Part, should wish for such a Fiction, as that, by which I might live prosperously and undisturbed. What you wish for, it is your Business to consider.

§. 5. Of what Service, then, is *Chrysippus* to us ?

(e) To teach you, that those Things are not false, on which Prosperity and Ease depend. “ Take my Books, and you will see, how true “ and conformable to Nature those Things are, “ which render me easy.” How great a Happiness !

(f) What ought to be our Dispositions towards Good and Evil, may be learned from Philosophy : but what that certainly-attainable Good, and that Evil which, without our own Faults, we need never incur, are, Christianity alone can teach. That alone can enable us to unite the Wisdom, Courage, Dignity, and Composure of the Stoics, with the Humility that belongs to our frail Nature, and the various Affections that are inseparable from Humanity.

ness! And how great the Benefactor, who shows the Way! To *Triptolemus* all Men have raised Temples and Altars, because he gave us a milder Kind of Food: but to him who hath discovered, and brought to Light, and communicated, the Truth to all (*f*); the Means, not of living, but of living well; who among you ever raised an Altar or a Temple, or dedicated a Statue, or who worships God on that Account? We offer Sacrifices on the Account of those [Benefactors] who have given us Corn and the Vine; and shall we not give Thanks to God, for those who have produced that Fruit in the human Understanding, by which they proceed to discover to us the true Doctrine of Happiness?

C H A P.

(*f*) *Epictetus* speaks with great Thankfulness to Heaven on the Account of *Chrysippus*, a subtle and perplexed Writer, from whose Instructions, only a few studious abstracted Persons could derive any Benefit. How much stronger ought to be the Gratitude of those, who are blessed with the Knowledge of Him, who hath brought *Life and Immortality to Light* (the Word is the same in *Epictetus* and *St. Paul*); who hath rendered the Way to Virtue and to Happiness not only intelligible, but accessible, to all Mankind; and who is Himself *the Way, the Truth, and the Life*.

C H A P. V.

Concerning the Academics (a).

§. 1. **I**F any one opposes very evident Truths, it is not easy to find a Reason which may persuade him, to alter his Opinion. This arises neither from his own Strength, nor from the Weakness of his Teacher: but when, after being driven upon an Absurdity, he becomes petrified, how shall we deal with him any longer by Reason?

§. 2. Now there are two Sorts of Petrification: The one, a Petrification of the Understanding; the other, of the Sense of Shame, when a Person hath obstinately set himself not to assent to evident Truths, nor to quit the Defence of Contradictions. We all dread a bodily Mortification; and would make use of every Contrivance to avoid it: but none of us is troubled about a Mortification in the Soul. And yet, indeed, even with regard to the Soul, when a Person is so affected, as not to apprehend or understand any thing, we think him in a sad Condition: but where the Sense of Shame

(a) The Academics held, that there is nothing to be known; that we have not Faculties to distinguish between Truth and Falshood; and their Custom was neither to affirm nor deny any thing.

Shame and Modesty is under an absolute Mortification, we go so far, as even to call *this*, Strength of Mind (*b*).

§. 3. Are you certain that you are awake?—
 “I am not (replies such a Person): for neither
 “am I certain, when, in dreaming, I appear to
 “myself to be awake.”—Is there no Difference,
 then, between these Appearances?—“None.”
 —Shall I argue with this Man any longer?
 For what Steel or what Caustic can I apply, to
 make him sensible of his Mortification? He is
 sensible of it: and pretends not to be so. He is
 even worse than dead. Doth not he see the Re-
 pugnancy of contradictory Propositions? He sees
 it; and is never the better. He is neither moved,
 nor improves. Nay, he is in a yet worse Condi-
 tion: his Sense of Shame and Modesty is utterly
 extirpated. His reasoning Faculty indeed is not
 extirpated; but turned wild and savage. Shall I
 call *this*, Strength of Mind? By no Means: un-
 less we allow it be such in the vilest Debauchées,
 publicly to speak and act whatever comes into
 their Heads.

CHAP.

(*b*) A Sceptic was held to be an *Esprit fort*.

CHAP. VI.

Of Providence.

§. 1. **F**ROM every Event that happens in the World; it is easy to celebrate Providence, if a Person hath but these two Circumstances in himself; a Faculty of considering what happens to each Individual, and a grateful Temper. Without the first, he will not perceive the Usefulness of Things which happen: and without the other, he will not be thankful for them. If God had made Colours, and had not made the Faculty of seeing them, what would have been their Use?

None.

On the contrary, if he had made the Faculty, without such Objects as fall under its Observation, what would have been the Use of that?

None.

Again: If he had formed both the Faculty and the Objects, but had not made Light?

Neither in that Case would they have been of any Use.

§. 2. Who is it then that hath fitted each of these to the other? Who is it that hath fitted the Sword to the Scabbard, and the Scabbard to the Sword? Is it no one? From the very Construc-

tion of a complete Work, we are used to declare positively, that it must be the Operation of some Artificer, and not the Effect of mere Chance. Doth every such Work, then, demonstrate an Artificer; and do not visible Objects, and the Sense of Seeing, and Light, demonstrate one? Doth not the Difference of the Sexes, and their Inclination to each other, and the Use of their several Powers; do not these Things, neither, demonstrate an Artificer?

Most certainly they do.

§. 3. But farther: This Constitution of Understanding, by which we are not simply impressed by sensible Objects; but take and subtract from them; and add and compose something out of them; and pass from some to others absolutely remote (a): Is not all this, neither, sufficient to prevail on some Men, and make them ashamed of leaving an Artificer out of their Scheme? If not, let them explain to us what it is that effects each of these; and how it is possible that Things so wonderful, and which carry such Marks of Contrivance, should come to pass spontaneously, and without Design.

What, then, do these Things come to pass for our Service only?

Many

(a) The Translation follows *videtur* in Mr. Upton's *Appendix*.

Many for *ours* only ; such as are peculiarly necessary for a reasonable Creature : but you will find many, common to us with mere Animals.

Then, do *they* too understand what happens ?

Not at all : For Use is one Affair, and Understanding another. But God had Need of Animals, to make Use of the Appearances of Things (*b*) ; and of Us to *understand* that Use. It is sufficient, therefore, for them to eat, and drink, and sleep, and continue their Species, and perform other such Offices as belong to each of them : but to *us*, to whom he hath given likewise a Faculty of Understanding, these Offices are not sufficient. For if we do not act in a proper and orderly Manner, and suitably to the Nature and Constitution of each Thing ; we shall no longer attain our End. For where the Constitution of Beings is different, their Offices and Ends are different likewise. Thus where the Constitution is adapted only to Use, there Use is alone sufficient : But where Understanding is added to Use, unless that too be duly exercised, the End of such a Being will never be attained.

§. 4. Well then : each of the Animals is constituted either for Food, or Husbandry, or to produce Milk ; and the rest of them for some other like Use : and for these Purposes what need is there of *understanding* the Appearances of Things,

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and

(*b*) See Introduction, §. 7.

and being able to make Distinctions concerning them? But God hath introduced *Man*, as a Spectator of Himself, and of his Works; and not only as a Spectator, but an Interpreter of them. It is therefore shameful that *Man* should begin, and end, where irrational Creatures do. He is indeed rather to begin there, but to end where Nature itself hath fixt our End; and that is in Contemplation, and Understanding, and in a Scheme of Life conformable to Nature.

§. 5. Take care, then, not to die without being Spectators of these Things. You take a Journey to *Olympia* to behold the Work (c) of *Phidias*, and each of you thinks it a Misfortune to die without a Knowledge of such Things: and will you have no Inclination to understand, and be Spectators of those Works, for which there is no need to take a Journey; but which are ready and at hand, even to those who bestow no Pains (d)! Will you never perceive, then, either what you are, or for what you were born; nor for what Purpose you are admitted Spectators of this Sight?

But there are some Things unpleasant and difficult, in Life.

And

(c) The famous Statue of *Jupiter Olympius*.

(d) The Translation follows a conjectural Emendation of Mr. *Upton's* on this Passage.

And are there none at *Olympia*? Are not you heated? Are not you crouded? Are not you without good Conveniencies for bathing (e)? Are not you wet through, when it happens to rain? Do not you bear Uproar, and Noise, and other disagreeable Circumstances? But I suppose, by comparing all these with the Advantage of seeing so valuable a Sight, you support and go through them. Well: and [in the present Case] have not you received Faculties by which you may support every Event? Have not you received Greatness of Soul? Have not you received a manly Spirit? Have not you received Patience? What signifies to me any thing that happens, while I have a Greatness of Soul? What shall disconcert or trouble or appear grievous to me? Shall I not make Use of my Faculties, to that Purpose for which they were granted me; but lament and groan at what happens?

§. 6. Oh, but my Nose (f) runs.

And what have you Hands for, Beast, but to wipe it?

But was there then any good Reason, that there should be such a dirty Thing in the World?

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And

(e) It was one Part of the Elegance of those Times, to bathe every Day.

(f) *Epictetus* probably introduces this ridiculous Complaint, in order to intimate, that others commonly made are little less so. See *M. Antoninus*, l. viii. §. 50. of *Ga-taker's* Edition and the *Glasgow* Translation.

And how much better is it that you should wipe your Nose, than complain? Pray, what Figure do you think *Hercules* would have made, if there had not been such a Lion, and a Hydra, and a Stag, and unjust and brutal Men; whom he expelled and cleared away? And what would he have done, if none of these had existed? Is it not plain, that he must have wrapt himself up and slept? In the first Place, then, he would never have become a *Hercules*, by slumbering away his whole Life in such Delicacy and Ease: or if he had, what Good would it have done? What would have been the Use of his Arm, and the rest of his Strength; of his Patience, and Greatness of Mind; if such Circumstances and Subjects of Action had not roused and exercised him?

What then must we provide these Things for ourselves; and introduce a Boar, and a Lion, and a Hydra, into our Country?

This would be Madness and Folly. But as they were in being, and to be met with, they were proper Subjects to set off and exercise *Hercules*. Do you therefore likewise, being sensible of this, inspect the Faculties you have: and after taking a View of them, say, “Bring on me now, O
“*Jupiter*, what Difficulty thou wilt, for I have
“Faculties granted me by Thee, and Abilities
“by which I may acquire Honour and Ornament
“to

“to myself.”—No: but you sit trembling, for fear this or that should happen: and lamenting, and mourning, and groaning at what doth happen; and then you accuse the Gods. For what is the Consequence of such a Meanspiritedness, but Impiety? And yet God hath not only granted these Faculties, by which we may bear every Event, without being depressed or broken by it; but, like a good Prince, and a true Father, hath rendered them incapable of Restraint, Compulsion, or Hindrance, and intirely dependent on our own Pleasure: nor hath he reserved a Power, even to himself, of hindering or restraining them. Having these Things free, and your own, will you make no Use of them, nor consider what you have received, nor from whom? But sit groaning and lamenting, some of you, blind to him who gave them, and not acknowledging your Benefactor; and others, basely turning yourselves to Complaints and Accusations of God? Yet I undertake to show you, that you have Qualifications and Occasions for Greatness of Soul, and a manly Spirit: but what Occasions you have to find Fault, and complain, do *you* show me.

C H A P. VII.

*Of the Use of convertible and hypothetical Propositions,
and the like.*

§. I. **I**T (a) is a Secret to the Vulgar, that the Practice of convertible, and hypothetical, and interrogatory Arguments, and, in general, of all other logical Forms, hath any Relation to the Duties of Life. For, in every Subject of Action, the Question is, how a wise and good Man may find a Way of extricating himself, and a Method of Behaviour conformable to his Duty upon the Occasion. Let them say, therefore, either that the Man of Virtue will not engage in Questions and Answers; or that, if he doth, he will not think it worth his Care whether he behaves rashly and at hazard in questioning and answering: or if they allow neither of these; it is necessary to confess, that some Examination ought to be made of those Topics, in which the Affair of Question and Answer is principally concerned. For what is the Profession of Reasoning? To lay down true Positions; to reject false ones; and to suspend the Judgment in doubtful ones. Is it enough,

(a) It is but fair to warn the Reader, that little Entertainment is to be expected from this Chapter, which is wholly logical.

enough, then, to have learned merely this? It is enough, say you.—Is it enough, then, for him who would not commit any Mistake in the Use of Money, merely to have heard, that we are to receive the good Pieces, and to reject the bad?—This is not enough:—What must be added besides?—That Faculty which tries and distinguishes what Pieces are good, what bad.—Therefore, in Reasoning too, what hath been already said is not enough: but it is necessary that we should be able to prove and distinguish between the true, and the false, and the doubtful.—It is necessary.

§. 2. And what farther is professed in Reasoning?—To admit the Consequence of what you have properly granted.—Well: and here, too, is the mere Knowing this enough?—It is not; but we must learn how such a Thing is the Consequence of such another; and when one Thing follows from one Thing, and when from many Things in common. Is it not moreover necessary, that he, who would behave skilfully in Reasoning, should both himself demonstrate whatever he delivers, and be able to comprehend the Demonstrations of others; and not be deceived by such as sophisticate, as if they were demonstrating. Hence, then, the Employment and Exercise of concluding Arguments and Figures arises; and appears to be necessary.

§. 3. But it may possibly happen, that from the Premises which we have properly granted, there arises some Consequence, which, though false, is nevertheless a Consequence. What then ought I to do? To admit a Falsehood?—And how is that possible?—Well: or to say that my Concessions were not properly made?—But neither is this allowed—Or that the Consequence doth not arise from the Premises?—Nor is even this allowed.—What then is to be done in the Case?—Is it not this? As the having once borrowed Money, is not enough to make a Person a Debtor, unless he still continues to owe Money, and hath not paid it: so the having granted the Premises, is not enough to make it necessary to grant the Inference, unless we continue our Concessions. If the Premises continue to the End, such as they were when the Concessions were made, it is absolutely necessary to continue the Concessions, and to admit what follows from them. But if the Premises do not continue such as they were when the Concession was made, it is absolutely necessary to depart from the Concession, and admit [rather the contrary: I mean] what doth not (b) follow from the

(b) The Passage seems to require that ανακολουθον should be ακολουθον; *We are to depart from the Concession, and admit what follows from the Argument itself.* The Meaning I apprehend

the Argument itself. For this Inference is no Consequence of ours; nor belongs to us, when we have departed from the Concession of the Premises. We ought then to examine these Kinds of Premises, and their Changes and Conversions, on which any one, by laying hold, either in the Question itself, or in the Answer, or in the syllogistical Conclusion, or in any other thing of that sort, gives an Occasion to the Unthinking of being disconcerted, not foreseeing the Consequence. — Why so? — That in this Topic we may not behave contrary to our Duty, nor with Confusion.

§. 4. The same Thing is to be observed in Hypotheses and hypothetical Arguments. For it is sometimes necessary to require some Hypothesis to be granted, as a kind of Step to the rest of the Argument. Is every given Hypothesis then to be granted, or not every one; and if not every one, which? And is he who has granted an Hypothesis, for ever to abide by it? Or is he sometimes to depart from it, and admit only Consequences, but not to admit Contradictions? — Ay: but a Person may say, on your admitting

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the

apprehend to be, that if, in the Course of an Argument, our Opponent sophistically alters the State of the Question on which our Concessions were founded, it is lawful to revoke those Concessions; and admit no Consequence but what is fairly drawn from the Argument itself.

the Hypothesis of a Possibility, I will drive you upon an Impossibility. With such a one as this, shall the Man of Prudence not engage; but avoid all Examination and Conversation with him?—And yet who, besides the Man of Prudence, is capable of treating an Argument, or who besides is sagacious in Questions and Answers, and incapable of being deceived and imposed on by Sophistry?—Or will he indeed engage, but without regarding whether he behaves rashly and at hazard in the Argument?—Yet how then can he be such a one, as we are supposing him? But, without some such Exercise and Preparation, is it possible for him to preserve himself consistent? Let them shew this: and all these Theorems will be superfluous and absurd, and unconnected with our Idea of the virtuous Man. Why then are we still indolent, and slothful, and sluggish, seeking Pretences of avoiding Labour? Shall we not be watchful to render Reason itself accurate?—“But suppose, after all, I should make a Mistake in these Points:” have I killed a Father?—Wretch! why, in this Case, where had you a Father to kill? What is it then that you have done? The only Fault that you could commit, in this Instance, you have committed. This very Thing I myself said to *Rufus*, when he reprov'd me, for not finding something that was omitted in some Syllogism. Why, said I,
have

have I burnt the Capitol then? Wretch! answered he, was the Thing here omitted the Capitol? Or are there no other Faults, but burning the Capitol, or killing a Father? and is it no Fault to treat the Appearances presented to our Minds rashly, and vainly, and at hazard; not to comprehend a Reason, nor a Demonstration, nor a Sophism; nor, in short, to see what is for, or against one's self in a Question or Answer? Is nothing of all this any Fault?

C H A P. VIII.

That Faculties are not safe to the Uninstructed!

§. 1. **I**N as many Ways as equivalent Syllogisms may be varied, in so many may the Forms of Arguments, and Enthymemas, be varied likewise. As for Instance: *If you had borrowed, and not paid, you owe me Money. But you have not borrowed, and not paid; therefore you do not owe me Money.* To perform this skilfully, belongs to no one more than to a Philosopher. For if an Enthymema be an imperfect Syllogism; he who is exercised in a perfect Syllogism, must be equally ready at an imperfect one.

(a) Why then do not we exercise ourselves and others, after this Manner?

Because,

(*) This is spoken by one of the Audience.

Because, even now, though we are not exercised in these Things, nor diverted, by me, at least, from the Study of Morality; yet we make no Advances in Virtue. What is to be expected then if we should add this Avocation too? Especially, as it would not only be an Avocation from more necessary Studies, but likewise a capital Occasion of Conceit and Insolence. For the Faculty of arguing, and of persuasive Reasoning is great; and, particularly, if it be much laboured, and receive an additional Ornament from Rhetoric. For, in general, every Faculty is dangerous to weak and uninstructed Persons; as being apt to render them arrogant and elated. For by what Method can one persuade a young Man, who excels in these Kinds of Study, that he ought not to be an Appendix to *them*, but they to *him*? Will he not trample upon all such Advice; and walk about elated, and puffed up, not bearing any one should touch him, to put him in mind, where he is wanting, and in what he goes wrong.

What then, was not *Plato* a Philosopher?

Well, and was not *Hippocrates* a Physician? Yet you see [how elegantly], he expresses himself. But is it in Quality of Physician, then, that he expresses himself so? Why do you confound Things, accidentally united, from different Causes, in the same Men? If *Plato* was handsome and well-made, must I too set myself to endeavour at becoming

becoming handsome and well-made ; as if this was necessary to Philosophy, because a certain Person happened to be at once handsome and a Philosopher ? Why will you not perceive and distinguish what are the Things, that make Men Philosophers, and what belong to them on other Accounts ? Pray, if I (*b*) were a Philosopher, would it be necessary, that you should be lame too ?

§. 2. What then ? Do I reject these Faculties ? By no Means. For neither do I reject the Faculty of Seeing. But if you ask me, what is the Good of Man ; I have nothing else to say to you, but that it is a certain Regulation of the Choice, with regard to the Appearances of Things.

CHAP.

(*b*) *Epictetus*, whenever he has Occasion to mention himself, speaks with remarkable Modesty ; and in a Stile very different from that of many of the more ancient Philosophers ; as appears by the several arrogant Speeches recorded of them by *Diogenes Laertius*, &c. It is probable he might improve in this humble Disposition, by the Character of *Socrates*, which he seems particularly to have studied, and admired. Yet other Philosophers had studied and admired the same Character, without profiting by it. Perhaps the sober and unassuming Temper of Christianity might, from the Example of its Professors in those Days, have produced this, and other good Effects, in the Minds of many who knew little, if any thing, of the Gospel itself.

C H A P. IX.

How, from the Doctrine of our Kindred to God, we are to proceed to its Consequences.

§. 1. **I**F what Philosophers say of the Kindred between God and Men be true; what has any one to do, but, like *Socrates*, when he is asked what Countryman he is, never to say that he is a Citizen of *Athens*, or of *Corinth*; but of the World? For why do you say that you are of *Athens*: and not of that Corner only, where that paultry Body of yours was laid at its Birth? Is it not, evidently, from what is principal, and comprehends not only that Corner, and your whole House; but the general Extent of the Country, from which your Pedigree is derived down to you, that you call yourself an *Athenian*, or a *Corinthian*? Why may not he then, who understands the Administration of the World; and has learned that the greatest, and most principal, and comprehensive, of all Things, is this System, composed of Men and God: and that from Him the Seeds of Being are descended, not only to my Father or Grandfather, but to all Things that are produced and born on Earth; and especially to rational Natures, as they alone are qualified to partake of.

of a Communication with the Deity, being connected with him by Reason : Why may not [such a one] call himself a Citizen of the World ? Why not a Son of God ? And, why shall he fear any thing that happens among Men ? Shall Kindred to *Cæsar*, or any other of the Great at *Rome*, enable a Man to live secure, above Contempt, and void of all Fear whatever : and shall not the having God for our Maker, and Father, and Guardian, free us from Grievances and Terrors ?

§. 2. “ But how shall I subsist ? For I have “ nothing.”

Why, how do Slaves, how do Fugitives ? To what do they trust, when they run away from their Masters ? Is it to their Estates ? Their Servants ? Their Plate ? To nothing but themselves. Yet they do not fail to get Necessaries. And must a Philosopher, think you, when he leaves his own Abode, rest and rely upon others ; and not take care of himself ? Must he be more helpless and anxious than the brute Beasts ; each of which is self-sufficient, and wants neither proper Food, nor any suitable and natural Provision ? One would think, there should be no Need for an old Fellow to sit here contriving, that you may not think meanly, nor entertain low and abject Notions of yourselves : but that his Business would be, to take care, that there may not happen to be [among you] young Men of such

a Spirit, that, knowing their Affinity to the Gods; and that we are as it were fettered by the Body and its Possessions, and by so many other Things as are necessary, upon these Accounts, for the Œconomy and Commerce of Life; they should resolve to throw them off, as both troublesome and useless, and depart to their Kindred.

§. 3. This is the Work, if any, that ought to employ your Master and Preceptor, if you had one: that you should come to him, and say; “*Epicletus*, we can no longer bear being tied down to this paultry Body: feeding and resting, and cleaning it, and hurried about with so many low Cares on its Account. Are not these Things indifferent, and nothing to us: and Death no Evil? Are not we Relations of God: and did we not come from him? Suffer us to go back thither from whence we came: suffer us, at length, to be delivered from these Fetters, that chain and weigh us down. Here, Thieves and Robbers, and Courts of Judicature, and those who are called Tyrants, seem to have some Power over us, on account of the Body and its Possessions. Suffer us to show them, that they have no Power.”

§. 4. And in this Case it would be my Part to answer: “My Friends, wait for God, till he shall give the Signal, and dismiss you from this Service: then return to him. For the present, be content

"content to remain in this Post, where he has
 "placed you. The Time of your Abode here is
 "short, and easy to such as are disposed like you :
 "For what Tyrant, what Robber, what Thief,
 "or what Courts of Judicature are formidable to
 "those, who thus account the Body, and its
 "Possessions, as nothing? Stay. Depart not in-
 "considerately."

§. 5. Thus ought the Case to stand between a
 Preceptor and ingenuous young Men, But how
 stands it now? The Preceptor has no Life in
 him : you have none neither. When you have
 had enough To-day, you sit weeping about To-
 morrow, how you shall get Food. Why, if you
 have it, Wretch, you will have it : if not you
 will go out of Life. The Door is open : why
 do you lament : What room doth there remain
 for Tears? What Occasion for Flattery? Why
 should any one Person envy another? Why should
 he be struck with awful Admiration of those who
 have great Possessions, or are placed in high Rank,
 [as is common]? Especially, if they are power-
 ful and passionate? For what will they do to us?
 The Things which *they* can do, *we* do not re-
 gard : the Things which *we* are concerned about,
they cannot do. Who then, after all, shall com-
 mand a Person thus disposed? How was *Socrates*
 affected by these Things? As it became one per-
 suaded of his being a Relation of the Gods.
 " If

“ If you should tell me (says he to his Judges),
 “ we will acquit you, upon Condition that you
 “ shall no longer discourse in the Manner you
 “ have hitherto done, nor make any Disturbance
 “ either among our young or our old People ;”
 I would answer ; “ You are ridiculous in think-
 “ ing, that if your General had placed me in
 “ any Post, I ought to maintain and defend it,
 “ and chuse to die a thousand times, rather than
 “ desert it : but that if God hath assigned me
 “ any Station or Method of Life, I ought to
 “ desert *that* for you (a).”

§. 6. This it is, for a Man to be truly a Relation of God. But we consider ourselves as a mere Assemblage of Stomach and Entrails, and bodily Parts. Because we fear, because we desire ; we flatter those who can help us in these Matters ; we dread the very same Persons.

§. 7. A Person desired me once to write for him to *Rome*. He was one vulgarly esteemed unfortunate, as he had been formerly illustrious and rich, and afterwards stript of all his Possessions, and reduced to live here. I wrote for him in a submissive Stile ; but, after reading my Letter, he returned it to me, and said : “ I wanted
 “ your Assistance, not your Pity ; for no Evil
 “ hath befallen me.”

§. 8.

(a) *Δι' ὑμᾶς* should probably be *δι' ὑμᾶς*, and is so translated.

§. 8. (b) Thus *Rufus*, to try me, used to say, this or that you will have from your Master. When I answered him, these are [uncertain] human Affairs: Why then, says he, should I intercede with him (c), when you can receive these Things from yourself? For what one hath of his own, it is superfluous and vain to receive from another. Shall I then, who can receive Greatness of Soul and a manly Spirit from myself, receive an Estate, or a Sum of Money, or a Place, from you? Heaven forbid! I will not be so insensible of my own Possessions. But, if a Person is fearful and abject, what else is necessary, but to write Letters for him as if he was dead. "Pray oblige us with the Corpse and Blood of such a one." For, in fact, such a one is Corpse and Blood; and nothing more. For, if he was any thing more, he would be sensible, that one Man is not rendered unfortunate by another.

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(b) This Passage has great Difficulties, which I know not how to solve, any otherwise than by supposing something after *avθρωπιν* to be lost.

(c) The Translator follows Mr. *Upton's* Conjecture in this Place, and the *French* Version agrees with it.

C H A P. X.

Concerning Those who strove for Preferments at Rome.

§. 1. **I**F we all applied ourselves as heartily to our proper Business, as the old Fellows at *Rome* do to their Schemes; perhaps *we* too might make some Proficiency. I know a Man older than I am, and who is now Superintendant of Provisions at *Rome*. When he past through this Place, on his Return from Exile, what an Account did he give me of his former Life! and how did he promise, that for the future, when he was got back, he would apply himself to nothing but how to spend the Remainder of his Days in Repose and Tranquillity. “For how few have “I now remaining!”—You will not do it, said I. When you are once got within the Smell of *Rome*, you will forget all this: and, if you can but once gain Admittance to Court, you will (a) go in, heartily rejoiced, and thank God. “If you ever “find me, *Epiſtetus*, said he, putting one Foot “into the Court, think of me whatever you “please.” Now, after all, how did he act? Before

(a) *Eccet* probably should be *Eccetrai*, and the *French* Translator seems to have made and followed the same Conjecture.

Before he entered the City, he was met by a Billet from *Cæsar*. On receiving it, he forgot all his former Resolutions; and has ever since been heaping up one Incumbrance upon another. I should be glad now, to have an Opportunity of putting him in mind of his Discourse upon the Road; and of saying, how much more clever a Prophet am I than you!

§. 2. What then do I say? that Man is made for an inactive Life? No, surely. "But why is not ours a Life of Activity?" For my own part, as soon as it is Day, I recollect a little what Things I am to read over again [with my Pupils], and then say to myself quickly, What is it to me how such a one reads? My chief Point is to get to sleep.

§. 3. But, indeed, what Likeness is there between the Actions of these [old Fellows at *Rome*] and ours? If you consider what it is they do, you will see. For about what are they employed the whole Day, but in calculating, contriving, consulting, about Provisions; about an Estate; or other Emoluments like these? Is there any Likeness, then, between reading such a Petition from any one, as—"I intreat you to give me a Permission to export Corn;" and—"I intreat you to learn from Chrysippus, of what Nature the Administration of the World is; and what Place a reasonable Creature holds in it. Learn, too, what
" you

“ you yourself are ; and wherein your Good and Evil
 “ consists.” Are these Things at all alike ? Do
 they require an equal Degree of Application ?
 And is it as shameful to neglect the one as the
 other (b) ?

§. 4. Well, then, are we Preceptors the only
 idle Dreamers ? No : but you young Men are so
 first, in a greater Degree. And so even we old
 Folks, when we see young ones trifling, are
 tempted to grow fond of trifling with them.
 Much more, then, if I was to see you active and
 diligent, I should be excited to join with you in
 serious Industry.

C H A P. XI.

Of Natural Affection.

§. 1. **W**HEN one of the great Men came to
 visit him ; *Epicætetus*, having inquired
 into the Particulars of his Affairs, asked him,
 Whether he had a Wife and Children ? The
 other replying, that he had ; *Epicætetus* likewise
 inquired, In what Manner do you live with
 them ? Very miserably, says he—How so ? For
 Men do not marry, and get Children, to be mi-
 serable ;

(b) This Passage has a striking Resemblance to that in
 Scripture, where the Children of this World are said to be
 wiser in their Generation than the Children of Light.

serable ; but rather to make themselves happy.—
But, I am so very miserable about my Children,
that the other Day, when my Daughter was sick,
and appeared to be in Danger, I could not bear
even to be with her ; but ran away, till it was
told me, that she was recovered.—And pray do
you think this was acting right?—It was acting
naturally, said he.—Well : do but convince *me*
that it was acting naturally, and I will convince
you that every thing natural is right.—All, or
most of us Fathers, are affected in the same Way.
—I do not deny the Fact : but the Question be-
tween us is, whether it be right. For, by this
Way of Reasoning, it must be said, that Tu-
mours happen for the Good of the Body, because
they do happen : and even that Vices are natural,
because all, or the most Part of us, are guilty of
them. Do you show me then, how such a Beha-
viour as yours, appears to be natural.

I cannot undertake that. But do you rather
show me, how it appears to be neither natural,
nor right.

If we were disputing about Black and White,
what Criterion must we call in, to distinguish
them ?

The Sight.

If about Hot and Cold, and Hard and Soft,
what ?

The Touch.

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Well

Well then: when we are debating about Natural and Unnatural, and Right and Wrong; what Criterion are we to take?

I cannot tell.

And yet, to be ignorant of a Criterion of Courage, or of Smells, or Tastes, might perhaps be no very great Loss. But do you think, that he suffers only a small Loss, who is ignorant of what is Good and Evil, and Natural and Unnatural, to Man?

No. The very greatest.

Well: tell me; Are all Things which are judged good and proper by some, rightly judged to be so? Is it possible, that the several Opinions of *Jews*, and *Syrians*, and *Egyptians*, and *Romans*, concerning Food, [for Instance] should all be right?

How can it be possible?

I suppose then, it is absolutely necessary, if the Opinions of the *Egyptians* be right, the others must be wrong: if those of the *Jews* be good, all the rest must be bad.

How can it be otherwise?

And whose Ignorance is, there likewise is Want of Learning, and Instruction, in necessary Points.

It is granted.

Then, as you are sensible of this, you will for the future apply to nothing, and think of nothing else, but how to acquaint yourself with the Cri-

terion of what is agreeable to Nature : and to use that, in judging of each particular Case.

§. 2. At present the Assistance I have to give you, towards what you desire, is this. Doth Affection seem to you to be a right and a natural Thing (a)?

How should it be otherwise?

Well : and is Affection natural and right, and Reason not so?

By no means.

Is there any Opposition, then, between Reason and Affection?

I think not.

If there was, of two Opposites if one be natural, the other must necessarily be unnatural. Must it not?

It must.

What we find, then, at once affectionate, and reasonable, that we may safely pronounce to be right and good.

Agreed.

Well, then : you will not dispute, but that to run away, and leave a sick Child, is contrary to Reason. It remains for us to consider, whether it be consistent with Affection.

Let us consider it.

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Did

(a) The Stoics say, that wise and good Men have the truly natural Affection towards their Children; and that bad Persons have it not. DIOG. LAERT. L. vii. §. 120.

Did you, then, from an Affection to your Child, do right in running away, and leaving her? Hath her Mother no Affection for the Child?

Yes, surely, she hath.

Would it have been right, then, that her Mother too should leave her; or would it not?

It would not.

And doth not her Nurse love her?

She doth.

Then ought not she likewise to leave her?

By no means.

And doth not her Preceptor love her?

He doth.

Then ought not he also to have run away, and left her: and so the Child to have been left alone, and unassisted, from the great Affection of her Parents, and her Friends; or to die in the Hands of People, who neither loved her, nor took care of her?

Heaven forbid!

But is it not unreasonable and unjust, that what you think right in yourself; on the Account of your Affection; should not be allowed to others, who have the very same Affection as you?

It is absurd.

Pray, if you were sick yourself, should you be willing to have your Family, and even your Wife
and

and Children, so very affectionate, as to leave you helpless and alone?

By no means.

Or would you wish to be so loved by your Friends, as from their excessive Affection, always to be left alone when you were sick? Or would you not rather wish, if it were possible, to have such a Kind of Affection from your Enemies, as to make them always keep from you? If so, it remains, that your Behaviour was by no means affectionate. Well then: was it merely *nothing* that induced *you* to desert your Child?

How is that possible?

No: but it was some such Motive, as induced a Person at *Rome* to hide his Face while a Horse was running, to which he earnestly wished Success: and when, beyond his Expectation, it won the Race; he was obliged to have Recourse to Spunges, to recover his Senses.

And what was this Motive?

At present perhaps it cannot be accurately explained. It is sufficient to be convinced, (if what Philosophers say be true) that we are not to seek it from without: but that there is universally one and the same Cause, which moves us to do or forbear any Action; to speak or not to speak; to be elated or depressed; to avoid or pursue: that very Cause which hath now moved us two; you, to come, and sit and hear me; and me, to speak as I do.

And what is that?

Is it any thing else, than that it seemed right to us to do so?

Nothing else.

And if it had seemed otherwise to us, what should we have done else, than what we thought right? This, and not the Death of *Patroclus*, was the Cause of Lamentation to *Achilles*, (for every Man is not thus affected by the Death of a Friend) that it seemed right to him. This too was the Cause of your running away from your Child, that it seemed right: and if hereafter you should stay with her, it will be because *that* seemed right. You are now returning to *Rome*, because it seems right to you: but if you should alter your Opinion, you will not return. In a Word, neither Death, nor Exile, nor Pain, nor any thing of this Kind, is the Cause of our doing, or not doing, any Action: but our Opinions and Principles. Do I convince you of this, or not?

You do.

§. 3. Well then: such as the Cause is, such will be the Effect. From this Day forward, then, whenever we do any thing wrong, we will impute it only to the Principle from which we act: and we will endeavour to remove that, and cut it up by the Roots, with greater Care than we would Wens and Tumours from the Body.

Body. In like manner, we will ascribe what we do right, to the same Cause: and we will accuse neither Servant, nor Neighbour, nor Wife, nor Children, as the Causes of any Evils to us; persuaded, that if we had not such Principles, such Consequences would not follow. Of these Principles we ourselves, and not Externals, are the Masters.

Agreed.

From this Day, then, we will neither consider nor enquire of what Sort, or in what Condition, any thing is; our Estate, or Slaves, or Horses, or Dogs, but only our *Principles*.

I wish to do it.

You see, then, that it is necessary for you to become a Scholar: that Kind of Animal which every one laughs at; if you really desire to make an Examination of your Principles. But this, as you are sensible, is not the Work of an Hour, or a Day.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Contentment.

§. 1. CONCERNING the Gods, some affirm, that there is no Deity: others, that he indeed exists; but slothful, negligent, and without a Providence: a third Sort admit both his

Being and Providence, but only in great and heavenly Objects, and in nothing upon Earth : a fourth, both in Heaven and Earth ; but only in general, not Individuals : a fifth, like *Ulysses* and *Socrates* (a) :

*O Thou, who, ever present in my Way,
Dost all my Motions, all my Toils survey.*
POPE'S HOMER.

It is, before all Things, necessary to examine each of these ; which is, and which is not, rightly said. Now, if there are no Gods, how is it our End to follow them ? If there are, but they take no Care of any thing ; how will it be right, in this Case, to follow them ? Or, if they both are, and take Care ; yet, if there is nothing communicated from them to Men, nor indeed to myself in particular, how can it be right even in this Case ? A wise and good Man, after examining these Things, submits his Mind to him who administers the Whole, as good Citizens do to the Laws of the Commonwealth.

§. 2. He, then, who comes to be instructed, ought to come with this Intention : “ How may
“ I

(a) It was the Opinion of *Socrates*, That the Gods know all Things that are either said or done, or silently thought on : that they are every where present, and give Significations to Mankind concerning all human Affairs.
XEN. MEM. L. I.

“ I in every thing follow the Gods ? How may
 “ I acquiesce in the divine Administration ? And
 “ how may I be free ?” For He is free, to whom
 all happens agreeably to his Choice, and whom
 no one can restrain.

What ! then, is Freedom Distraction ?

By no means : for Madness and Freedom are
 incompatible.

But I would have whatever appears to me to be
 right, happen ; however it comes to appear so.

You are mad : you have lost your Senses. Do
 not you know, that Freedom is a very beautiful
 and valuable Thing ? But for me to chuse at
 random, and for things to happen agreeably to
 such a Choice, may be so far from a beautiful
 Thing, as to be, of all others, the most shock-
 ing. For how do we proceed in Writing ? Do
 I chuse to write the Name of *Dion* [for Instance]
 as I will ? No : but I am taught to be willing to
 write it, as it ought to be writ. And what is the
 Case in Music ? The same. And what in every
 other Art or Science ? Otherwise, it would be to
 no Purpose to learn any thing ; if it was to be
 adapted to each one’s particular Humour. Is it
 then only in the greatest and principal Point,
 that of Freedom, permitted me to will at ran-
 dom ? By no means : but true Instruction is this :
 learning to will, that Things should happen as
 they do. And how do they happen ? As the

Appointer of them hath appointed. He hath appointed, that there should be Summer and Winter; Plenty and Dearth; Virtue and Vice; and all such Contraries, for the Harmony of the Whole (a). To each of us he hath given a Body, and its Parts, and our several Properties, and Companions. Mindful of this Appointment, we should enter upon a Course of Education and Instruction, not to change the Constitutions of Things; which is neither put within our Reach, nor for our Good; but that, being as they are, and as their Nature is with regard to us, we may have our Mind accommodated to what exists. Can we, for Instance, fly Mankind? And how is, that, possible? Can we, by conversing with them, change them? Who hath given us such a Power? What then remains, or what Method is, there to be found for such a Commerce with them, that while they act agreeably to the Appearances in their own Minds, we may nevertheless be affected conformably to Nature? But you are wretched and discontented. If you are alone, you term it a Desert; and if, with Men, you call them Cheats and Robbers. You find Fault too with your Parents, and Children, and Brothers, and Neighbours. Whereas you ought, when you live alone, to call that a Repose and Freedom; and to esteem yourself as resembling

(a) See *Enchiridion*, c. xxviii

the Gods : and when you are in Company, not to call it a Crowd and a Tumult, and a Trouble; but an Assembly, and a Festival; and thus to take all Things contentedly. What, then, is the Punishment of those who do not? To be just as they are. Is any one discontented with being alone? Let him be in a Desert (*b*). Discontented with his Parents? Let him be a bad Son; and let him mourn, Discontented with his Children? Let him be a bad Father. Throw him into Prison. What Prison? Where he already is : for he is in a Situation against his Will; and wherever any one is against his Will, that is to him a Prison : just as *Socrates* was not in Prison; for he was willingly there. “What then must my Leg be lame?”—And is it for one poultry Leg, Wretch, that you accuse the World? Why will you not give it up to the Whole? Why will you not withdraw yourself from it? Why will you not gladly yield it to him who gave it? And will you be angry and discontented with the Decrees of *Jupiter*; which he, with the *Fates*, who spun in his Presence the Thread of your Birth, ordained and appointed? Do not you know how very small a Part you are of the Whole? That is, as to Body : for, as to Reason, you are neither worse, nor less, than the Gods. For Reason is not measured by Length or Height; but

D. 6.

by

(*b*) See Introduction, §. 20.

by Principles. Will you not therefore place your Good there, where you are equal to the Gods (2)?
 "How wretched am I in such a Father and
 "Mother!"—What, then, was it granted you
 to come before-hand, and make your own Terms,
 and say; "Let such and such Persons, at this
 "Hour, be the Authors of my Birth?" It was
 not granted: for it was necessary that your Pa-
 rents should exist before you, and so you be born
 afterwards.—Of whom?—Of just such as they
 were. What, then, since they are such, is there
 no Remedy afforded you? Now, surely, if you
 were ignorant to what Purpose you possess the
 Faculty of Sight, you would be wretched and
 miserable, in shutting your Eyes at the Approach
 of Colours: and are not you more wretched and
 miserable, in being ignorant, that you have a
 Greatness of Soul, and a manly Spirit, answer-
 able to each of the abovementioned Accidents?
 Occurrences proportioned to your Faculty [of
 Discernment] are brought before you: but you
 turn it away, at the very Time when you ought
 to have it the most open, and quick-sighted.
 Why do not you rather thank the Gods, that
 they have made you superior to whatever they
 have not placed in your own Power; and have
 rendered you accountable for that only, which
 is

(c) One of the Stoic Extravagancies; arising from the
 Notion, that human Souls were literally Parts of the Deity.

is in your own Power? Of your Parents they acquit you; as not accountable: of your Brothers they acquit you: of Body, Possessions, Death, Life, they acquit you. For what, then, have they made you accountable? For that which is alone in your own Power: a right Use of the Appearances of Objects. Why, then, should you draw those Things upon yourself, for which you are not accountable? This is giving one's self Trouble, without need.

C H A P. XIII.

How every Thing may be performed acceptably to the Gods.

WHEN a Person inquired, How any one might eat acceptably to the Gods: if he eats with Justice, says *Epicetus*, and Gratitude; and fairly and temperately, and decently, must he not also eat acceptably to the Gods? And when you call for hot Water, and your Servant doth not hear you; or, if he doth, brings it only warm; or perhaps is not to be found at home; then, not to be angry, or burst with Passion: is not this acceptable to the Gods?

But how, then, can one bear such things?

Wretch, will you not bear with your own Brother, who hath God for his Father, as being a Son from the same Stock, and of the same high
Descent

Descent [with yourself]? But, if you chance to be placed in some superior Station, will you presently set yourself up for a Tyrant? Will you not remember what you are, and over whom you bear Rule? That they are by Nature your Relations, your Brothers; that they are the Offspring of God (a)?

But I have them by Right of Purchase, and not they me.

Do you see what it is you regard? That it is Earth and Mire, and these wretched Laws of dead (b) Men; and that you do not regard those of the Gods.

C H A P. XIV.

That all Things are under the divina Inspection.

§. 1. **W**HEN a Person asked him, How any one might be convinced, that each of his Actions are under the Inspection of God? Do not you think, says *Epietetus*, that all Things are mutually bound together, and united?

I do.

Well:

(a) If I did despise the Cause of my Man Servant, or my Maid Servant, when they contended with me: what then shall I do when God riseth up? And when he riseth, what shall I answer him? Did not he who made me in the Womb, make him? And did not One fashion us in the Womb? Job xxxi.

13, 14, 15.

(b) i. e. Deceased Legislators, who had in View low and worldly Considerations.

Well: and do not you think, that Things on Earth feel the Influence of the heavenly Bodies?

Yes.

Else how could the Trees so regularly, as if by God's express Command, bud, (a) blossom, bring forth Fruit, and ripen it: then let it drop, and shed their Leaves, and lie contracted within themselves in Quiet and Repose; all when He speaks the Word? Whence, again, are there seen, on the Increase and Decrease of the Moon, and the Approach and Departure of the Sun, so great Vicissitudes and Changes, to the direct contrary, in earthly Things? Have then the very Leaves, and our own Bodies, this Connection and Sympathy with the Whole; and have not our Souls much more? But our Souls are thus connected and intimately joined to God, as being indeed Members, and distinct Portions, of his Essence: and must not be sensible of every Movement of them, as belonging, and connatural to himself? Can even you think of the divine Administration, and every other divine Subject, and together with these of human Affairs also? Can you at once receive Impressions on your Senses and your Understanding, from a thousand Objects? At once assent to some things, deny or suspend your

(a) There is a Beauty in the Original, arising from the different Terminations in the Verbs, which cannot be preserved in our Language.

your Judgment concerning others, and preserve in your Mind Impressions from so many and various Objects, and whenever you are moved by [the Traces of] them, hit on Ideas similar to those which first impressed you? Can you retain a Variety of Arts, and the Memorials of ten thousand Things? And is not *God* capable of surveying all Things, and being present with all, and receiving a certain Communication from all? Is the Sun capable of illuminating so great a Portion of the Universe, and of leaving only that small Part of it unilluminated, which is covered by the Shadow of the Earth: and cannot *He* who made and revolves the Sun, a small Part of himself, if compared with the Whole; cannot *He* perceive all Things?

§. 2. “But *I* cannot (say you) attend to all “Things at once.” Why, doth any one tell you, that you have equal Power with *Jupiter*? No: but nevertheless He has assigned to each Man a Director, his own good Genius, and committed him to his Guardianship: a Director, whose Vigilance no Slumbers interrupt, and whom no false Reasonings can deceive. For, to what better and more careful Guardian could he have committed us? So that when you have shut your Doors, and darkened your Room, remember, never to say that you are alone; for you are not: but God is within, and your Genius is within: and what need have

have they ~~of~~ Light, to see what you are doing? To (b) this God you likewise ought to swear such an Oath as the Soldiers do to *Cæsar*. For do they, in order to receive their Pay, swear to prefer before all things, the Safety of *Cæsar*: and will not *you* swear, who have received so many and so great Favours: or, if you have sworn, will you not stand to it? And what must you swear? Never to disobey, nor accuse, nor murmur at any of the Things appointed by him: nor unwillingly to do or suffer any thing necessary. Is this Oath like the former? In the first, Persons swear not to honour any other beyond *Cæsar*; in the last, beyond all, to honour themselves.

CHAP. XV.

What it is that Philosophy promises.

§. I. **W**HEN one consulted him, 'How he might persuade his Brother to forbear treating him ill: Philosophy, answered *Epictetus*, doth not promise to procure any thing external to Man; otherwise it would admit something beyond its proper Subject-matter. For the Subject-matter of a Carpenter is Wood; of a Statuary, Brass: and

(b) Perhaps the *καὶ* in this Line may have been misplaced; and it should be read *τῷ καὶ τῷ θεῷ ἰδίῳ υμᾶς*; and then the Translation will be—To this [Genius] and to God you ought to swear, &c.

and so, of the Art of Living, the Subject-matter is each Person's own Life.

What, then, is my Brother's?

That, again, belongs to his own Art [of Living;] but to your's is external: like an Estate, like Health, like Reputation. Now Philosophy promises none of these. In every Circumstance I will preserve the governing Part conformable to Nature. Whose governing Part? His in whom I exist.

But how, then, is my Brother to lay aside his Anger against me?

Bring him to me, and I will tell *him*; but I have nothing to say to *you* about his Anger.

§. 2. Well; but I still farther ask, How am I to keep myself in a State of Mind conformable to Nature, though he should not be reconciled to me?

No great Thing is brought to Perfection suddenly; when not so much as a Bunch of Grapes or a Fig is. If you tell me, that you would at this Minute have a Fig, I will answer you, that there must be Time. Let it first (a) blossom, then bear Fruit, then ripen. Is then the Fruit
of

(a) The Philosopher had forgot that Fig-trees do not blossom: and is less excusable than the *English* Translators of the Bible, *Hab.* iii. 17. to whom Fig-trees were not so familiar. But the *Hebrew* Word used there signifies rather in general to shoot out, thrive, than in particular to flower. The LXX have *καρποποιεῖς*; reading, perhaps, *μισθω* for *μισθ*. This Note was given to the Translator by a Friend.

of a Fig-tree not brought to Perfection suddenly, and in one Hour; and would you possess the Fruit of the human Mind in so short a Time, and without Trouble? I tell you, expect no such thing.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Providence.

§. 1. **B**E not surpris'd, if other Animals have all Things necessary to the Body ready provided for them, not only Meat and Drink but Lodging: that they want neither Shoes, nor Bedding, nor Cloaths: while we stand in need of all these. For they not being made for themselves, but for Service, it was not fit that they should be formed so as to need the Help of others. For, consider what it would be for us to take care, not only for ourselves, but for Sheep and Asses too: how they should be clothed, how shod, and how they should eat and drink. But as Soldiers are ready for their Commander, shod, clothed, and armed (for it would be a grievous thing for a Colonel to be obliged to go through his Regiment to put on their Shoes, and Clothes): so Nature likewise has formed the Animals made for Service, ready provided, and standing in need of no further Care. Thus one little Boy, with only a Crook, drives a Flock.

§. 2. But now we, instead of being thankful for this, complain of God, that there is not the same kind of Care taken of us likewise. And yet, good Heaven! any one Thing in the Creation is sufficient to demonstrate a Providence, to a modest and grateful Mind. Not to instance at present in great Things: but only in the very Production of Milk from Grass, Cheese from Milk, and Wool from Skins: who formed and contrived these Things? No one, say you. O surprising Stupidity, and want of Shame! But come; let us omit the *Works* of Nature. Let us contemplate what she hath done, as it were, by-the-bye. What is more useless than the Hairs which grow on the Chin? And yet hath she not made use even of these, in the most becoming manner possible? Hath she not by these distinguished the Sexes? Doth not Nature in each of us call out, even at a Distance, I am a Man; approach and address me as such; enquire no farther; see the Characteristic. On the other hand, with regard to Women, as she hath mixed something softer in their Voice, so she hath deprived them of a Beard. But no: to be sure, the Animal should have been left undistinguished, and each of us obliged to proclaim, *I am a Man!* But why is not this Characteristic beautiful and becoming, and venerable? How much more beautiful than the Comb of Cocks; how much more noble than the Mane of Lions!

Therefore,

Therefore, we ought to have preserved the divine Characteristics : we ought not to have rejected them ; nor confounded, as much as in us lay, the distinct Sexes.

§. 3. Are these the only Works of Providence, with regard to us (a). And what Words can proportionably express our Applauses and Praise ? For, if we had any Understanding, ought we not both, in public and in private, incessantly to sing Hymns, and speak well of the Deity, and rehearse his Benefits ? Ought we not, whether we are digging, or ploughing, or eating, to sing the Hymn [due] to God ? Great is God, who has supplied us with these Instruments to till the Ground : Great is God, who has given us Hands, a Power of Swallowing, a Stomach : who has given us to grow insensibly, to breathe in Sleep. [Even] these Things we ought upon every Occasion to celebrate ; but to make it the Subject of the greatest and most divine Hymn, that he has given us the Faculty of apprehending them, and using them in a proper Way. Well then : because the most of you are blind and insensible, was it not necessary, that there should be some one to fill this Station, and give out, for all Men, the Hymn to God ? For what else can I, a lame old Man, do, but sing Hymns to God ? If I was a Nightingale, I would act the Part of a Nightingale :

(a) Something here seems to be lost.

Nightingale: if a Swan (*b*), the Part of a Swan. But, since I am a reasonable Creature, it is my Duty to praise God. This is my Business. I do it. Nor will I ever desert this Post, as long as it is vouchsafed me: and I exhort you to join in the same Song (*c*).

C H A P. XVII.

That the Art of Reasoning is necessary.

§. 1. **SINCE** it is Reason which sets in Order and finishes all other Things, it ought not itself to be left in Disorder. But by what shall it be set in Order?

Evidently, either by itself, or by something else.

Well: either *that* too is Reason, or there is something else superior to Reason (which is impossible): and, if it be Reason, what, again, shall set that in Order? For, if Reason can set itself in Order in one Case, it can in another: and, if we will still require any thing further, it will be infinite, and without End.

But, the more urgent Necessity is to cure [our Opinions, Passions], and the like (*a*).

Would

(*b*) The Ancients imagined Swans could sing very melodiously.

(*c*) Beautiful and affecting Examples of such Praise and Exhortation, see in *Psal.* xxxiv. civ. cxlv. and other Parts of the sacred Writings.

(*a*) The Sense here is supplied from a Conjecture of *Wolfius*.

Would you hear about these, therefore? Well: hear. But then, if you should say to me, "I cannot tell whether your Arguments are true or false;" and if I should happen to express myself doubtfully, and you should say, "distinguish [which Sense you mean]," I will bear with you no longer; but will retort your own Words upon you; *the more urgent Necessity is, &c.* Therefore, I suppose, the Art of Reasoning is first settled: just as, before the Measuring of Corn, we settle the Measure. For, unless we first determine what a Bushel, and what a Balance, is, how shall we be able to measure or weigh? Thus, in the present Case: unless we have first learnt, and accurately examined, that which is the Criterion of other Things, and by which other Things are learnt, how shall we be able accurately to learn any thing else? And how is it possible? Well: a Bushel, however, is only Wood, a Thing of no Value [in itself]: but it measures Corn. And Logic [you say] is of no Value in itself. That we will consider hereafter. Let us, for the present, then, make the Concession. It is enough that it distinguishes and examines, and, as one may say, measures and weighs all other Things. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And doth not Antisthenes say it? And who is it, then, who has written, That the Beginning of a right Edu-

cation is the Examination of Words? Doth not *Socrates* say it? Of whom, then, doth *Xenophon* write, That he began by the Examination of Words; what each signified (b).

§. 2. Is this, then, the great and admirable Thing, to understand or interpret *Chrysippus*?

Who says that it is? But what, then, is the admirable Thing?

To understand the Will of Nature.

Well then: do you apprehend it of yourself? In that Case, what Need have you for any one else? For, if it be true, that Men never err but involuntarily; and you have learnt the Truth, you must necessarily act right.

But, indeed, I do not apprehend the Will of Nature.

Who, then, shall interpret that?

They say, *Chrysippus* (c). I go and enquire what this Interpreter of Nature says. I begin not to understand his Meaning. I seek one to interpret that. Here explain how this is expressed, and as if it were put into *Latin*. How, then, doth a supercilious Self-opinion belong to the Interpreter!

Indeed,

(b) So the Stoics were remarkably exact in tracing the Etymology of Words: a Study, certainly, of very great Use: but, by too great Subtlety and Refinement, they were often led by it into much Trifling and Absurdity.

(c) See the *Enchiridion*, ch. xlix.

Indeed, it doth not justly belong to *Chrysippus* himself, if he only interprets the Will of Nature, and doth not follow it: and much less to his Interpreter. For we have no need of *Chrysippus*, on his own Account; but that, by his Means, we may apprehend the Will of Nature: nor do we need a Diviner on his own Account; but that, by his Assistance, we hope to understand future Events, and what is signified by the Gods: nor the Entrails of the Victims, on their own Account; but, on the Account of what is signified by them: neither is it the Raven, or the Crow, that we admire; but the God, who delivers his Significations by their Means. I come, therefore, to the Diviner and Interpreter of these Things; and say, "Inspect the Entrails for me: what is signified to me?" Having taken, and laid them open, he thus interprets them. You have a Choice, Man, incapable of being restrained or compelled. This is written here in the Entrails. I will show you this first, in the Faculty of Assent. Can any one restrain you from assenting to Truth?—"No one."—Can any one compel you to admit a Falshood?—"No one."—You see, then, that you have in this Topic, a Choice incapable of being restrained, or compelled, or hindered. Well: is it any otherwise with regard to *Pursuit* and *Desire*? What can conquer one Pursuit?—"Another Pursuit."—"What, Vol. I. E "Desire

“Desire and Aversion? Another Desire and
 “another Aversion.” If you *set Death before me*
 (say you) *you compel me*. No: not what is set
 before you doth it: but your Principle, that it is
 better to do such or such a thing, than to die.
 Here, again, you see it is your own Principle
 which compels you: that is, Choice compels
 Chelte. For, if God had constituted that Por-
 tion which he hath separated from his own Essence,
 and given to us, capable of being restrained or
 compelled, either by himself, or by any other,
 he would not have been God; nor have taken
 care of us, in a due manner.

§. 3. These Things, says the Diviner, I find in
 the Victims. These Things are signified to you.
 If you please, you are free. If you please, you
 will have no one to complain of, no one to ac-
 cuse. All will be equally according to your own
 Mind; and to the Mind of God.

§. 4. For the Sake of this Oracle, I go to the
 Diviner and the Philosopher: admiring not *him*
 merely, on the Account of his Interpretation, but
 the *Things* which he interprets.

C H A P. XVIII.

That we are not to be angry with the Errors of others.

§. 1. (a) **I**F what the Philosophers say be true,
That all Mens Actions proceed from
one Source: that, as they assent, from a Persuasion
that a Thing is so, and dissent, from a Persuasion
that it is not; and suspend their Judgment, from
a Persuasion that it is uncertain; so, likewise, they
exert their Pursuits, from a Persuasion that such a
Thing is for their Advantage: and it is impossible
to esteem one Thing advantageous, and desire an-
other; to esteem one Thing a Duty, and pursue
another: why, after all, should we be angry at
the Multitude?

They are Thieves and Pilferers.

What do you mean by Thieves and Pilferers?
They are in an Error concerning Good and Evil.
Ought you, then, to be angry, or to pity them?

E 2

Do

(a) The most ignorant Persons often practise what they
know to be evil: and they, who voluntarily suffer, as many
do, their Inclinations to blind their Judgment, are not jus-
tified by following it. The Doctrine of *Epictetus*, there-
fore, here, and elsewhere, on this Head, contradicts the
Voice of Reason and Conscience: nor is it less pernicious,
than ill grounded. It destroys all Guilt and Merit, all
Punishment and Reward, all Blame of ourselves or others,
all Sense of Misbehaviour towards our Fellow-creatures,
or our Creator. No wonder that such Philosophers did not
teach Repentance towards God.

Do but show them their Error, and you will see, that they will amend their Faults : but, if they do not see it, the Principles they form, are to them their supreme Rule.

What, then, ought not this Thief and this Adulterer to be destroyed ?

By no means [ask that] : but say rather (b),
 “ Ought not he to be destroyed, who errs and is
 “ deceived in Things of the greatest Importance ;
 “ blinded, not in the Sight that distinguishes White
 “ from Black, but in the Judgment, that distin-
 “ guishes Good from Evil ? ” By stating your
 Question thus, you see how inhuman it is ; and
 just as if you would say, “ Ought not this blind,
 “ or that deaf Man, to be destroyed ? ” For, if
 the greatest Hurt be a Deprivation of the most
 valuable Things, and the most valuable Thing
 to every one is a right Judgment in chusing ;
 when any one is deprived of this, why, after all,
 are you angry ? You ought not to be affected,
 Man, contrary to Nature, by the Ills of another.
 Pity (c) him rather. Do not be angry ; nor say,
 as

(b) Several Words are wanting in different Places of some of the following Lines of the *Greek* ; which are conjecturally supplied in the Translation from Mr. Upton's Version.

(c) See *Gal.* vi. 1. and many other Parts of the New Testament, in which all the Humanity and Tenderness prescribed by the Stoics are enjoined ; and the dangerous Notions, on which they found them, are avoided.

as many do, What ! shall these execrable and odious Wretches dare to act thus ! Whence have you so suddenly learnt Wisdom ? Because we admire those Things which such People take from us. Do not admire your Clothes, and you will not be angry with the Thief. Do not admire the Beauty of your Wife, and you will not be angry with an Adulterer. Know, that a Thief and an Adulterer have no Place in the Things that are properly your own : but in those that belong to others ; and which are not in your Power. If you give up these Things, and look upon them as nothing, with whom will you any longer be angry ? But, while you admire them, be angry with yourself, rather than with others. Consider only : you have a fine Suit of Clothes ; your Neighbour has not. You have a Casement ; you want to air them. He knows not in what the Good of Man consists ; but imagines it is in a fine Suit of Clothes : the very Thing which you imagine too. Must not he, then, of course, come and take them away ? When you show a Cake to greedy People, and are devouring it all yourself ; would not you have them snatch it from you ? Do not provoke them. Do not have a Casement. Do not air your Clothes. I, too, the other Day, had an Iron Lamp burning before my Household Deities. Hearing a Noise at the Window, I ran. I found my Lamp was

stolen. I considered, that he who took it away, did nothing unaccountable. What then? Tomorrow, says I, you shall find an Earthen one: for a Man loses only what he hath. *I have lost my Coat.* Ay: because you had a Coat. *I have a Pain in my Head.* Why, can you have a Pain in your Horns (d)? Why, then, are you out of Humour? For Loss and Pain can be only of such Things as are possessed.

§. 2. But the Tyrant will chain—What?—A Leg—He will take away—What?—A Head.—What is there, then, that he can neither chain, nor take away?—The Will, and Choice. Hence the Advice of the Ancients—*Know thyself.*

What ought to be done, then?

Exercise yourself, for Heaven's sake, in little Things; and thence proceed to greater. “I have a Pain in my Head.”—Do not cry, alas!—“I have a Pain in my Ear.”—Do not cry, alas! I do not say, you may not groan; but do not groan inwardly: or, if your Servant is a long while in bringing you something to bind your Head, do not bawl, and distort yourself; and say, “Every body hates me.” For, who would not hate such a one?

§. 3. Relying for the future on these Principles, walk upright, and free; not trusting to Bulk of
Body,

(d) This alludes to a famous Quibble among the Stoics. *What you have not lost, you have: but you have not lost a Pair of Horns; therefore you have a Pair of Horns.* UPTON.

Body, like a Wrestler : for one should not be unconquerable in the Sense that an Ass is.

Who then is unconquerable ? He whom nothing, independent on Choice, disconcerts. Then I run over every Circumstance, and consider [such a one in each. As they say] of an athletic Champion. He has been victorious in the first Encounter : What will he do in the Second ? What, if the Heat should be excessive ? What, if he were to appear at *Olympia* ? So I say in this Case. What, if you throw Money in his Way ? He will despise it. What, if a Girl ? What, if in the dark ? What, if he be tried by popular Fame, Calumny, Praise, Death ? He is able to overcome them all. What, then, if he be placed in the Heat, or in the Rain (ε) ? What, if he be hypo-

E 4 chondriac,

(e) Mr. *Upton* observes, That *Epictetus* here applies to the wise Man, what he had just been saying of the athletic Champion : and he proposes a Change in one Word ; by which, instead of the Heat, or the Rain, the Translation will be, in a Fever, or in Drink. For the Stoics held their wise Man to be a perfect Master of himself in all these Circumstances. The Passages which Mr. *Upton* produces from L. ii. c. 17. towards the End, and L. iii. c. 2. towards the Beginning, makes the Conjecture of *συναισθησις* for *δωμενος* as probable as it is ingenious. But yet the *τις οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος* is one would imagine to have crept in by a Repetition of the Transcriber, from the Description, a few Lines before ; as it is scarcely probable, that the same Word should be used by *Epictetus* in two different Senses, at so small a Distance, in the same Discourse.

chondriac, or asleep? [Just the same.] This is my unconquerable athletic Champion.

C H A P. XIX.

Of the Behaviour to be observed towards Tyrants.

§. 1. **W**HEN a Person is possessed of some either real or imaginary Superiority, unless he hath been well instructed, he will necessarily be puffed up with it. A Tyrant, for Instance, says; “I am supreme over All.”—And what can you do for *Me*? Can you exempt my Desires from Disappointment? How should you? For do you never incur your own Aversions? Are your own Pursuits infallible? Whence should *You* come by that Privilege? Pray, on Ship-board, do you trust to yourself, or to the Pilot? In a Chariot, to whom but to the Driver? And to whom in all other Arts? Just the same. In what, then, doth your Power consist?—“All Men pay Regard to me.”

So do I to my Desk. I wash it, and wipe it; and drive a Nail, for the Service of my Oil Flask.—“What, then, are these Things to be valued beyond *Me*?”—No: but they are of some Use to *me*, and therefore I pay Regard to them. Why, Do not I pay Regard to an *Ass*? Do I not wash his Feet? Do not I clean him? Do not you know, that every one pays Regard to himself; and
to

to you, just as he doth to an Ass? For who pays Regard to you as a Man? Show that. Who would wish to be like *You*? Who would desire to imitate *You*, as he would *Socrates*?—"But I can take off "your Head?"—You say right. I had forgot, that one is to pay Regard to you as to a Fever, or the Cholic; and that there should be an Altar erected to you, as there is to the Goddess *Fever* at *Rome*.

§. 2. What is it, then, that disturbs and strikes Terror into the Multitude? The Tyrant, and his Guards? By no means. What is by Nature free, cannot be disturbed, or restrained, by any thing but itself. But its own Principles disturb it. Thus, when the Tyrant says to any one; "I will chain your Leg:" he who values his Leg, cries out for Pity: while he, who sets the Value on his own Will and Choice, says; "If you imagine it for your Interest, chain it."—"What! do not you care?"—No: I do not care.—"I will show you that I am Master."—*You*? How should *You*? *Jupiter* has set me free. What! do you think he would suffer his own Son to be enslaved? You are Master of my Carcase. Take it.—"So that, when you come into "my Presence, you pay no Regard to me?"—No: but to myself: or, if you will have me say, to you also: I tell you; the same to you as to a Ripkin. This is not selfish Vanity: for every

Animal is so constituted, as to do every thing for its own Sake. Even the Sun doth all for his own Sake: nay; and to name no more, even *Jupiter* himself. But when he would be stiled the Dispenser of Rain and Plenty, and the Father of Gods and Men, you see that he cannot attain these Offices and Titles, unless he contributes to the common Utility. And he hath universally so constituted the Nature of every reasonable Creature, that no one can attain any of its own proper Advantages, without contributing something to the Use of Society. And thus it becomes not unsociable to do every thing for one's own Sake. For, do you expect, that a Man should desert himself, and his own Interest? How, then, can all Beings have one and the same original Instinct, Attachment to themselves? What follows then? That where those absurd Principles, concerning Things independent on Choice, as if they were either good or evil, are at the Bottom, there must necessarily be a Regard paid to Tyrants; and I wish it were to Tyrants only, and not to the very Officers of their Bed-chamber too. And how wise doth a Man grow on a sudden, when *Cæsar* has made him Clerk of the Close-stool? How immediately we say, "*Felicio* talked very sensibly to me!" I wish he were turned out of the Bed-chamber, that he might once more appear to you the Fool he is.

§. 3. *Epaphroditus* had [a Slave, that was] a Shoemaker; whom, because he was good for nothing, he sold. This very Fellow being, by some strange Luck, bought by a Courtier, became Shoemaker to *Cæsar*. Then you might have seen how *Epaphroditus* honoured him. “How doth good *Felicio* do, pray?” And, if any of us asked, what the great Man himself was about, it was answered; “He is consulting about Affairs with *Felicio*.” Did not he sell him, as good for nothing? Who, then, hath, all on a sudden, made a wise Man of him? This it is to honour any thing, besides what depends on Choice.

§. 4. Is any one exalted to the Office of Tribune? All that meet him congratulate him. One kisses his Eyes, another his Neck, and the Slaves his Hands. He goes to his House; finds it illuminated. He ascends the Capitol. Offers a Sacrifice. Now, who ever offered a Sacrifice for having good Desires? For exerting Pursuits conformable to Nature? For we thank the Gods for that wherein we place our Good.

§. 5. A Person was talking with me To-day about the Priesthood (a) of *Augustus*. I say to him, Let the Thing alone, Friend: you will be

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at

(a) When Temples began to be erected to the Emperors, as to Gods, the Office of Priest was purchased by vile Flatterers, at a very great Expence. UPTON from CAUSAUBON,

at great Expence for nothing. “ But my Name, “ says he, will be written in the Annals.” Will you stand by, then, and tell those who read them; “ *I am the Person whose Name is written there?*” But, if you could tell every one so now, what will you do when you are dead?—“ My Name “ will remain.”—Write it upon a Stone, and it will remain just as well. But, pray what Remembrance will there be of you out of *Nicopolis*?—“ But I shall wear a Crown (b) of Gold.”—If your Heart is quite set upon a Crown, take and put on one of Roses; for it will make the prettier Appearance.

C H A P. XX.

In what manner Reason contemplates itself.

EVERY Art, and every Faculty, contemplates some Things as its principal Objects. Whenever, therefore, it is of the same Nature with the Objects of its Contemplations, it necessarily contemplates itself too. But, where it is of a different Nature, it cannot contemplate itself. The Art of Shoemaking, for Instance, is exercised upon Leather; but is itself intirely distinct from the Materials it works upon: therefore it doth not

(b) Which was the Ornament of the Priests, while they were offering Sacrifice. *Nicopolis* was built by *Augustus*, in Memory of the Victory at *Actium*.

not contemplate itself. Again: Grammar is exercised on articulate Speech. Is the Art of Grammar itself, then, articulate Speech?

By no means.

Therefore it cannot contemplate itself. To what Purpose, then, is Reason appointed by Nature?

To a proper Use of the Appearances of Things. And what is Reason?

A Composition of certain Appearances to the Mind: and, thus, by its Nature, it becomes contemplative of itself too. Again: what Subjects of Contemplation belong to Prudence?

Good, and Evil, and Indifferent.

What, then, is Prudence itself?

Good.

What, Imprudence?

Evil.

You see, then, that it necessarily contemplates both itself and its contrary. Therefore, the first and greatest Work of a Philosopher is, to try and distinguish the Appearances; and to admit none untried. Even in Money, where our Interest seems to be concerned, you see what an Art we have invented; and how many Ways an Assayer uses to try its Value. By the Sight; the Touch; the Smell; and, lastly, the Hearing. He throws the Piece down, and attends to the Jingle; and is not contented with its Jingling only once;

but, by frequent Attention to it, becomes quite musical. In the same manner, whenever we think it of Consequence, whether we are deceived or not, we use the utmost Attention to distinguish those Things, which may possibly deceive us. But, yawning and slumbering over the poor miserable ruling Faculty, we admit every Appearance that offers. For here the Mischief does not strike us. When you would know, then, how very languidly you are affected by Good and Evil, and how vehemently by Things indifferent; consider how you are affected with regard to being blinded; and how with regard to being deceived; and you will find, that you are far from being moved, as you ought, in relation to Good and Evil.

But much previous Qualification, and much Labour, and Learning, are wanted.

What, then? Do you expect the greatest of Arts is to be acquired by slight Endeavours? And yet the principal Doctrine of the Philosophers, of itself, is short. If you have a Mind to know it, read *Zeno*, and you will see (a). For what Pro-
ximity

(a) *Zeno*, the Founder of the Stoic Sect, was born at Citium, a Sea-port Town, in the Island of Cyprus. He was originally a Merchant; and very rich. On a Voyage from Tyre, where he had been trading in Purple, he was shipwrecked, near the Piræum. During his Stay at Athens, he happened to meet, in a Bookseller's Shop, with the

Second

lixity is there in saying, *Our End is to follow the Gods?* And, *The Essence of Good consists in the proper Use of the Appearances of Things.* Indeed, if you say, *What, then, is God?* What is an *Appearance?* What is particular, what universal Nature? Here the Affair becomes prolix. And so, if *Epicurus* should come and say, that Good must be placed in Body; here, too, it will be prolix: and it will be necessary to hear, what is the principal, and substantial; and essential Part in us. It is unlikely, that the Good of a Snail should be placed in the Shell: and, is it likely, that the Good of a Man should? You yourself, *Epicurus*,
have

Second Book of *Xenophon's* Memoirs; with which he was extremely delighted; and asked the Bookseller, where such kind of Persons, as the Author mentioned, were to be found. The Bookseller answered, pointing to *Crates*, the Cynic, who was luckily passing by; Follow him: which *Zeno* did, and became his Disciple. But his Disposition was too modest to approve of the Cynic Indecency: and, forsaking *Crates*, he applied himself to the Academics; whom he attended for ten Years, and then formed a School of his own. There was a constant Severity, or, perhaps, Austerity, in his Manners, his Dress, and his Discourse; except at an Entertainment, when he used to appear with Cheerfulness and Ease. His Morals were irreproachable: and he was presented by the *Athenians* with a golden Crown; because his Life was a public Example of Virtue, by its Conformity with his Worth and Doctrines. He lived Ninety-eight Years, and then strangled himself; because, in going out of his School, he happened to fall down, and break his Finger. *DIOPH. LAERT. in ZENO.*

have something superior to this. What is That in you, which deliberates, which examines, which forms the Judgment, concerning Body itself, that it is the principal Part? And why do you light your Lamp, and labour for us, and write so many Books? That we may not be ignorant of the Truth? What are *We*? What are we to *You*? Thus the Doctrine becomes prolix.

C H A P. XXI.

Of the Desire of Admiration.

WHEN a Person maintains his proper Station in Life, he doth not gape after Externals. What would you have, Man?

“I am contented, if my Desires and Aversions are conformable to Nature: if I manage my Powers of Pursuit and Avoidance, my Purposes, and Intentions and Assent, in the Manner I was formed to do.”

Why, then, do you walk as if you had swallowed a Spit?

“I could wish moreover to have all who meet me, admire me, and all who follow me, cry out, What a great Philosopher!”

Who are those, by whom you would be admired? Are they not the very People, who, you used to say, were mad? What, then, would you be admired by Madmen?

C H A P.

C H A P. XXII.

Of Pre-conceptions.

§. 1. **P**RE-conceptions (a) are common to all Men: and one Pre-conception doth not contradict another. For, who of us doth not lay it down as a Maxim, That Good is advantageous and eligible, and at all Events, to be pursued and followed: that Justice is fair and becoming? Whence, then, arises the Dispute?—In adapting these Pre-conceptions to particular Cases. As, when one cries; “Such a Person hath acted well: he is a gallant Man:” and another; “No; he hath acted like a Fool.” Hence arises the Dispute among Men. This is the Dispute between *Jews*, and *Syrians*, and *Egyptians*, and *Romans*: not whether Sanctity be preferable to all Things, and in every Instance to be pursued; but whether the eating Swine’s Flesh be consistent with Sanctity, or not. This, too, you will find to have been the Dispute between *Achilles* and *Agamemnon*. For, call them forth. What say you, *Agamemnon*? Ought not that to be done, which is fit and right?—Yes, surely.—*Achilles*, what say you? Is it not agreeable to you, that what is right should be done?—Yes: beyond every other thing. Adapt your Pre-conceptions,

(a) See Introduction, §. 1a.

conceptions, then. Here begins the Dispute. One says ; “ It is not fit, that I should restore *Chryseis* “ to her Father.” The other says ; “ Yes ; but “ it is.” One, or the other of them, certainly makes a wrong Adaptation of the Pre-conception of *Fitness*. Again : one says ; “ If it be fit, that “ I should give up *Chryseis* ; it is fit, too, that I “ should take some one of your Prizes.” The other : “ What, that you should take my Mis- “ tress ? ” “ Ay ; yours.” “ What, *mine* only ? “ Must *I* only, then, lose my Prize ? ”

§. 2. What, then, is it to be properly educated ? To learn how to adapt natural Pre-conceptions to particular Cases, conformably to Nature : and, for the future, to distinguish, that some Things are in our own Power ; others not. In our own Power, are Choice, and all Actions dependent on Choice : not in our Power, the Body, the Parts of the Body, Property, Parents, Brothers, Children, Country ; and, in short, all with whom we are engaged in Society. Where, then, shall we place Good ? To what kind of Things shall we adapt the Pre-conception of it ? To that in our own Power.

§. 3. So, then ! is not Health, and Strength, and Life, good ? And are not Children, nor Parents, nor Country ? Who will have Patience with you ?

Let

Let us transfer it, then, to the other Sort of Things. Can he who suffers Harm, and is disappointed of good Things, be happy?

He cannot.

And can he preserve a right Behaviour with regard to Society? How is it possible he should? For I am naturally led to my own Interest. If, therefore, it is for my Interest, to have an Estate, it is for my Interest likewise to take it away from my Neighbour. If it is for my Interest to have a Suit of Clothes; it is for my Interest likewise to steal it wherever I find it (b). Hence Wars, Seditions, Tyranny, unjust Invasions. How shall I, if this be the Case, be able, any longer, to preserve my Duty towards *Jupiter*? If I suffer Harm, and am disappointed, he takes no care of me. And, what is *Jupiter* to me, if he cannot help me: or, again; what is he to me, if he chuses I should be in the Condition I am? Henceforward I begin to hate him. What, then, do we build Temples, do we raise Statues, to *Jupiter*, as to evil Demons, as to the Goddess *Fever*? How, at this rate, is he the Preserver; and how the Dispenser of Rain and Plenty? If we place the Essence of Good any-where here, all this will follow.—What, then, shall we do?

§. 4.

(b) Wars and Fightings are ascribed to the same Causes, by St. James, iv. 1.

§. 4. This is the Enquiry of him who philosophizes in reality, and labours to bring forth [Truth]. “Do (c) not I now see what is good, “and what is evil?” Surely I am in my Senses. Ay: but shall I place Good any-where on this other Side; in Things dependent [only] on my own Chioce? Why, every one will laugh at me. Some grey-headed old Fellow will come, with his Fingers covered with Gold Rings, and shake his Head, and say; “Hark ye, Child, it is fit “you should learn Philosophy; but it is fit, too, “you should have Brains. This is Nonsense. “You learn Syllogisms from Philosophers: but “how you are to act, you know better than “they.” “Then, why do you chide me, Sir, “if I do know.” What can I say to this Wretch? If I make no Answer, he will burst. I must e’en answer thus: “Forgive me, as^s they do “People in Love. “I am not myself. I have “lost my Senses.

C H A P.

(c) This seems intended to express the Perplexity of a Person convinced, that Good is not to be found in *Externals*; and afraid of popular Raillery, if he places it in such Things only, as depend on our own Choice.

C H A P. XXIII.

Against EPICURUS.

§. I. **E**VEN *Epicurus* is sensible, that we are by Nature sociable: but having once placed our Good in the mere Shell, he can say nothing afterwards different from that. For, again, he strenuously maintains, that we ought not to admire, or receive, any thing separated from the Nature of Good. And he is in the right to maintain it. But how, then, came (a) any such Suspicions [as your Doctrines imply, to arise], if we have no natural Affection towards an Offspring? Why do you, *Epicurus*, dissuade a wise Man from bringing up Children? Why are you afraid, that, upon their Account, he may fall into Uneasinesses? Doth he fall into any for a Mouse, that feeds within his House? What is it to him, if a little *Mouse* bewails itself there? But *Epicurus* knew, that, if once a *Child* is born, it is no longer in our Power not to love and be solicitous for it. For the same Reason, he says, a wise Man will not engage himself in public Business: for he knew very well, what such an Engagement would oblige him to do: for what should

(a) This Passage is obscure; and variously read, and explained by the Commentators. It is here translated conjecturally.

should restrain any one from Affairs, if we may behave among Men, as we would among a Swarm of Flies?

§. 2. And doth He, who knows all this, dare to bid us not bring up Children? Not even a Sheep, or a Wolf, deserts its Offspring; and shall Man? What would you have? That we should be as silly as Sheep? Yet even these do not desert their Offspring. Or as savage as Wolves? Neither do these desert them. Pray, who would mind you, if he saw his Child fallen upon the Ground, and crying? For my Part, I am of Opinion, that your Father and Mother, even if they could have foreseen, that you would have been the Author of such Doctrines, would not, however, have thrown you away.

C H A P. XXIV.

How we are to struggle with Difficulties.

§. 1. **D**ifficulties are the Things that shew what Men are. For the future, on any Difficulty, remember, That God, like a (a) Master of Exercise, has engaged you with a rough Antagonist:

For

(a) The Greek Word signifies, a Person who used to anoint the Body of the Combatants; and prepare them, by proper Exercises, for the Olympic Games.

For what End?

That you may be a Conqueror, like one in the Olympic Games; and it cannot be without Toil. No Man, in my Opinion, has a more advantageous Difficulty on his Hands than you have; provided you will but use it, as an athletic Champion doth his Antagonist. We are now sending (b) a Spy to Rome: but no one ever sends a timorous Spy, who, when he only hears a Noise, or sees a Shadow, runs back, frightened out of his Wits, and says; "The Enemy is just at hand." So now, if you should come and tell us; "Things are in a fearful Way at Rome: Death is terrible; Banishment, terrible; Calumny, terrible; Poverty, terrible: run, good People, the Enemy is at hand:" we will answer; Get you gone, and prophesy for yourself; our only Fault is, that we have sent such a Spy. *Diogenes* (c) was

(b) Probably, according to Mr. Upton's Conjecture, it should be *et. We send you.*

Wulfius imagines this Passage to allude to the Commotions after the Death of *Nero*; when there were many Competitors for the Empire; and every one was eager to take the Part of him who appeared to have the greatest Probability of Success.

(c) *Diogenes*, passing through the Camp of *Philip*, at the Time that he was on his March against the *Greeks*, was taken, and brought before the King; who, not knowing him, asked, if he was a Spy. Yes, certainly, *Philip* (answered the Philosopher), I am a Spy of your Inconsiderateness,

was sent a Spy before *you*: but he told us other Tidings. He says, That Death is no Evil; for it is nothing base: that Defamation is only the Noise of Madmen. And what Account did this Spy give us of Pain? Of Pleasure? Of Poverty? He says, that, to be naked is better than a Purple Robe: to sleep upon the bare Ground the softest Bed: and gives a Proof of all he says, by his own Courage, Tranquillity, and Freedom; and, moreover, by a healthy and robust Body. There is no Enemy near, says he. All is profound Peace.—How so, *Diogenes*? Look upon *me*, says he. Am *I* hurt? Am *I* wounded? Have *I* run away from any one? This is such a Spy as he ought to be. But you come, and tell us one Thing after another. Go back again, and examine Things more exactly, and without Fear.

§. 2. What shall I do, then?

What do you do when you come out of a Ship? Do you take away the Rudder, or the Oars, along with you? What do you take, then? Your own, your Bottle, and your Bundle. So, in the present Case, if you will but remember what is your own, you will not claim what belongs to others. Are you bid to put off your Consular Robe?—Well:

I

rateness, and Folly, in risking your Kingdom and Person, without any Necessity, upon the Hazard of a single Hour. UPTON. The Story is thus told by *Plutarch*; but is related something differently by other Authors.

I am in my Equeſtrian. Put off that too.—I have only my Coat.—Put off that too.—Well: I am naked.—Still you raiſe my Envy.—Then e'en take my whole Body. If I can throw off a paultry Body, am I any longer afraid of a Tyrant (d) ?

§. 3. But ſuch a one will not leave me his Heir. What, then, have I forgot, that none of theſe Things is mine ? How, then, do we call them mine ? As a Bed, in an Inn. If the Landlord when he dies, leaves you the Beds ; well and good : but, if to another, they will be his ; and you will ſeek one elſewhere : and, conſequently, if you do not find one, you will ſleep upon the Ground : only ſleep quiet, and ſnore ſoundly ; and remember, that Tragedies have no other Subjects, but the Rich, and Kings, and Tyrants. No poor Man fills any other Place in one, than as Part of the Chorus : whereas Kings begin, indeed ; with Proſperity. “ *Crown the Palace with feſtive Garlands (e).* ” —But, then, about the third or fourth Act ; “ *Alas, Citheron ! Why didſt thou receive me !* ” Where are thy Crowns, Wretch ; where is thy Diadem ? Cannot thy Guards help thee ?

Whenever you approach any of theſe then, remember, that you meet a Tragic Player ; or, rather, not an Actor, but *Oedipus* himſelf.—But

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ſuch

(d) The Translation follows Mr. Upton's Reading.

(e) An Alluſion to the *Oedipus* of *Sophocles*.

such a one is happy. He walks with a numerous Train. Well: I join myself with the Croud, and I too walk with a numerous Train.

§. 4. But, remember the principal Thing; That the Door is open. Do not be more fearful than Children; but, as they, when the Play doth not please them, say; "I will play no longer:" so do you, in the same Case, say; "I will play no longer;" and go: but, if you stay, do not complain.

CHAP. XXV.

On the same Subject.

§. 1. IF these Things are true; and we are not stupid, or acting a Part, when we say, that the Good or Ill of Man consists in Choice, and that all besides is nothing to us; why are we still troubled? Why do we still fear? What hath been *our* Concern, is in no one's Power: what is in the Power of others, *we* do not regard. What Embarrassment have we left?

But direct me.

Why should I direct you? Hath not *Jupiter* directed you? Hath he not given you what is your *own*, incapable of Restraint, or Hindrance; and what is *not* your own, liable to both? What Directions, then, what Orders, have you brought from him? "By all Methods keep what is your
own:

“ own: what belongs to others, do not covet.
 “ Honesty, is your own: a Sense of virtuous
 “ Shame is your own. Who, then, can deprive
 “ you of these? Who can restrain you from
 “ making use of them, but yourself? And how
 “ do you do it? When you make that your Con-
 “ cern which is not your own, you lose what is.”
 Having such Precepts and Directions from *Jupiter*,
 what Sort do you still want from me? Am I
 better than *He*? More worthy of Credit? If you
 observe these, what others do you need? Or are
 not these Directions *his*? Produce your natural
 Pre-conceptions: produce the Demonstrations of
 Philosophers: produce what you have often heard,
 and what you have said yourself; what you have
 read, and what you have studied.

How long is it right to observe these Things,
 and not break up the Game?

As long as it goes on agreeably. A King is
 chosen at the *Saturnalian* Festival (for it was
 agreed to play at that Game): he orders; “ Do
 “ you drink: you mix the Wine: you sing:
 “ you go: you come.” I obey; that the Game
 may not be broken up by my Fault.—“ Well:
 “ but I bid you think yourself to be unhappy.”
 I do not think so: and who shall compel me to
 think so? Again: we agreed to play *Agamemnon*
 and *Achilles*. He who is appointed for *Agamemnon*,

says to me; "Go to *Achilles*, and force away "*Briseis*." I go. "Come." I come.

§. 2. We should converse in Life as we do in hypothetical Arguments. "Suppose it to be "Night."—Well: suppose it.—"Is it Day, "then?" No: for I admitted the Hypothesis, that it is Night.—"Suppose, that you think it "to be Night."—Well: suppose it.—"But think "also, in reality, that it is Night."—That doth not follow from the Hypothesis. Thus, too, in the other Case. Suppose you have ill Luck.—Suppose it.—"Are you, then, unlucky?"—Yes.—"Have you some cross Demon."—Yes.—"Well: but think too [in earnest], that you "are unhappy."—This doth not follow from the Hypothesis: and there is one who forbids me [to think so].

How long, then, are we to obey such Orders?

As long as it is worth while: that is, as long as I preserve what is becoming and fit.

§. 3. Further: some are peevish and fastidious; and say, I cannot dine with such a Fellow, to be obliged to hear him all Day recounting, how he fought in *Myſia*. "I told you, my Friend, how "I gained the Eminence. There I am besieged "again. But another says, "I had rather get "a Dinner, and hear him prate as much as he "pleases."

Do

Do you compare the Value of these Things, and judge for yourself: but do not let it be with Depression, and Anxiety; and with a Supposition, that you are unhappy: for no one compels you to that. Is the House in a Smoke? If it be a moderate one, I will stay: if a very great one, I will go out. For you must always remember, and hold to this, that the Door is open. "Well: do not live at *Nicopolis*."—I will not live there! —"Nor at *Athens*."—Well: nor at *Athens*. —"Nor at *Rome*."—Nor at *Rome* neither. —"But you shall live at *Gyaros* (a)."—I will live there. But living at *Gyaros* seems to me like living in a great Smoke. I will retire where no one can forbid me to live; (for that Abode is open to all) and put off my last (b) Garment, this paultry Body of mine: beyond this, no one hath any Power over me. Thus *Demetrius* said to *Nero*; "You sentence me to Death; and Nature, F 3 "you;"

(a) An Island in the *Ægean* Sea, to which the *Romans* used to banish Criminals.

(b) The Body, which *Epictetus* here compares to a Garment, is, by the sacred Writers, represented under the Figure of a House, or Tabernacle, *Job* iv. 19. 2 *Pet.* i. 13, 14. *St. Paul*, with a sublime Rapidly of Expression, joins the two Metaphors together, 2 *Cor.* v. 2—4. as, indeed, the one is but a looser, the other a closer Covering. The same Apostle hath made use of the Figure of Clothing, in another Place, in a strikingly beautiful Manner, 1 *Cor.* xv. 53, 54.

“you (c);” If I place my Admiration on Body, I give myself up for a Slave: if on an Estate; the same: for I immediately betray myself, how I may be taken. Just as when a Snake pulls in his Head, I say strike that Part of him which he guards: and be you assured, that whatever you shew a Desire to guard, there your Master will attack you. Remember but this, whom will you any longer flatter, or fear?

But I want to sit where the Senators do.

Do not you see, that by this you straiten yourself? You squeeze yourself?

Why, how else shall I see the Show, in the Amphitheatre cleverly?

Do not see it [at all], Man; and you will not be squeezed. Why do you give yourself Trouble? Or wait a little while; and when the Show is over, go sit in the Senators Places, and sun yourself. For remember, that this holds universally; we squeeze ourselves; we straiten ourselves: that is; our own Principles squeeze and straiten us. What is it to be reviled, for Instance? Stand by a Stone, and revile it; and what will you get? If you, therefore, would hear like a

Stone,

(c) *Anaxagoras* is said, by some, and *Socrates*, by others, to have made the same Speech, on receiving the News of his being condemned to Death by the Judges of *Athens*: and from one of them, probably, *Demetrius* borrowed it. *Demetrius* was a Cynic Philosopher; and is mentioned with high Approbation by *Seneca*.

Stone, what would your Reviler be the better? But, if the Reviler hath the Weakness of the Reviled for an Advantage-ground, then he carries his Point.—“Strip him.” “What do you mean by *him*?” “Take my Clothes; strip off *them* [if you will].”—“I have put an Affront upon you.”—“Much Good may it do you.”

§. 4. These Things were the Study of *Socrates*; and, by this Means, he always preserved the same Countenance. But *we* had rather exercise and study any thing, than how to become unrestrained and free.

The Philosophers talk Paradoxes.

And are there not Paradoxes in other Arts? What is more paradoxical, than the pricking any one's Eye, to make him see? If a Person was to tell this to one ignorant of Surgery, would not he laugh at him? Where is the Wonder then, if, in Philosophy too, many Truths appear Paradoxes to the Ignorant?

C H A P. XXVI.

What the Law of Life is.

§. 1. **A**S one [of his Scholars] was reading hypothetical Syllogisms; it is likewise a Law in these, says *Epicletus*, to admit what follows from the Hypothesis: but much more is it a Law in Life, to do what follows from Nature. For, if

we desire in every Subject of Action, and in every Circumstance, to keep up to Nature; we must, on every Occasion, evidently make it our Aim, neither to let Consequences escape our Observation, nor to admit Contradictions. Philosophers, therefore, first exercise us in Theory, which is the more easy Task, and then lead us to the more difficult: for in Theory, there is nothing to oppose our following what we are taught; but in Life, there are many Things to draw us aside. It is ridiculous then, to say, we must begin from these; for it is not easy to begin from the most difficult: and this Excuse must be made to those Parents, who dislike that their Children should learn philosophical Speculations.—“Am I to
“blame then, Sir, and ignorant of my Duty,
“and of what is incumbent on me? If this is
“neither to be learnt, nor taught, why do you
“find fault with me? If it is to be taught, pray
“teach me yourself: or, if you cannot, give me
“Leave to learn it from those who profess to un-
“derstand it. Besides: do you think that I vo-
“luntarily fall into Evil, and miss of Good?
“Heaven forbid! What then, is the Cause of
“my Faults?” Ignorance. “Are you not will-
“ing then, that I should get rid of my Ignorance?
“Who was ever taught the Art of Music, or
“Navigation, by Anger? Do you expect then,
“that your Anger should teach me the Art of
“Living?”

“Living?”—This however, is allowed to be said only by one who really hath that Intention. But he who reads these Things, and applies to the Philosophers, merely for the sake of shewing, at an Entertainment, that he understands hypothetical Syllogisms; what doth he do it for, but to be admired by some Senator, who happens to sit near him (a)

§. 2. I once saw a Person weeping and embracing the Knees of *Epaphroditus*; and deploring his hard Fortune, that he had not 50,000*l.* left. What said *Epaphroditus*, then? Did he laugh at him, as we should do? No: but cried out with Astonishment, Poor Man! How could you be silent? How could you bear it?

§. 3. The first Step, therefore, towards becoming a Philosopher, is, being sensible in what State the ruling Faculty of the Mind is: for, when a Person knows it to be in a weak one, he will not immediately employ it in great Attempts. But, for want of this, some, who can scarce get down a Morfel, buy, and set themselves to swallow, whole Treatises; and so they throw them up again, or cannot digest them: and then come Cholics, Fluxes, and Fevers. Such Persons ought to consider what they can bear. Indeed, it is

F 5

easy

(a) The Text is so very corrupt in some Parts of this Chapter, that the Translation must have been wholly conjectural; and therefore is omitted.

easy to convince an ignorant Person in Theory ; but in Matters relating to Life, no one offers himself to Conviction ; and we hate those who have convinced us. *Socrates* used to say, that we ought not to live a Life unexamined.

C H A P. XXVII.

Of the several Appearances of Things to the Mind : and what Remedies are to be provided for them.

§. I. **A**PPPEARANCES to the Mind are of Four Kinds. Things are either what they appear to be : or they neither are, nor appear to be : or they are, and do not appear to be : or they are not, and yet appear to be. To form a right Judgment in all these Cases, belongs only to the completely Instructed. But whatever presses, to that a Remedy must be applied. If the Sophistries of *Pyrrhonism* (a), or the Academy,

(a) *Pyrrho*, the Founder of the Sect of the *Pyrrhonists*, was born at *Elis*, and flourished about the Time of *Alexander*. He held, that there is no Difference between Just and Unjust, Good and Evil : that all Things are equally indifferent, uncertain, and undistinguishable ; that neither our Senses or Understanding give us either a true or a false Information : therefore, that we ought to give them no Credit ; but to remain without Opinion ; without Motion ; without Inclination ; and to say of every thing, that it no more is, than it is not ; that it is no more one thing than another ; and that against one Reason, there is always an equal

Academy, press us, the Remedy must be applied *there*: if specious Appearances, by which Things seem to be good which are not so, let us seek for a Remedy *there*. If it be Custom which presses us, we must endeavour to find a Remedy against that.

What Remedy is to be found against Custom?

A contrary Custom. You hear the Vulgar say, "Such a one, poor Soul! is dead."—Why, his Father died: his Mother died.—"Ay: but he" "was cut off in the Flower of his Age, and in a" "foreign Land."—Hear the contrary Ways of Speaking: withdraw yourself from these Expressions. Oppose to one Custom, a contrary Custom; to Sophistry, the Art of Reasoning, and the frequent Use and Exercise of it. Against specious Appearances, we must have clear Pre-conceptions,

F 6 brightened,

equal Reason to be opposed. His Life is said to have been conformable to his Principles; for that he never avoided any thing: and his Friends were obliged to follow him, to prevent his running under the Wheels of a Coach, or walking down a Precipice. But these Stories, perhaps, are nothing but mere Invention; formed to expose the Absurdities of his System. Once, when he saw his Master *Anaxarchus* fallen into a Ditch, he passed by him, without offering him any Assistance: *Anaxarchus* was consistent enough with his Principles, not to suffer *Pyrrho* to be blamed for this tranquil Behaviour: which he justified, as a laudable Instance of Indifference, and Want of Affection. A fine Picture this, of sceptical Friendship!

For a more complete Account of the System of *Pyrrho*, see *DIOG. LAERT.* in his Life. And *LIPSIUS* *Manuduct.* ad *Stoic. Philosoph.* L. ii. Dis. 3.

brightened up, and ready. When Death appears as an Evil, we ought immediately to remember, that Evils may be avoided, but Death is Necessity. For what can I do, or where can I fly from it? Let me suppose myself to be *Sarpedon*, the Son of *Jove*, that I may speak in the same gallant Way.

*Brave tho' we die, and honour'd if we live ;
Or let us Glory gain, or Glory give.* POPE.

If I can atchieve nothing myself, I will not envy another the Honour of doing some gallant Action. But suppose this to be a Strain too high for us; are not we capable [at least] of arguing thus?—Where shall I fly from Death? Shew me the Place; shew me the People, to whom I may have Recourse, whom Death doth not overtake. Shew me the Charm to avoid it. If there be none, what would you have me do? I cannot escape Death: but (b) cannot I escape the Dread of it? Must I die trembling, and lamenting? For the Origin of the Disease is, wishing for something that is not obtained. In consequence of this, if I can bring over Externals to my own Inclination, I do it: if not, I want to tear out the Eyes of whoever hinders me. For it is the Nature of Man, not to bear the being deprived of Good; not to bear the falling into Evil. And so, at last,
when

(b) The Translation follows Mr. Upton's Reading,
of the world.

when I can neither bring over Things [to my own Inclination], nor tear out the Eyes of him who hinders me, I sit down, and groan, and revile him whom I can; *Jupiter*, and the rest of the Gods (c). For what are they to me, if they take no care of me?

Oh! but you will be guilty of Impiety.

What then? Can I be in a worse Condition than I am now? In general, remember this, That unless Piety and Interest be placed in the same Thing, Piety cannot be preserved in any mortal Breast.

§. 2. Do not these Things seem to have Force (d)? Let a *Pyrrhonist*, or an Academic, come and oppose them. For my Part, I am not at Leisure; nor able to stand up as an Advocate for general Consent. Even if the Business were concerning an Estate, I should call in another Advocate. With what Advocate, then, am I contented [in the present Case]? With any that may be upon the Spot. I may be at a Loss, perhaps, to give a Reason, how Sensation is performed: whether it be diffused universally, or reside in a particular Part:

(c) The blasphemous Impatience, here introduced, resembles that which is strongly described, in a few Words, *Isa. viii. 21.*—*When they shall be hungry, they shall fret themselves; and curse their King, and their God, and look upward.*

(d) This is spoken in Opposition to the Sceptics, who are alluded to in the Beginning of the Chapter; and who say, that no Argument hath any Force.

Part : for I find Difficulties that shock me, in each Case : but, that you and I are not the same Person, I very exactly know.

How so ?

Why, I never, when I have a Mind to swallow any thing, carry it to *your* Mouth ; but *my own*. I never, when I wanted to take a Loaf, took a Brush : but went directly to the Loaf, as fit to answer my Purpose. And do you yourselves, who deny all Evidence of the Senses, act any otherwise ? Who of you, when he intended to go into a Bath, ever went into a Mill ?

What, then, must not we, to the utmost, defend these Points ? support the general Consent [of Mankind] ? be fortified against every thing that opposes it (e) ?

Who denies that ? But it must be done by him who hath Abilities ; who hath Leisure : but he, who is full of Trembling and Perturbation, and inward Disorders of Heart, must employ his Time about something else.

C H A P.

(e) This seems to be said by one of the Hearers, who wanted to have the Absurdities of the Sceptics confuted, and guarded against, by regular Argument. *Epietetus* allows this to be right, for such as have Abilities and Leisure : but recommends to others, the more necessary Task, of curing their own moral Disorders : and insinuates, that the mere common Occurrences of Life are sufficient to overthrow the Notions of the *Pyrrhonists*.

C H A P. XXVIII.

That we are not to be angry with Mankind. What Things are little, what great, among Men.

§. 1. **W**HAT is the Cause of Assent to any thing ?

Its appearing to be true.

It is not possible, therefore, to assent to what appears to be not true.

Why ?

Because it is the very Nature of the Understanding to agree to Truth ; to be dissatisfied with Falshood ; and to suspend its Belief, in doubtful Cases.

What is the Proof of this ?

Persuade yourself, if you can, that it is now Night.

Impossible.

Unpersuade yourself that it is Day.

Impossible.

Persuade yourself, that the Stars are, or are not, even.

Impossible.

§. 2. When any one, then, assents to what is false, be assured, that he doth not wilfully assent to it, as false (for, as *Plato* affirms, the Soul is never voluntarily deprived of Truth) : but what is false, appears to him to be true. Well, then :
Have

Have we, in Actions, any thing correspondent to True and False, in Propositions?

Duty, and contrary to Duty: Advantageous, and Disadvantageous: Suitable, and Unsuitable; and the like.

A Person then, cannot think a Thing advantageous to him, and not chuse it.

He cannot. But how says *Medea*?

“ *I know what Evils wait my dreadful Purpose ;*

“ *But vanquish'd Reason yields to powerful Rage.*”

Because she thought, that very Indulgence of her Rage, and the punishing her Husband, more advantageous than the Preservation of her Children.

Yes : but she is deceived.

Shew clearly to her, that she is deceived, and she will forbear : but, till you have shewn it, what is she to follow, but what appears to herself?

Nothing.

Why, then, are you angry (a) with her, that the unhappy Woman is deceived, in the most important Points; and instead of a human Creature, becomes a Viper? Why do not you rather, as we pity the Blind and Lame, so likewise pity those who are blinded and lamed, in their superior Faculties? Whoever, therefore, duly remembers, that the Appearance of Things to the Mind is the Standard of every Action to Man : that
this

(a) See Note a, c. 18. §. 1.

this is either right or wrong : and, if right, he is without Fault ; if wrong, he himself bears the Punishment : for that one Man cannot be the Person deceived, and another the Sufferer : will not be outrageous and angry at any one ; will not revile, or reproach, or hate, quarrel with, any one.

§. 3. So then, Have all the great and dreadful Deeds, that have been done in the World, no other Original than *Appearance* ?

Absolutely, no other. The *Iliad* consists of nothing but the Appearances [of Things to the Mind] ; and the Use of those Appearances. It *appeared* [right] to *Paris*, to carry off the Wife of *Menelaus*. It *appeared* [right] to *Helen*, to follow him. If, then, it had *appeared* [right] to *Menelaus*, to persuade himself, that it was an Advantage to be robbed of such a Wife, what could have happened ? Not only the *Iliad* had been lost, but the *Odyssey* too.

Do these great Events then, depend on so small a Cause ?

What are these Events, which you call great ?

Wars, and Seditious ; the Destruction of Numbers of Men ; and the Overthrow of Cities.

And what great Matter is there in all this ? Nothing. What great Matter is there in the Death of Numbers of Oxen, Numbers of Sheep, or in the burning or pulling down Numbers of Nests of Storks or Swallows ?

Are

Are these like Cases, then?

Perfectly like. The Bodies of Men are destroyed, and the Bodies of Sheep and Oxen. The Houses of Men are burnt, and the Nests of Storks. What is there great or dreadful in all this? Pray, shew me what Difference there is between the House of a Man, and the Nest of a Stork, so far as it is a Habitation *(b)*, excepting that Houses are built with Beams, and Tiles, and Bricks; and Nests, with Sticks and Clay?

What, then, is a Stork and a Man a like Thing? What do you mean?

With regard to Body, extremely like.

Is there no Difference, then, between a Man and a Stork?

Yes, surely: but not in these Things.

In what then?

Enquire; and you will find, that the Difference consists in something else. See whether it be not, in acting with Discernment: whether it be not, in a social Disposition; in Fidelity, Honour, Steadiness, Judgment.

§. 4. Where then, is the great Good or Evil of Man?

Where his Difference is. If this is preserved, and remains well fortified, and neither Honour, Fidelity, or Judgment, is destroyed; then he himself

(b) The Order of the following Words is disturbed in the Original. The Translation follows Mr. Upton's Correction.

self is preserved likewise : but, when any of these is lost and demolished, he himself is lost also. In this do all great Events consist. *Paris*, they say, was undone, because the *Greeks* invaded *Troy*, and laid it waste ; and his Family were slain in Battle. By no means : for no one is undone by an Action, not his own. All *that* was only laying waste the Nests of Storks. But his true Undoing was, when he lost the modest, the faithful, the hospitable, and the decent Character. When was *Achilles* undone ? When *Patroclus* died ? By no means. But when he gave himself up to Rage, when he wept over a Girl ; when he forgot, that he came there, not to get Mistresses, but to fight. This is human Undoing ; this is the Siege ; this the Overthrow : when right Principles are ruined ; when these are destroyed.

But, when Wives and Children are led away Captives, and the Men themselves killed, are not these Evils ?

Whence do you conclude them such ? Pray inform me, in my Turn.

Nay : but whence do you affirm, that they are not Evils ?

§. 5. Let us recur to the Rules. Produce the Pre-conceptions. One cannot sufficiently wonder at what happens, in this Respect. When we would judge of Light and Heavy, we do not judge by Guess : when of Strait and Crooked,

not.

not by Guess : and, in general, when it concerns us to know the Truth of any Particular, no one of us will do any thing, by Guess. But, where the first and principal Cause is concerned, of acting either right or wrong ; of being prosperous or unprosperous, happy or unhappy ; there only do we act rashly, and by Guess. . No-where any thing like a Balance ; no-where any thing like a Rule : but some Fancy strikes me, and I instantly act conformably to it. For am I better than *Agamemnon* or *Achilles* ; that they, by following their Fancies, should do and suffer so many Things ; and Fancy not suffice *me* ? And what Tragedy hath any other Original ? The *Atreus* of *Euripides*, what is it ? Fancy. The *Oedipus* of *Sophocles* ? Fancy. The *Phœnix* ? The *Hippolytus* ? All Fancy. To what Character, then, doth it belong, think you, to take no care of this Point ? What are they called who follow every Fancy ?

Madmen.

Do *we*, then, behave any otherwise ?

C H A P. XXIX.

Of Intrepidity.

§. 1. **T**HE Essence of Good and Evil, is a certain Disposition of the Choice.

What are External, then ?

Materials

Materials to the Faculty of Choice: in the Management of which, it will attain its own Good or Evil.

How, then, will it attain Good?

If it doth not admire the Materials themselves; for right Principles, concerning these Materials, constitute a good Choice: but perverse and distorted Principles, a bad one. This Law hath God ordained, who says; "If you wish for Good, receive it from yourself." You say, No: but from another.—"Nay; but from yourself." In consequence of this, when a Tyrant threatens, and sends for me; I say, Against what is your Threatning pointed? If he says, "I will chain you;" I answer, It is my *Hands* and *Feet* that you threaten. If he says, "I will cut off your Head;" I answer, It is my *Head* that you threaten. If he says, "I will throw you into Prison;" I answer, It is the Whole of this paultry *Body* that you threaten; and, if he threatens Banishment, just the same.

Doth not he threaten *you*, then?

If I am persuaded, that these Things are nothing to me, he doth not: but, if I fear any of them, it is *me* that he threatens. Whom, after all, is it that I fear? The Master of what? Of Things in my own Power? Of these no one is the Master. Of Things not in my Power? And what are these to *me*?

§. 2. What, then ! do you Philosophers teach us a Contempt of Kings ?

By no means. Who of us teaches any one to contend with them, about Things of which they have the Command ? Take my Body ; take my Possessions ; take my Reputation ; take those who are about me. If I persuade any one to contend for these Things, as his own, accuse me, with Justice.—“ Ay : but I would command your “ *Principles* too.”—And who hath given you that Power ? How can you conquer the Principle of another ?—By applying Terror, I will conquer it.—Do not you see, that (a) what conquers itself, is not conquered by another ? And nothing but itself can conquer the Choice. Hence, too, the most excellent and equitable Law of God ; that the Better should always prove superior to the Worse. Ten are better than one.

To what Purpose ?

For chaining, killing, dragging where they please ; for taking away an Estate. Thus Ten conquer One, in the Instances wherein they are better.

In what, then, are they worse ?

When the one hath right *Principles*, and the others have not. For can they conquer in this Point ? How should they ? If we were weighed in a Scale, must not the Heavier outweigh ?

§. 3.

(a) The Sense of this Passage seems to require that the first *are* should be read *is*.

§. 3. That ever *Socrates* should suffer such Things from the *Athenians* !

Wretch ! what do you mean by (b) *Socrates* ? Express the Fact as it is. That ever the poor paultry *Body* of *Socrates* should be carried away, and dragged to Prison, by such as were stronger [than itself] : that ever any one should give Hemlock to the *Body* of *Socrates* ; and that it should expire ! Do *these* Things appear wonderful to you ? *These* Things unjust ? Is it for such Things as *these* that you accuse God ? Had *Socrates*, then, no Equivalent for them ? In what, then, to him, did the Essence of Good consist ? Whom shall we mind ; you, or him ? And what doth he say ? “ *Anytus* and *Melitus* (c) may indeed kill ; but “ hurt me they cannot.” And again : “ If it so “ pleases God, so let it be.”

§. 4. But shew me, that he who hath the worse Principles, gets the Advantage over him, who hath the better. You never will shew it, nor any thing like

(b) *Socrates*, being asked by *Crito*, in what Manner he would be buried ? answered, As you please ; if you can lay hold on me, and I do not escape from you. Then, smiling, and turning to his Friends, I cannot, says he, persuade *Crito*, that I, who am now disputing, and ranging the Parts of my Discourse, am *Socrates* : but he thinks the Corpse, which he will soon behold, to be *me* ; and, therefore, asks how he must bury *me*. PLATO, in *Phad.* §. 64. FORSTER's Edition.

(c) The two principal Accusers of *Socrates*.

like it: for the Law of Nature and of God, is this; Let the Better be always superior to the Worse.

In what?

In that, wherein it is better. One Body is stronger than another: Many than one; and a Thief, than one who is not a Thief. Thus I, too, lost my Lamp; because the Thief was better at keeping awake, than I. But he bought a Lamp, at the Price of being a Thief, a Rogue, and a wild Beast. This seemed to him a good Bargain: and much Good may it do him!

§. 5. Well: but one takes me by the Coat, and draws me to the Forum; and then all the rest bawl out—"Philosopher, what Good do your *Principles* do you? See, you are dragging to Prison: "see, you are going to lose your Head!"—And, pray what Rule of Philosophy could I contrive, that, when a stronger than myself lays hold on my Coat, I should not be dragged? Or that, when ten Men pull me at once, and throw me into Prison, I should not be thrown there? But have I learnt nothing, then? I have learnt to know, whatever happens, that, if it is not a Matter of Choice, it is nothing to *me*. Have my Principles, then, done me no Good (*d*)!

What,

(*d*) This is evidently a Continuation of the Philosopher's Answer to those who reproached him, that his Principles had done him no Good; and, therefore, is translated in the first Person, though it is *ωφελήσει* and *ζήτεις* in the
Greek,

What, then ! do I seek for any thing else to do me Good, but what I have learnt ? Afterwards, as I sit in Prison, I say : He, who makes this Outcry, neither hears what Signal is given, nor understands what is said ; nor is it any Concern to him, to know what Philosophers say, or do. Let him alone.—[Well : but I am bid] to come out of Prison again.—If you have no further Need for me, in Prison, I will come out : if you want me again, I will return.—“ For how long [will “ you go on thus ?] ”—Just as long as (e) Reason requires I should continue in this paultry Body : when that is over, take it, and fare ye well. Only let not this be done inconsiderately ; nor from Cowardice ; nor upon every slight Pretence : for that, again, would be contrary to the Will of God : for he hath Need of such a World, and such [Creatures] to live on Earth. But, if he sounds

V O L. I.

G

a

Greek. This sudden Change of the Person, is very frequent in *Epicetetus* ; but would often disturb the Sense, if it was preserved in a Translation. Perhaps *ωφελησαι* is a Mistake, for *ωφελημαι* ; as M, Σ are the same Letters differently turned.

(e) The Meaning of *Epicetetus*, in this Passage, is not clear. If he is speaking of a voluntary Death, which some of his Expressions plainly imply, the Instance of *Socrates* seems improperly chosen : for he did not kill himself ; but was sentenced by the Laws of his Country : to which, indeed, he paid so great a Reverence, as to refuse all the Assistance which was offered by his Friends, in order to his Escape.

a Retreat, as he did to *Socrates*, we are to obey him, when he sounds it, as our General.

§. 6. Well: but are these Things to be said to the World?

For what Purpose? Is it not sufficient to be convinced one's self? When Children come to us, clapping their Hands, and saying; "To-morrow" "is the good Feast of *Saturn*:" do we tell them, that *Good* doth not consist in such Things? By no means: but we clap our Hands along with them. Thus, when you are unable to convince any one, consider him as a Child, and clap your Hands with him: or, if you will not do that, at least hold your Tongue. These Things we ought to remember; and, when we are called to any Difficulty, to know, that an Opportunity is come, of shewing whether we have been well taught. For he who goes from a philosophical Lecture to a difficult Point of Practice, is like a young Man who has been studying to solve Syllogisms. If you propose an easy one, he says; Give me rather a fine intricate one, that I may try my Strength. Even athletic Champions are displeased with a slight Antagonist. He cannot lift me, says one. This is a Youth of Spirit. No: but, I warrant you, when the Occasion calls upon him, he must fall a crying, and say; "I" "wanted to learn a little longer first."—Learn what? If you did not learn these Things to shew them
them

them in Practice, why did you learn them at all? I am persuaded there must be some one among you who sit here, that feels secret Pangs of Impatience, and says; "When will such a Difficulty come to *my* Share, as hath now fallen to his? Must I sit wasting my Life in a Corner, when I might be crowned at *Olympia*? When will any one bring the News of such a Combat, for *me*?" Such should be the Disposition of you all. Even among the Gladiators of *Cæsar*, there are some who bear it very ill, that they are not brought upon the Stage, and match'd; and who offer Vows to God, and address the Officers, begging to fight. And will none among *you*, appear such? I would willingly take a Voyage, on purpose to see how a Champion of mine acts; how he treats his Subject.—"I do not chuse such a Subject," say you.—Is it in your Power, then, to take what Subject you chuse? Such a Body is given you; such Parents, such Brothers, such a Country, and such a Rank in it; and, then, you come to me, and say, "Change my Subject." Besides, have not you Abilities to manage that which is given you? It is your Business, [we should say] to propose; mine, to treat the Subject well.—"No. But do not propose *such* an Argument to me; but *such* a one: do not offer *such* an Objection to me; but *such* a one."—There will be a Time, I suppose, when Trage-

dians will fancy themselves to be mere Masks, and Buskins, and long Train. These Things are your Materials, Man, and your Subject. Speak something; that we may know, whether you are a Tragedian, or a Buffoon: for both have all the rest, in common. If any one, therefore, should take away his Buskins, and his Mask, and bring him upon the Stage, in his (f) common Dress, is the Tragedian lost, or doth he remain? If he hath a Voice, he remains. "Here, this Instant, take upon you the Command." I take it; and, taking it, I shew how a Person, who hath been properly instructed, behaves.—"Lay aside your Robe; put on Rags, and come upon the Stage in that Character."—What then? Is it not in my Power to bring a good Voice [and Manner] along with me?—"In what Character do you now appear?" As a (g) Witness cited by God. "Come you, then, and bear witness for me; for you are a Witness worthy of being produced by me. Is any thing, external to the Choice, either Good or Evil? Do I hurt any one?" Have

(f) *οαιβολη*. Lord SHAFTESBURY.

(g) This imaginary Witness, first extolled, then failing in his Testimony, brings to one's Mind with unspeakable Advantage, that *true and faithful Witness*, who hath so fully attested the far more important Doctrines of Pardon, Grace, and everlasting Life: and taught Men, on this Foundation, not to be afraid of them that kill the Body; and, after that, have no more that they can do.

“Have I placed the Good of each Individual in any one, but in himself? What Evidence do you give for God?”—*I am in a miserable Condition, O Lord (b); I am undone: no Mortal cares for me: no Mortal gives me any thing: all blame me; all speak ill of me.*—Is this the Evidence you are to give? And will you bring Disgrace upon his Citation, who hath conferred such an Honour upon you, and thought you worthy of being produced as a Witness in such a Cause?

§. 7. But he who hath the Power, hath given Sentence. “*I judge you to be impious and profane.*”—What hath befallen you?—I have been judged to be impious and profane—Any thing else?—Nothing.—Suppose he had passed his Judgment upon any hypothetical Proposition, and pronounced it to be a false Conclusion, that, if it be Day, it is light; what would have befallen the Proposition? In this Case, who is judged; who condemned; the Proposition, or he who is deceived, concerning it? Doth he, who hath the Power of pronouncing any thing, concerning you, know, what Pious, or Impious, mean? Hath he made it his Study, or learned it? Where? From whom? A Musician would not regard him, if he pronounced

G 3

(b) It hath been observed, that this Manner of Expression is not to be met with in the Heathen Authors before Christianity: and, therefore, it is one Instance of Scripture Language coming early into common Use.

nounced Bass to be Treble ; nor a Mathematician, if he passed Sentence, that Lines drawn from the Center to the Circumference, are not equal. And shall He, who is truly learned, regard an unlearned Man, when he pronounces upon Pious and Impious, Just and Unjust ?

§. 8. “ Oh the Injuries to which the Learned “are exposed !” Is it *here* that you have learned this ? Why do not you leave such pitiful Reasonings to idle pitiful Fellows (*i*) ; and let them sit in a Corner, and receive some little sorry Pay ; or grumble, that nobody gives them any thing ? But do *you* appear, and make use of what you have learned. It is not *Reasonings* that are wanted now. On the contrary, Books are stuffed full of Stoical Reasonings.

What is wanted, then ?

One to apply them ; whose Actions may bear Testimony to his Doctrines. Assume me this Character, that we may no longer make use of the Examples of the Ancients, in the Schools ; but may have some Example of our own.

§. 9. To whom, then, doth the Contemplation of these [speculative Reasonings] belong ?

To him, that hath Leisure. For Man is an Animal fond of Contemplation. But it is shameful to take a View of these Things, as run-away Slaves do of a Play. We are to sit quietly, and
listen,

(*i*) The mercenary Professors of Philosophy, at that Time,

listen, sometimes to the Actor, and sometimes to the Musician : and not do like those, who come in and praise the Actor, and at the same time look round them every Way : then, if any one happens to name their Master, 'are frighted out of their Wits, and run off. It is shameful for a Philosopher, thus to contemplate the Works of Nature. Now, what, in this Case, is the Master? Man is not the Master of Man ; but Death, and Life, and Pleasure, and Pain : for without these, bring *Cæsar* to me, and you will see how intrepid I shall be. But, if he comes thundering and lightening with *these* ; and *these* are the Objects of my Terror ; what do I else, but, like the runaway Slave, acknowledge my Master? While I have any Respite from these, as the Fugitive comes into the Theatre, so I bathe, drink, sing ; but all, with Terror and Anxiety. But, if I free myself from my Masters, that is, from such Things as render a Master terrible, what Trouble, what Master have I remaining?

§. 10. What, then, are we to publish these Things to all Men?

No. But humour the Vulgar, and say ; This poor Man advises me to what he thinks good for himself. I excuse him : for *Socrates*, too, excused the Jailer, who wept when he was to drink the Poison : and said, “ How heartily he sheds Tears for us.” Was it to *him* that *Socrates* said, “ For

“ this Reason we sent the Women out of the
“ Way ?” No : but to his *Friends* ; to such, as
were capable of hearing it : while he humoured
the other, as a Child.

C H A P. XXX.

What we ought to have ready, in difficult Circumstances.

WHEN you are going to any of the Great,
remember, that there is Another, who sees
from Above, what passes ; and whom you ought
to please, rather than Man. He, therefore, asks
you :

In the Schools, what did you use to call Exile,
and Prison, and Chains, and Death, and Defa-
mation ?

I? Indifferent Things.

What, then, do you call them *now* ? Are they
at all changed ?

No.

Are *you* changed, then ?

No.

Tell me, then, what Things are indifferent.

Things independent on Choice.

Tell me the Consequence too.

Things independent on Choice, are nothing to
me.

Tell me, likewise, what appeared to us, to be
the Good of Man.

A

A right Choice, and a [right] Use of the Appearances of Things.

What his End?


To follow Thee.

Do you say the same Things *now*, too?

Yes. I do say the same Things, even now.

Well, go in, then, boldly, and mindful of these Things; and he [to whom you are going] will see, what a Youth, who hath studied what he ought, is among Men, who have not. I protest, I imagine you will have such Thoughts as these: "Why do we provide so many and great Qualifications, for nothing? Is the Power, the Antichamber, the Attendants, the Guards, no more than this? Is it for these, that I have listened to so many Dissertations? These are nothing: and I had qualified myself as for some great Encounter."

END of the FIRST BOOK.






THE
DISCOURSES
OF
EPICTETUS.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

That Courage is not inconsistent with Caution.

§. I.  HAT is asserted by the Philosophers, may, perhaps, appear a Paradox to some: let us, however, examine, as well as we can, whether this be true; That it is possible in all Things, to act at once with Caution and Courage. For Caution seems, in some measure, contrary to Courage: and Contraries are by no means consistent. The Appearance

G. 6.

pearance of a Paradox to many, in the present Case, seems to me to arise from something like this : If, indeed, we assert, that Courage and Caution are to be used, in the same Instances, we should justly be accused of uniting Contradictions : but, in the Way that we affirm it, where is the Absurdity ? For, if what hath been so often said, and so often demonstrated, be certain, that the Essence of Good and Evil consists in the Use of the Appearances ; and that Things independent on Choice, are not of the Nature either of Good or Evil ; what Paradox do the Philosophers assert, if they say : “ Where Things are not dependent on Choice, be courageous : where they are, be cautious ? ” For in these only, if Evil consists in a bad Choice, is Caution to be used. And if Things independent on Choice, and not in our Power, are nothing to us, in these we are to make use of Courage. Thus we shall be at once cautious and courageous : and, indeed, courageous on the Account of this very Caution ; for by using Caution, with regard to Things really evil, we shall gain Courage, with regard to what are not so.

§. 2. But we are in the same Condition as [hunted] Deer : when these, in a Fright, fly from the Feathers (a), where do they turn, and to what

(a) This was a Kind of Scare-crow, formed of different coloured Feathers, by which the Animal was terrified ; and so driven into the Net : which was the ancient Manner of Hunting.

what do they retire for Safety? To the Toils. And thus they are undone, by inverting the Objects of Fear and Confidence. Thus we, too. In what Instances do we make use of Fear? In Things independent on Choice. In what, on the other hand, do we behave with Courage, as if there were nothing to be dreaded? In Things dependent on Choice. To be deceived then, or to act rashly or impudently, or to indulge a scandalous Desire, is of no Importance to us, if we do but take a good Aim, in Things independent on Choice. But where Death, or Exile, or Pain, or Ignominy, are concerned, there is the Retreat, there, the Flutter and Fright. Hence, as it must be with those who err in Matters of the greatest Importance, what is naturally Courage, we render bold, desperate, rash, and impudent: and what is naturally Caution, timid and base, and full of Fears and Perturbations. For if a Person was to transfer Caution to Choice, and the Actions of Choice, by a Willingness to be cautious, he will, at the same time, have it in his Power to avoid [what he guards against:] but if he transfers it to Things not in our Power, or Choice, by fixing his Aversion on what is not in our own Power, but dependent on others, he will necessarily fear; he will be hurried; will be disturbed. For it is not Death, or Pain, that is to
6 be

be feared; but the *Fear* of Pain or Death. Hence we commend him who says:

Death is no Ill, but shamefully to die.

Courage, then, ought to be opposed to Death; and Caution to the Fear of Death: whereas *we*, on the contrary, oppose to Death, Flight; and to our Principle concerning it, Carelessness, and Desperateness, and Indifference.

§. 3. *Socrates* used, very properly, to call these Things Vizards: for, as Masks appear shocking and formidable to Children, from their Inexperience; we are affected in like manner, with regard to Things, for no other Reason, than as Children are, with regard to Vizards. For what is a Child? Ignorance. What is a Child? Want of Learning: for, so far as the Knowledge of Children extends, they are not inferior to us. What is Death? A Vizard. Turn it, and be convinced. See, it doth not bite. This little Body and Spirit must be separated (as they formerly were) either now, or hereafter: why, then, are you displeased if it be now? For if not *now*, it will be hereafter. Why? To complete the Revolution of the World: for that hath need of some Things present, others to come, and others already completed. What is Pain? A Vizard. Turn it, and be convinced.

This

This paultry Flesh is sometimes affected by harsh, sometimes by smooth Impressions. If suffering be not worth your while, the Door is open; if it be, bear it: for it was fit the Door should be open, against all Accidents. And thus we have no Trouble.

§. 4. What, then, is the Fruit of these Principles? What it ought to be; the most noble, and the most becoming the Truly Educated (*b*), Tranquillity, Security, Freedom. For in this Case, we are not to give Credit to the Many, who say, that none ought to be educated but the Free; but rather to the Philosophers, who say, that the Well-educated alone are free.

How so?

Thus;

(*b*) *Nedus*, in Greek, means nearly the same Thing, as what we now call *liberal Education*. It was that Sort of Education peculiar to Gentlemen; that is, such as were free; and of which the Slaves, or lower Sort of People, were forbid to partake, according to the Systems of some Legislators. Such (as well as I can remember) was the Case among the *Lacedemonians*, and amongst the ancient *Persians*, till the Time of *Cyrus*.

It must be observed, that the Words Educated, Free, King, and many others, were taken by the Stoics from common Life; and by them applied solely to the Character of their wise, and perfect Man.

The Translator is obliged for this Note, as well as for many other valuable Hints, to Mr. HARRIS; so well known for many Works of Literature and Genius.

Thus: Is Freedom any thing else, than the Power of Living as we like?

Nothing else.

Well: tell me then, do you like to live in Error?

We do not. No one, sure, that lives in Error, (c) is free.

Do you like to live in Fear? Do you like to live in Sorrow? Do you like to live in Perturbation?

By no means.

No one, therefore, in a State of Fear, or Sorrow, or Perturbation, is free: but whoever is delivered from Sorrow, Fear, and Perturbation, by the same means is delivered likewise from Slavery. How shall we believe you, then, good Legislators, when you say; "We allow none to be educated but the Free?" For the Philosophers say; "We allow none to be free, but the Liberally-educated:" that is, God doth not allow it.

What, then, when any Person hath turned his Slave (d) about before the Consul, hath he done nothing?

Yes,

(c) *And ye shall know the Truth, and the Truth shall make you free.* John viii. 32. This is one, among many other Passages to the same Purpose, in that *perfect Law of Liberty*, the New Testament.

(d) When a Slave was to be presented with his Freedom, he was brought before the Consul; and his Master, taking him by the Hand, pronounced a certain Form of Words,
and

Yes, he hath.

What?

He hath turned his Slave about, before the Consul.

Nothing more?

Yes. He pays a (*d*) Fine for him.

Well then: is not the Man, who hath gone through this Ceremony, rendered free?

No more than [he is rendered] exempt from Perturbation. Pray, have you, who are able to give this Freedom to others, no Master of your own? Are not you a Slave to Money? To a Girl? To a Boy? To a Tyrant? To some Friend of a Tyrant? Else, why do you tremble when *any* of these is in question? Therefore, I so often repeat to you, Let this be your Study; have this always at hand; in what it is necessary to be courageous, and in what cautious: courageous, in what doth not depend on Choice; cautious, in what doth.

§. 5. (*e*) But have not I read my Papers to you? Do not you know what I am doing?

In what?

In my Essays.

Show me in what State you are, as to Desire an Aversion. Whether you do not fail of what you

and then turned the Slave about, who was thus rendered free. The Fine which the Master was to pay on this Occasion, was applied to the public Use. UPTON.

(*d*) See Note (*d*) in the preceding Page.

(*e*) This seems to be spoken by one of the Scholars.

you wish, and incur what you would avoid : but, as to these common-place Essays, if you are wise, you will take them, and obliterate them.

Why, did not *Socrates* write ?

Yes : who (*f*) so much ? But how ? As he had not always one at hand, to argue against his Principles, or be argued against in his Turn, he argued with, and examined, himself ; and always treated, at least, some one natural Notion, in a manner fitted for the Use of Life. These are the Things which a Philosopher writes : but for such (*g*) common-place Essays as those I am speaking of, he leaves to the Insensible, or to the happy Creatures whom Idleness (*b*) furnishes with Leisure ;

(*f*) No other ancient Author mentions *Socrates*, as having written any Thing, excepting a Hymn to *Apollo*, and a Translation of some Fables of *Æsop* into Verse. Many Authors of Credit affirm, that he wrote nothing. Therefore *Wolffius* doubts, whether some other Name should not be put here, instead of *Socrates*. Yet the Description most properly belongs to him. And, perhaps, *Epietetus* doth not mean to intimate here, that *Socrates* had published any thing : but that he wrote, when he had no Opportunity of discoursing, for his own Improvement. But still, living constantly at *Athens*, the Seat of philosophical Disputation, he cannot be supposed, often, to have had that Reason for Writing.

(*g*) The Original here seems corrupt, or inaccurate. I hope the Translation is not far from the true Sense.

(*b*) The Greek is *Αταξία*, Tranquillity : but it seems to be a false Reading for *Αταξία*. *Αταξία* is the very Thing

sure ; or to such as are too weak to regard Consequences. And will you, when you are gone from hence (i), which the Time now calls for, be fond of showing, and reading, and be ridiculously conceited, of these Things ?

Pray see, how I compose Dialogues.

Talk not of that, Man ; but rather be able to say ; See, how I avoid being disappointed of my Desire : see, how I secure myself against incurring my Aversion. Set Death before me ; set Pain, set a Prison, set Ignominy, set Condemnation before me ; and you will know me. This is the [proper] Ostentation of a young Man come out from the Schools. Leave the rest to others. Let no one ever hear you utter a Word about them : nor suffer it, if any one commends you for them : but think that you are nobody, and that you know nothing. Appear to know only this, how you may never be disappointed of your Desire ; never incur your Aversion. Let others study Causes, Problems, and Syllogisms. Do you study

Thing which *Epicetus* had been recommending through the whole Chapter, and which makes the Subject of the next ; and, therefore, cannot be well supposed to be the true Reading in a Place, where it is mentioned with Contempt.

(i) For *παλθων*, perhaps, the Reading, should be *απελθων* ; and it is so translated. The Person to whom *Epicetus* speaks, was a young Man just leaving the philosophical School.

study Death, Chains, Torture, Exile (*k*): and all these, with Courage, and Reliance upon Him, who hath called you to them, and judged you worthy a Post, in which you may show, what the rational governing Faculty can do, when set in Array, against Powers independent on the Choice. And thus, this Paradox becomes neither impossible, nor a Paradox, that we must be at once cautious and courageous: courageous, in what doth not depend upon Choice; and cautious, in what doth.

CH A P. II.

Of Tranquillity.

§. I. **C**ONSIDER, you who are going to take your Tryal, what you wish to preserve, and in what to succeed. For if you wish to preserve a Choice conformable to Nature, you are intirely safe: every thing goes well; you have no Trouble on your Hands. While you wish to preserve what is in your own Power, and which

is

(*k*) Some *English* Readers, too happy to comprehend how Chains, Torture, Exile, and sudden Executions, can be ranked among the common Accidents of Life, may be surprized to find *Epictetus* so frequently endeavouring to prepare his Hearers for them. But it must be recollected, that he addressed himself to Persons, who lived under the *Roman* Emperors; from whose Tyranny, the very best of Men were perpetually liable to such Kind of Dangers.

is naturally free, and are contented with that, whom have you longer to care for? For who is the Master of Things like these? Who can take them away? If you wish to be a Man of Honour and Fidelity, who shall prevent you? If you wish not to be restrained, or compelled, who shall compel you to Desires, contrary to your Principles; to Aversions, contrary to your Opinion? The Judge, perhaps, will pass a Sentence against you, which he thinks formidable: but how can he likewise make you receive it with Aversion? Since, then, Desire and Aversion are in your own Power, what have you else to care for? Let this be your Introduction; this your Narration; this your Proof; this your Victory; this your Conclusion; and this your Applause. Thus *Socrates*, to one who put him in mind to prepare himself for his Tryal; "Do not you think, says he, that I have been preparing myself for this very Thing my whole Life?" — By what kind of Preparation? — "I have preserved what was in my own Power." — What do you mean? — "I have done nothing unjust, either in public, or in private Life."

§. 2. But if you wish to preserve Externals too; your paultry Body, your Estate, or Dignity; I advise you immediately to prepare yourself by every possible Preparation; and besides, consider the Disposition of your Judge, and of your Adversary.

fary. If it be necessary to fall down at his Feet ; fall down at his Feet : if to weep, weep : if to groan ; groan. For when you have subjected what is in your own Power to Externals, submit to Slavery at once, and do not struggle ; and at one time, be willing to be a Slave, and at another, not willing : but simply, and with your whole Intention, be one or the other ; free, or a Slave ; well-educated, or not ; a Game Cock, or a Craven : either bear to be beat till you die, or give out at once ; and do not be soundly beat first, and then give out at last. If both these be shameful, make the Distinction immediately.

§. 3. Where is the Nature of Good and Evil ?

Where Truth likewise is. Where Truth and where Nature are (a), there is Caution : where Truth and where Nature are not, there is Courage. Why, do you think, that if *Socrates* had wished to preserve Externals, that he would have said, when he appeared at his Tryal, “ *Anytus* “ and *Mellitus* may indeed kill ; but hurt me they “ cannot ?” Was he so foolish, as not to see that this Way doth not lead to that End, but the contrary ;

(a) This Passage is perplexed in the *Greek*, and the Translation conjectural. The Meaning seems to be, that where our moral Conduct is concerned, Caution is necessary ; and Courage is necessary in Things not dependent on our own Choice ; and with which, according to the Stoic Principle, Truth and Nature have nothing to do.

trary? What, then, is the Reason, that he not only disregards, but provokes his Judges? Thus my Friend *Heracitus*, in a trifling Suit, about a little Estate at *Rhodes*, after having proved to the Judges that his Cause was good, when he came to the Conclusion of his Speech; "I will not intreat you, says he; nor care what Judgment you give: for it is rather you who are to be judged, than I." And thus he lost his Suit. What need was there of this? Be content not to intreat: do not tell them too, that you will not intreat; unless it be a proper Time to provoke the Judges designedly; as in the Case of *Socrates*. But if you too are preparing such a Speech, what do you wait for? Why do you submit to be tried? For if you wish to be hanged, have Patience, and the Gibbet will come. But if you chuse rather to submit, and make your Defence as well as you can, all the rest is to be ordered accordingly: with a due Regard, however, to the Preservation of your own Character.

§. 4. For this Reason it is ridiculous too to say, "Suggest to me what is to be done." How should I know what to suggest to you? [You should rather say] inform my Understanding to accommodate itself to whatever may be the Event. The former is just as if an illiterate Person should say, "Tell me what to write, when any Name
" is

“ is proposd to me ;” and I direct him to write *Dion* ; and then another comes, and proposes to him the Name not of *Dion*, but of *Theon* ; what will be the Consequence ? What will he write ? Whereas, if you had made Writing your Study, you would be ready prepared for whatever Word might occur : if not, how can I suggest to you ? For, if the Circumstances of the Affair should suggest something else, what will you say, or how will you act ? Remember, then, the general Rule, and you will need no Suggestion : but if you gape after Externals, you must necessarily be tossed up and down, according to the Inclination of your Master.

And who is my Master ?

He in whose Power, is placed whatever you strive to acquire, or would avoid.

C H A P. III.

Concerning such as recommend Persons to the Philosophers.

§. 1. *DIOGENES* rightly answered one, who desired Letters of Recommendation from him, “ At first sight he will know you to
 “ be a Man ; and whether you are good or a bad
 “ Man, if he hath any Skill in distinguishing, he
 “ will know likewise : and, if he hath not, he
 “ will never know it, though I should write a
 “ thousand

“ thousand times (a).” Just as if you were a Piece of Coin, and should desire to be recommended to any Person as good, in order to be tried ; if it be to an Assayer, he will know your Value ; for you will recommend yourself.

§. 2. We ought, therefore, in Life also, to have something analogous to this Skill in Gold : that one may be able to say, like the Assayer, Bring me whatever Piece you will, and I will find out its Value : or, as I would say with regard to Syllogisms, Bring me whomever you will, and I will distinguish for you, whether he knows how to solve Syllogisms, or not. Why ? Because I can solve Syllogisms myself, and have that Faculty, which is necessary for one who knows how to find out Persons skilled in the Solution of Syllogisms. But how do I act in Life ? I at sometimes call a Thing good ; at others, bad. What is the Cause of this ? The contrary to what happens in Syllogisms ; Ignorance, and Inexperience.

VOL. I.

H

CHAP.

(a) This is one of the many extravagant Refinements of the Philosophers ; and might lead Persons into very dangerous Mistakes, if it was laid down as a Maxim, in ordinary Life.

C H A P. IV.

Concerning a Person, who had been guilty of Adultery.

§. 1. **A**S he was saying, that Man is made for Fidelity; and that whoever subverts this, subverts the peculiar Property of Man; one of those who pass for Men of Literature happened to come in, who had been found guilty of Adultery, in that City. But, continues *Epicletus*, if, laying aside that Fidelity for which we were born, we form Designs against the Wife of our Neighbour, what do we do? What else but destroy and ruin — What? Fidelity, Honour, and Sanctity of Manners. — Only these? And do not we ruin Neighbourhood? Friendship? Our Country? In what Rank do we place ourselves? How am I to consider you, Sir? As a Neighbour? A Friend? What Sort of one? As a Citizen? How shall I trust you? Indeed, if you were some sorry Vessel, so noisome that no Use could be made of you; you might be thrown on a Dunghill, and no Mortal would take the Trouble to pick you up: but if, being a *Man*, you cannot fill any one Place in human Society, what shall we do with you? For, suppose you cannot hold the Place of a Friend, can you hold even that of a Slave? And who will trust you? Why, then, should not you also be contented to be thrown upon some Dunghill,

Dunghill, as a useleſs Veſſel, and indeed as mere Dung? Will you ſay, after this, Hath no one any Regard for *me*, a Man of Letters? Why, you are wicked, and fit for no Uſe. Juſt as if Waſps ſhould take it ill that no one hath any Regard for them; but all ſhun, and whoever can, beats them down. You have ſuch a Sting, that whoever you ſtrike with it, is thrown into Troubles and Pangs. What would you have us do with you? There is no where to place you.

§. 2. What, then, are not Women, by Nature, common?

I admit it: and ſo is a Pig at Table common to thoſe who are invited. But, after it is diſtributed, go, if you think proper, and ſnatch away the Share of him who ſits next you; or ſlily ſteal it, or ſtretch out your Hand, and taſte; and, if you cannot tear away any of the Meat, dip your Fingers and lick them. A fine Companion! A *Socratic* Gueſt indeed! Again: Is not the Theatre common to all the Citizens? Therefore come, when all are ſeated, if you think proper, and turn any one of them out of his Place. Thus Women are common by Nature: but when the Legiſlator, like the Maſter of an Entertainment, diſtributes them, will not you, like the reſt of the Company, be contented with deſiring a Share for yourſelf; but muſt you pilfer, and taſte what belongs to another?

But I am a Man of Letters, and understand *Archedemus* (a).

With all your Understanding of *Archedemus*, then, be an Adulterer, or a Rogue: And, instead of a Man, a Wolf, or an Ape. For where is the Difference?

CHAP. V.

How Magnanimity may be consistent with Care.

§. 1. **T**HE Materials of Action are indifferent: but the Use of them is not indifferent.

How, then, shall one preserve Intrepidity and Tranquillity; and at the same time be careful, and neither rash, nor indolent?

By imitating those who play at Tables. The Dice are indifferent; the Pieces are indifferent. How do I know what will fall out? But it is my Business, to manage carefully and dextrously whatever doth fall out. Thus in Life too, this is the chief Business: distinguish, and separate Things; and say, "Externals are not in my Power; Choice is. Where shall I seek Good and Evil? Within; in what is my own." But in what belongs to others, call nothing Good, or Evil, or Profit, or Hurt, or any thing of that Sort.

§. 2. What

(a) A Stoic Philosopher, of *Tarsus*, in *Cilicia*. UFTON.

§. 2. What then, are we to treat these, in a careless Way?

By no means: for this, on the other hand, is an evil Exercise of the Faculty of Choice: and on that (*b*) account, against Nature. But we are to act with Care, because the *Use* of the Materials [of Action] is not indifferent; and at the same time with Intrepidity and Tranquillity, because the *Materials* themselves are indifferent. For where a Thing is not indifferent, there no one can restrain or compel me. Where I am capable of being restrained, or compelled, the Acquisition doth not depend upon me; nor is either good or evil. The *Use* of it, indeed, is either good or evil; but that *doth* depend upon me. It is difficult, I own, to blend and unite [in one Character] the Carefulness of one who is affected by the Materials of Action, and the Intrepidity of one who disregards them; but it is not impossible: if it be, it is impossible to be happy. How do we act in a Voyage? What is in my Power? To chuse the Pilot, the Sailors, the Day, the Time of Day. Afterwards comes a Storm. What have I to care for? My Part is performed. The Subject belongs to another, to the Pilot. But the Ship is sinking: What then have I to do? That which alone I can do; I am drowned, without Fear, without Clamour, or

H 3

accusing

(*b*) The Translation follows Mr. Upton Conjecture.

accusing God ; but as one who knows, that what is born, must likewise die. For I am not Eternity, but a Man ; a Part of the Whole, as an Hour is of the Day. I must come like an Hour, and like an Hour must pass away. What signifies it whether by Drowning, or by a Fever ? For, in some Way or other, pass I must.

§. 3. This you may see to be the Practice of those, who play skilfully at Ball. No one contends for the Ball [itself], as either a Good or an Evil ; but how he may throw, and catch it again. Here lies the Address, here the Art, the Nimbleness, the Sagacity ; that I may not be able to catch it, even if I hold up my Lap for it ; another may catch it, whenever I throw it. But if we catch or throw it, with Fear or Perturbation, what Kind of Play will this be ? How shall we keep ourselves steady ; or how see the Order of the Game ? One will say, Throw : another, Do not throw : a Third, You have thrown once already. This is a mere Quarrel ; not a Play. Therefore *Socrates* well understood playing at Ball.

What do you mean ?

Using Pleasantry at his Trial. “ Tell me, “ says he, *Anytus*, how can you say, that I do “ not believe a God ? What do you think Demons are (c) ? Are they not either the Off- “ spring

(c) *Socrates* professed himself to have a good Demon ; and argues here jocularly from thence, that he must believe the

“ spring of the Gods, or compounded of Gods
 “ and Men ? ” — “ Yes. ” — “ Do you think, then,
 “ that one can believe there are Mules, and not
 “ believe, that there are Asses ? ” This was just
 as if he had been playing at Ball. And what
 was the Ball he had to play with ? Life, Chains,
 Exile, a Draught of Poison, Separation from a
 Wife, and the Desertion of Orphan Children.
 These were what he had to play with ; and yet,
 nevertheless, he did play, and threw the Ball with
 Address. Thus we should be careful how we play ;
 but indifferent, as to the Ball itself. We are
 by all means to manage external Materials with
 Art ; not taking them for ourselves ; but showing
 our Art about them, whatever they may happen
 to be. Thus a Weaver doth not make the Wool :
 but employs his Art upon what is given him. It
 is another who gives you Food, and a Property :
 and may take them away, and your paultry Body

H 4

too.

the Existence of a Deity : as he who believes there are
 Mules, must believe there are Asses ; because that Species
 enters into the Composition of the other. But there is a
 Play upon the Words in the Original, which cannot be
 preserved in the Translation. One cannot, I think, help
 regretting, that *Plato* should relate, and *Epictetus* approve,
 a Witticism unworthy of the *Attic* Genius ; and an Instance
 of Levity, on so awful a Subject, unbecoming the Character
 of the wise and pious *Socrates*. It may, however, be some
 Excuse, that he thought neither his Accuser, nor his Judges
 deserved, or were likely to be influenced by, a more serious
 Answer.

100. Do you, however, work upon the Materials you have received; and then, if you come off unhurt, others, no doubt, who meet you, will congratulate you on your Escape. But he who hath a clearer Insight into such Things, if he sees [indeed] you have behaved in a becoming Manner, will praise and congratulate you: but if you owe your Escape to any unbecoming Action, the contrary. For where there is a reasonable Cause of Rejoicing, there is likewise [a reasonable Cause] of Congratulation.

§. 4. How, then, are some external Things said to be according to Nature; others contrary to it?

When we are considered as unconnected Individuals. I will allow it is natural for the Foot, [for Instance,] to be clean. But if you take it as a Foot, and not as an unconnected individual Thing, it will be fit that it should walk in the Dirt, and tread upon Thorns; and sometimes that it should even be cut off, for the Good of the Whole: otherwise it is no longer a Foot. We should reason in some such manner concerning ourselves. What are you? A Man. If then, indeed, you consider yourself, as an unconnected Individual, it is natural that you should live to old Age; be rich, and healthy: but if you consider yourself as a Man, and as a Part of the Whole, it will be fit, on the Account of that Whole,

Whole, that you should at one time be sick ; at another, take a Voyage, and be exposed to Danger : sometimes be in Want ; and possibly it may happen, die before your Time. Why, then, are you displeased ? Do not you know, that else, as the other is no longer a Foot, so you are no longer a Man ? For what is a Man ? A Part of a Commonwealth ; principally of that which consists of Gods and Men ; and next, of that to which you immediately belong, which is a Miniature of the universal City.

§. 5. What then, must I, at one Time, be called to a Trial ; must another, at another Time, be scorched by a Fever ; another be exposed to the Sea ; another die ; another be condemned ?

Yes : for it is impossible, in such a Body, in such a World, and among such Companions, but that some or other of us, must fall into such Circumstances (*d*). Your Business, when you come into them, is, to say what you ought, to order Things as you can. Then says one, “ I decide “ that you have acted unjustly.” Much Good may it do you ; I have done *my* Part. You are to look to it, whether you have done *yours* : for there is some Danger of that too, let me tell you.

C H A P. VI.

Of Indifference.

§. 1. **A** Hypothetical Proposition is an indifferent Thing; but the Judgment concerning it, is not indifferent: but is either Knowledge, or Opinion, or Mistake. Thus Life is indifferent; the *Use* of it not indifferent. When you are told, therefore, that these Things are indifferent, do not, upon that account, ever be careless; nor, when you are excited to Carefulness, be abject, and struck by an Admiration of the Materials of Action. It is good to know your own Qualifications and Powers; that, where you are not qualified, you may be quiet, and not angry that others have the Advantage of you, in such Things. For you too, [in your Turn], will think it reasonable, that you should have the Advantage in the Art of Syllogisms: and, if others should be angry at it, you will tell them, by way of Consolation, “ I have learned it, and *you* have “ not.” Thus too, where-ever Practice is necessary, do not pretend to what can be attained no other Way; but leave the Matter to those who are practised in it, and do you be contented with a composed Firmness of Mind. “ Go, for Instance, and pay your Compliments to such a “ Person.” “ How?” “ Not meanly.” —
“ But

“ But I have been shut out ; for I have not
 “ learned to get in at the Window : and, finding
 “ the Door shut, I must necessarily either go
 “ back, or get in at the Window.” “ But speak
 “ to him too.” “ I will speak to him.” “ In
 “ what manner ?” “ Not meanly.” But you
 have not succeeded ; for this was not *your* Bu-
 siness, but *his*. Why do you claim what belongs
 to another ? Always remember what is your own,
 and what is another’s ; and you will never be
 disturbed.

§. 2. Hence *Chrysippus* rightly says ; While
 Consequences are uncertain, I will keep to those
 Things which are best adapted to the Attainment
 of what is conformable to Nature : for God him-
 self hath formed me to chuse this. If I knew,
 that it was now destined for me to be sick, I
 would even exert my Pursuits towards it : for even
 the Foot, if it had Understanding, would exert
 itself to get into the Dirt. For why are Ears of
 Corn produced, if it be not to ripen ? and why
 do they ripen, if not to be reaped ? For they are
 not separate Individuals. If they were capable of
 Sense, do you think they would wish never to be
 reaped ? It would be a Curse upon Ears of Corn,
 not to be reaped : and we ought to know, that it
 would be a Curse upon Man, not to die ; like
 that of not ripening, and not being reaped.
 Since, then, it is necessary for us to be reaped,

and we have, at the same time, Understanding to know it, are we angry at it? This is only because we neither know what we are, nor have studied what belongs to Man, as Jockies do, what belongs to Horses. Yet *Chryfantas*, when he was about to strike an Enemy, on hearing the Trumpet sound a Retreat, drew back his Hand: for he thought it more eligible to obey the Command of his General, than his own Inclination (a). But not one of us, even when Necessity calls, is ready and willing to obey it: but we suffer, whatever Things we do suffer, weeping and groaning, and calling them our Circumstances (b). What Circumstances, Man? For if you call what surrounds you, *Circumstances*, every thing is a *Circumstance*: but, if you apply this Name to Hardships, where is the Hardship, that whatever is born must die. The Instrument is either a Sword, or a Wheel, or the Sea, or a Tile, or a Tyrant. And what doth it signify to you, by what Way you descend to Hades? All are equal: but, if you would hear the Truth, the shortest is that by which

(a) In a Speech which *Cyrus* made to his Soldiers, after the Battle with the *Assyrians*, he mentions *Chryfantas*, one of his Captains, with particular Honour, for this Instance of his Obedience. XENOPH. L. iv.

(b) *περίστασις*, in *Greek*, hath a double Meaning, which cannot be preserved in a Translation. It signifies both in general Circumstances, and in particular, hard Circumstances, or Difficulties.

which a Tyrant sends you. No Tyrant was ever six Months, in cutting any Man's Throat: but a Fever is often a Year [in killing.] All these Things are mere Sound, and the Pomp of empty Names.

My Life is in Danger from *Cæsar*.

And am not I in Danger, who dwell at *Nicopolis*, where there are so many Earthquakes? And when you yourself cross the *Adriatic* (c), what is then in Danger? Is not your Life?

Ay: but I am in Danger, with respect to Opinion.

What, your own? How so? Can any one compel you to have any Opinion, contrary to your own Inclination?

But the Opinions of others too.

And what Danger is it of *yours*, if others have false Opinions?

But I am in Danger of being banished.

What is it to be banished? To be some-where else than at *Rome*.

Yes: but what if I should be sent to *Gyaros*?

If it be worth your while, you will go: if not, you have another Place to go to; where he, who now sends you to *Gyaros*, must go likewise, whether

(c) *Epictetus* probably means, in the Way Home, from *Nicopolis* to *Rome*; whence this Person had come to hear him.

ther he will or not (*d*). Why, then, do you come to these, as to great Trials? They are not equal to your Qualifications. So that an ingenuous young Man would say, It was not worth while for this, to have read, and writ, so much, and to have sat so long, listening to a good-for-nothing old Fellow. Only remember, that Division, by which your *own*, and *not* your own, is distinguished, and you will never claim what belongs to others. A Tribunal, and a Prison, is, each of them, a Place; one high, the other low: but Choice is equal: and if you have a mind to keep it equal for both Places, it may be kept. We shall then become Imitators of *Socrates*, when even in a Prison, we are able to write Hymns (*e*) of Praise: but, as we now are, consider whether we could bear, that even another should say to us in a Prison, “ Shall I read you a Hymn of
“ Praise?”

(*d*) How gloomy, how empty the Stoic Consolation! How differently would the Christian answer. “ Well, and
“ can he banish you from the Presence of your true Sovereign, your indulgent Father, your best Friend? And
“ what, then, is *Gyaros* worse than *Rome*? You, behaving
“ well in Adversity, are the Object of Almighty Protection
“ and future Reward: he, amidst his Tyranny, accountable to an offended Judge.”

(*e*) *Socrates* writ a Hymn to *Apollo*, when he was in Prison; of which *Diogenes Laertius* recites the first Line. See the Behaviour of *Paul* and *Silas* on a parallel Occasion. *Acts* xvi. 25.

“ Praise ? ” — “ Why do you trouble me : do
 “ you know in what a sad Situation I am ? ”
 “ In such Circumstances, am I able to hear
 “ Hymns ? ” — “ What Circumstances ? ” — I am
 “ going to die. ” — “ And are all other Men to
 “ be immortal ? ”

C H A P. VII.

Of Divination.

§. 1. **F**ROM an unseasonable Regard to Divi-
 nation, we omit many Duties (a). For
 what can the Diviner see, besides Death, or
 Danger, or Sickness, or, in short, Things of this
 Kind ? When it is necessary, then, to expose one's
 self to Danger for a Friend, or even a Duty to
 die for him, what Occasion have I for Divination ?
 Have not I a Diviner within, who hath told me
 the Essence of Good and Evil ; and who explains
 to me the Indications of both ? What further
 Need, then, have I of the Entrails [of Victims],
 or [the Flight] of Birds ? Can I bear with the
 other Diviner, when he says, “ This is for your
 “ Interest ? ” For doth *he* know what is for my
 Interest ? Doth he know what Good is ? Hath
 he learned the Indications of Good and Evil, as
 he

(a) The Stoics were Advocates for Divination ; though
 they condemned, what they deemed, the Abuses of it.
 The 32d Chapter of the *Enchiridion* is on the same Subject.

he hath those of the Victims? If so, he knows the Indications likewise of Fair and Base, Just and Unjust. Do you tell me, Sir, what is indicated to me; Life or Death; Riches or Poverty. But whether these Things are for my Interest, or not, I shall not inquire of you. "Why?" Because you do not give your Opinion about Grammar [or any established Point of Knowledge]; and do you give it here, in Things about which we all take different Ways, and dispute with one another? Therefore the Lady, who was going to send a Month's Provision to *Gratilla* (b), in her Banishment, made a right Answer to one, who told her *Domitian* would seize it: I had rather, says she, that he should seize it, than I not send it.

§. 2. What, then, is it that leads us so often to Divination? Cowardice; the Dread of Events. Hence we flatter the Diviners. "Pray, Sir, shall I inherit my Father's Estate?" — "Let us see: let us sacrifice upon the Occasion." — "Nay, Sir, just as Fortune pleases." Then, if he says, You shall inherit it, we give him Thanks, as if we received the Inheritance from him. The Consequence of this is, that they play upon us.

§. 3. What, then, is to be done?

We should come without previous Desire or Aversion: as a Traveller inquires the Road of the

(b) A Lady of high Rank at Rome, banished from Italy, among many other noble Persons, by *Domitian*.

the Person he meets, without any Desire for that which turns to the right Hand, more than to the Left: for he wishes for neither of these; but that only which leads him properly. Thus we should come to God, as to a Guide. Just as we make use of our Eyes: not persuading them to show us one Object rather than another; but receiving such as they present to us. But now we hold the Bird with Fear and Trembling: and, in our Invocations to God, intreat him; "Lord have Mercy upon me: suffer me to come off safe." You Wretch! would you have any thing then, but what is best? And what is best but what pleases God? Why do you, as far as in you lies, corrupt your Judge, and seduce your Adviser?

C H A P. VIII.

Wherein consists the Essence of Good.

§. 1. **G**OD is beneficial. Good is also beneficial. It should seem, then, that where the Essence of God is, there too is the Essence of Good. What then is the Essence of God? Flesh? — By no means. An Estate? — Fame? — By no means. Intelligence? Knowledge? Right Reason? — Certainly. Here then, without more ado, seek the Essence of Good. For, do you seek it in a Plant? — No. — Or in a Brute? — No. — If then you seek it only in a rational Subject, why

why do you seek it any where but in what is distinct from Irrationals? Plants have not the Use of the Appearances of Things; and therefore you do not apply the Term of *Good* to them. — *Good*, then, requires the Use of these Appearances. And nothing else? If so, you may say, that *Good*, and Happiness, and Unhappiness, belong to mere Animals. But this you do not say; and you are right: for, how much soever they have the Use of the Appearances of Things, they have not the Faculty of understanding that Use; and with good Reason: for they are made to be subservient to others, and not Principals themselves. Why was an *Ass* made? Was it as a Principal? No: but because we had need of a Back able to carry Burthens. We had need too that he should walk; therefore he had the Use of the Appearances of Things added; otherwise he could not have walked. But here his Endowments end: for, if an Understanding of that Use had been likewise added, he would not, in Reason, have been subject to us, nor have done us these Services; but would have been like, and equal to ourselves. Why will you not, therefore, seek the Essence of *Good* in that, without which, you will not say, there can be *Good* in any thing?

§. 2. What then? Are not these likewise the Works of the Gods? They are; but not Principals, nor Parts of the Gods. But you are a Principal.

cipal. You are a distinct Portion of the Essence of God; and contain a certain Part of him in yourself (a). Why then are you ignorant of your noble Birth? Why do not you consider, whence you came? why do not you remember, when you are eating, who you are who eat; and whom you feed? When you are in the Company of Women; when you are conversing; when you are exercising; when you are disputing; do not you know, that it is a God you feed; a God you exercise? You carry a God about with you, Wretch, and know nothing of it. Do you suppose I mean some God without you of Gold or Silver? It is within yourself you carry him; and profane him, without being sensible of it, by impure Thoughts, and unclean Actions. If even the Image of God were present, you would not dare to act as you do: and when God himself is within you, and hears and sees all, are not you ashamed

(a) See Introduction, §. 19.

See 1 Cor. vi. 19. 2 Cor. vi. 16. 2 Tim. i. 14. 1 John iii. 24. iv. 12, 13. But though the simple Expression of carrying God about with us, may seem to have some nearly Parallel to it in the New Testament, yet those represent the Almighty in a more venerable Manner; as taking the Hearts of Good Men for a Temple to dwell in. But the other Expressions here of Feeding and Exercising God, and the Whole of the Paragraph, and indeed of the Stoic System, shew the real Sense of even its more decent Phrases to be vastly different from that of Scripture.

ashamed to think and act thus ; insensible of your own Nature, and hateful to God?

§. 3. After all, why are we afraid, when we send a young Man from the School, into Action, that he should behave indecently, eat indecently, converse indecently with Women : that he should either debase himself by a shabby Dress, or clothe himself too finely ? Doth not he know the God within him ? Doth not he know with whom he sets out ? Have we Patience to hear him say, “ I wish to have you with me.”

Have you not God ? Do you seek any other, while you have him ? Or will He tell you any other than these things ? If you were a Statue of *Phidias*, either *Jupiter* or *Minerva*, you would remember both yourself and the Artist ; and, if you had any Sense, you would endeavour to do nothing unworthy of him who formed you, or of yourself : nor to appear in an unbecoming Manner, to Spectators. And are you now careless how you appear, because you are the Workmanship of *Jupiter* ? And yet, what Comparison is there, either between the Artists ; or the Things they have formed ? What Work of any [human] Artist contains in itself, those Faculties which are shown, in forming it ? Is it any thing but Marble, or Brass, or Gold, or Ivory ? And the *Minerva* of *Phidias*, when its Hand is once extended, and a *Victory* placed in it, remains in
that

that Attitude, for ever. But the Works of God are indued with Motion, Breath, the Use of the Appearances of Things, Judgment. Being, then, the Formation of such an Artist, will you dishonour him; especially, when he hath not only formed, but intrusted, and given the Guardianship of you, to yourself? Will you not only be forgetful of this, but, moreover, dishonour the Trust? If God had committed some Orphan to your Charge; would you have been thus careless of him? He hath delivered yourself to your Care; and says, “ I had no one fitter to be trusted than you: preserve this Person for Me, such as he is by Nature; modest, faithful, sublime, unserrified, dispassionate, tranquil:” And will you not preserve him?

§ 4. But it will be said; “ Whence this supercilious Look, and Gravity of Face?” [in our young Philosopher] — “ I have not yet so much Gravity, as the Case deserves. I do not yet trust to what I have learned, and assented to. I still fear my own Weakness. Let me but take Courage a little, and then you shall see such a Look, and such an Appearance, as I ought to have. Then I will show you the Statue, when it is finished, when it is polished. Do you think I will show you a supercilious Countenance? Heaven forbid! For *Olympian Jupiter* doth not lift up his Brow; but keeps a steady

“ steady Countenance, as becomes him who is
 “ about to say,

————— *Th’ immutable Decree*

No Force can shake : what is, that ought to be.

POPE.

“ Such will I show myself to you : faithful,
 “ modest, noble, tranquil.” — “ What, and im-
 “ mortal too, and exempt from Age and Sick-
 “ nefs ?” No. But sickening and dying as be-
 comes a God. This is in my Power ; this I
 can do. The other is not in my Power, nor can
 I do it. Shall I show you the (*b*) Nerves of a
 Philosopher ?

“ What Nerves are those ?”

A Desire undisappointed ; an Aversion unin-
 curred ; Pursuits duly exerted ; a careful Resolu-
 tion ; an unerring Assent. These you shall see.

C H A P. IX.

*That when we are unable to fulfil what the Character
 of a Man promises, we assume that of a Philosopher.*

§. I. **I**T is no common Attainment, merely to
 fulfil what the Nature of Man promises.
 For what is Man ?

A rational

(*b*) An Allusion to the Combatants in the public Exer-
 cises, who used to show their Shoulders, Muscles, and
 Nerves, as a Proof of their Strength. See B. I. c. 4. §. 4.
 B. II. c. 18. §. 5. B. III. c. 22. §. 5.

A rational and mortal Being.

Well: from what are we distinguished by Reason?

From wild Beasts.

From what else?

From Sheep, and the like.

Take care, then, to do nothing like a wild Beast; otherwise, you have destroyed the Man; you have not fulfilled what your Nature promises. Take care too, to do nothing like Cattle: for thus likewise the Man is destroyed.

In what do we act like Cattle?

When we act gluttonously, lewdly, rashly, fordidly, inconsiderately, into what are we sunk?

Into Cattle.

What have we destroyed?

The rational Being.

When we behave contentiously, injuriously, passionately, and violently, into what have we sunk?

Into wild Beasts.

§. 2. And farther; some of us are wild Beasts of a larger Size: others, little mischievous Vermin; whence there is room to say, Let me rather be eat by a Lion. By all these Means, is destroyed what the Nature of Man promises. For, when is a conjunctive Proposition preserved?

When it fulfils what its Nature promises.

So then the Preservation of such a Proposition
consists

consists in this ; that its several Parts are a Conjunction of Truths.

When is a disjunctive Proposition preserved ?

When it fulfils what its Nature promises.

When is a Flute, a Harp, a Horse, or a Dog, preserved ?

When each fulfils what its Nature promises.

Where is the Wonder then, that Man should be preserved, and destroyed, in the same Manner? All are preserved and improved by Operations correspondent [to their several Faculties]; as a Carpenter, by Building; a Grammarian, by Grammar: but if he accustom himself to write ungrammatically, his Art will necessarily be spoiled and destroyed. Thus modest Actions preserve the modest Man, and immodest ones destroy him: faithful Actions, the faithful Man: and the contrary destroy him. On the other hand, contrary Actions heighten contrary Characters. Thus Impudence, an impudent one; Knavery, a knavish one; Slander, a slanderous one; Anger, an angry one; and unequitable Dealings, a covetous one.

§. 3. For this Reason, Philosophers advise us, not to be contented with mere Learning; but to add Meditation likewise, and then Practice. For we have been long accustomed to contrary Actions, and have practised upon wrong Opinions. If therefore, we do not likewise habituate ourselves
to

to practise upon right Opinions, we shall be nothing more than Expositors of the Principles of others. For who among us is not already able to discourse, according to the Rules of Art, upon Good and Evil? *That some Things are good, some evil, and others indifferent: the Good, Virtue, and whatever partakes of Virtue; the Evil, the contrary; and the Indifferent, Riches, Health, Reputation:* and then, if, while we are saying all this, there should happen some more than ordinary Noise, or one of the By-standers should laugh at us, we are disconcerted. Philosopher, what is become of what you were saying? Whence did it proceed? Merely from your Lips? Why then, do you pollute the Aids which others have provided? Why do you trifle on the most important Subjects? It is one thing to hoard up Provision in a Store-house, and another to eat it. What is eaten is concocted, digested, and becomes Nerves, Flesh, Bones, Blood, Colour, Breath. Whatever is hoarded up is ready indeed, whenever you have a Mind to show it; but of no further Use to you than the mere Notion, that you have it. For what Difference is there, whether you explain *these* Doctrines, or those of Persons of opposite Principles? Sit down now, and comment, according to the Rules of Art, upon the Principles of *Epicurus*: and perhaps you may comment more practically than he could have done himself. Why

then do you call yourself a *Stoic*? Why do you act a *Jew*, when you are a *Greek*? Do not you see on what Terms each is called a *Jew*, a *Syrian*, an *Egyptian*? And when we see any one wavering, we are wont to say, This is not a *Jew*; but acts one. But, when he assumes the Sentiments of one who hath been baptized and circumcised (*a*), then he both really is, and is called, a *Jew*. Thus we, falsifying our Profession, are *Jews* in Name, but in reality something else. Our Sentiments are inconsistent with our Discourse; far from practising what we teach, and what we pride ourselves in the Knowledge of. Thus, while we are unable to fulfil what the Character of a Man promises, we assume, besides, so vast a Weight as that of a Philosopher. As if a Person, incapable of lifting ten Pounds, should endeavour to heave the same Stone with *Ajax*.

C H A P. X.

How we may investigate the Duties of Life from the Names which we bear.

§. I. **E**XAMINE who you are. In the first Place, A Man: that is, one who hath nothing superior to the Faculty of Choice; but all Things subject to this; and this itself uninflaved, and unsubjected, to any thing. Consider then;

(*a*) The Translation follows Mr. Upton's Conjecture.

then, from what you are distinguished by Reason. You are distinguished from wild Beasts : you are distinguished from Cattle. Besides : you are a Citizen of the World, and a Part of it : not a subservient, but a principal Part. You are capable of comprehending the divine Oeconomy ; and of considering the Connexions of Things. What then doth the Character of a Citizen promise ? To hold no private Interest ; to deliberate of nothing as a separate Individual, but like the Hand or the Foot ; which, if they had Reason, and comprehended the Constitution of Nature, would never pursue, or desire, but with a Reference to the Whole. Hence the Philosophers rightly say, That, if a wise and good Man could foresee what was to happen, he would help forward Sickness, and Death, and Mutilation, to himself ; being sensible, that these Things are appointed from the Order of the Universe ; and that the Whole is superior to a Part, and the City to the Citizen. But, since we do not foreknow what is to happen, it becomes our Duty to adhere to what is more naturally adapted to our Option : for, amongst other Things, we were born for this.

§. 2. Remember next, that perhaps you are a Son : and what doth this Character promise ? To esteem every thing that is his, as belonging to his Father : in every Instance to obey him : not to revile him to another : not to say or do any thing inju-
I 2
rious

rious to him: to give way and yield in every thing; co-operating with him to the utmost of his Power.

§. 3. After this, know likewise, that you are a Brother too: and that to this Character it belongs, to make Concessions; to be easily persuaded; to use gentle Language: never to claim, for yourself, any of the Things independent on Choice; but chearfully to give these, that you may have the larger Share of what is dependent on that. For consider what it is, instead of a Lettuce, for Instance, or a Chair, to procure for yourself a good Temper? How great an Advantage gained!

§. 4. If, besides this, you are a Senator of any City, consider yourself as a Senator: if a Youth, as a Youth: if an old Man, as an old Man. For each of these Names, if it comes to be considered, always points out the proper Duties. But, if you go and revile your Brother, I tell you, you have forgot who you are, and what is your Name. For even if you were a Smith, and made an ill Use of the Hammer, you would have forgot the Smith: and, if you have forgot the Brother, and are become, instead of a Brother, an Enemy, do you imagine you have made no Change of one Thing for another, in that Case? If, instead of a Man, a gentle, social Creature, you are become a wild Beast, mischievous, insidious, biting; have you lost nothing? But must you lose Money,

Money, in order to suffer Damage; and is there no other Thing, the Loss of which endamages a Man? If you were to part with your Skill in Grammar, or in Music, would you think the Loss of these a Damage? And, if you part with Honour, Decency, and Gentleness, do you think *that* no Matter? Yet the first are lost by some Cause external, and independent on Choice; but the last, by our own Fault. There is no Shame either in not (a) having, or in losing the one; but either not to have, or to lose, the other is equally shameful, and reproachful, and unhappy. What doth the Pothic lose? The Man. What doth the smooth effeminate Fellow lose? (b) Many other Things? but however the Man also. What doth an Adulterer lose? The Modest, the chaste Character; the Neighbour. What doth an angry Person lose? Something else. A Coward? Something else. No one is wicked without some Loss, or Damage. Now, if, after all, you have made the Loss of Money the only Damage, all these [Wretches] are unhurt and undamaged. Nay, it may be, even Gainers; as, by such Practices, their Money might possibly be increased. But consider: if you refer every thing to *Money*,

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(a) The true Reading of the *Greek* is *οὐτ' οὐκ ἔχειν*.

(b) It hath been suggested to me, that *διατίθεις*, not *διατίθεις*, is the true Reading; and I have ventured so to translate it. See L. III. c. 1. p. 352, 353. of Mr. Upton's Edition.

the Man who loses his Nose is not hurt. Yes, say you ; he is maimed in his Body. Well : but doth he who loses his Smell itself, lose nothing ? Is there, then, no Faculty of the Soul, which he who possesses it is the better for ; and he who parts with it, the worse ?

What Sort do you mean ?

Have we not a natural Sense of Honour ?

We have.

Doth he, who loses this, suffer no Damage ? Is he deprived of nothing ? Doth he part with nothing that belongs to him ? Have we no natural Fidelity ? No natural Affection ? No natural Disposition to mutual Usefulness, to mutual Forbearance ? Is he, then, who carelessly suffers himself to be damaged in these Respects, unhurt and undamaged ?

§. 5. What, then, shall not I hurt him, who hath hurt me ?

Consider first what *Hurt* is ; and remember what you have heard from the Philosophers. For, if both Good and Evil consists in Choice, see whether what you say, doth not amount to this : “ Since he hath hurt himself, by injuring me ; “ shall not I hurt myself by injuring him ? ” Why do we not make some such Representation to ourselves, as this ? Are we hurt, when any Detriment happens to our bodily Possessions ; and are we not at all hurt, when any happens to our
Faculty

Faculty of Choice? He who is deceived, or hath done an Injury, hath no Pain in his Head; nor loses an Eye, a Leg, or an Estate: and we wish for nothing beyond these. Whether we have a modest and faithful, or a shameless and unfaithful, Will and Choice, we make not the smallest Difference; except only in the Schools, as far as a few Words go. Therefore all the Improvement we make, reaches only to Words; and beyond them is absolutely nothing.

CHAP. XI.

What the Beginning of Philosophy is.

§. I. **T**HE Beginning of Philosophy, at least to such as enter upon it in a proper Way, and by the Door, is a Consciousness of our own Weakness, and Inability, in necessary Things. For we came into the World without any natural Idea of a right-angled Triangle; of a Diesis, or a Hemitone, in Music: but we learn each of these Things by some Instruction of Art. Hence, they who do not understand them, do not form any Conceit of understanding them. But who ever came into the World, without an innate Idea of Good and Evil; Fair and Base; Becoming and Unbecoming; Happiness and Misery; Proper and Improper; what ought to be done, and what not to be done? Hence we all make use

of the Names, and endeavour to apply our Pre-conceptions to particular Cases. "Such a one hath acted well; not well: right; not right: is unhappy; is happy: is just; is unjust." Who of us refrains from these Names? Who defers the Use of them, till he had learnt it; as those do, who are ignorant of Lines and Sounds? The Reason of this is, that we (a) come instructed, in some degree, by Nature upon these Subjects; and from this Beginning, we go on to add Self-conceit. "For why, say you, should not I know what Fair and Base is? Have not I the Idea of it?" You have. "Do not I apply this Idea to Particulars?" You do. "Do not I apply it right, then?" Here lies the whole Question; and here arises the Self-conceit. For, beginning from these acknowledged Points, Men proceed to what is in Dispute, by means of their unsuitable Application. For, if they possess a right Method of Application, what would restrain them from being perfect? Now, since you think, that you make a suitable Application, of your Pre-conceptions to particular Cases, tell me whence you derive this.

From its seeming so to me.

But it doth not seem so to another: and doth not he too form a Conceit, that he makes a right Application?

He

(a) For *τινας* in the *Greek*, the Sense seems to require *ἑμας*.

He doth.

It is possible, then, that each of you should apply your Pre-conceptions right, on the very Subjects about which you have contradictory Opinions?

It is not.

Have you any thing to show us, then, for this Application, preferable to its *seeming* so to you? And doth a Madman act any otherwise than seems to him, right? Is this then a sufficient Criterion to him too?

It is not.

Come therefore, to something preferable to what *seems*.

What is that?

§. 2. The Beginning of Philosophy is this: The being sensible of the Disagreement of Men with each other: an Inquiry into the Cause of this Disagreement; and a Disapprobation, and Distrust of what merely *seems*: a certain Examination into what seems, whether it seem rightly: and an Invention of some Rule, like a Balance, for the Determination of Weights; like a Square, for strait and crooked.

Is this the Beginning of Philosophy, that all Things which seem right to all Persons, are so?

Why; is it possible, that Contradictions can be right?

Well then, not all Things; but all that seem so to us.

And why more to *you*, than to the *Syrians*, or *Egyptians*? Than to *me*, or to any other Man?

Not at all more.

§. 3. Therefore [merely] what *seems* to each Man, is not sufficient to determine the Reality of a Thing. For even in Weights and Measures we are not satisfied with the bare Appearance; but for every thing we find some Rule. And is there, in the present Case then, no Rule, preferable to what *seems*? Is it possible, that what is of the greatest Necessity in human Life, should be left incapable of Determination and Discovery?

There is, then, some Rule.

And why do we not seek, and discover it; and, when we have discovered, make use of it, without fail, ever after, so as not even to move a Finger, without it. For this, I conceive, is what, when found, will cure (*b*) those of their Madness, who make use of no other Measure, but their own perverted Way of Thinking. That afterwards, beginning from certain known and determinate Points, we may make use of Pre-conceptions, properly applied to Particulars. What is the Subject that falls under our Inquiry? Pleasure.

Bring

(*b*) The Sense requires, that the Reading should be ἀπαλλάττειν, or ἀπαλλάττειν.

Bring it to the Rule. Throw it into the Scale. Must Good be something in which it is fit to confide? and to which we may trust?

Yes.

Is it fit to trust to any thing unsteady?

No.

Is Pleasure then, a steady Thing?

No.

Take it, then, and throw it out of the Scale, and drive it far distant from the Place of good Things. But, if you are not quick-sighted, and one Balance is insufficient, bring another. Is it fit to be elated by Good?

Yes.

Is it fit, then, to be elated by a present Pleasure? See that you do not say it is; otherwise I shall not think you so much as worthy to use a Scale. Thus are Things judged, and weighed, when we have the Rules ready. This is the Part of Philosophy, To examine, and fix the Rules: and to make use of them, when they are known, is the Business of a wise and good Man.

C H A P. XII.

Of Disputation.

§. 1. **W**HAT Things are to be learn'd, in order to the right Use of Reason, the Philosophers of our Sect have accurately taught:

but we are altogether unpractised in the due Application of them. Only give any of us, that you please, some illiterate Person, for an Antagonist, and he will not find out, how to treat him. But when he hath a little moved the Man, if he happens to answer beside the Purpose, he knows not how to deal with him any further; but either reviles, or laughs at him; and says, "He is an illiterate Fellow: there is no making any thing of him." Yet a Guide, when he perceives his Charge going out of the Way, doth not revile, and ridicule, and then leave him; but leads him into the right Path. Do you also show your Antagonist the Truth, and you will see, that he will follow. But till you do show it, do not ridicule him; but rather be sensible of your own Incapacity.

§. 2. How then, did *Socrates* use to act? He obliged his Antagonist himself to bear Testimony to him; and wanted no other Witness. Hence he might well say, "I give up all the rest; and am always satisfied with the Testimony of my Opponent: and I call in no one to vote, but my Antagonist alone." For he rendered the Arguments drawn from natural Notions so clear, that every one saw, and avoided the Contradiction. — "Doth an envious Man rejoice?" — "By no means. He rather grieves." (This he moved him to say, by proposing the contrary.) —

"Well:

“ Well : and do you think Envy to be a Grief,
 “ for Misery ?” — And who ever envied Misery ?
 “ — (Therefore he makes the other say, that
 “ Envy is a Grief, for Happiness.) — Doth any
 “ one envy those who are nothing to him ?” —
 “ No, surely.” Having thus drawn [from his
 Opponent] a full and distinct Idea, he then left
 that Point ; and doth not say, “ Define to me
 “ what Envy is :” And after he had defined it ;
 “ You have defined it wrong ; for the Definition
 “ doth not reciprocate to the Thing defined.”
 Technical Terms, and therefore grievous, and
 scarcely to be made intelligible to the Illiterate,
 which yet *We*, it seems, cannot part with. But
 we have no Capacity at all to move them, by such
 Arguments, as might induce them, in follow-
 ing the Track of the Appearances in their own
 Minds, to allow, or disprove, any Point. And,
 from a Consciousness of this Incapacity, those
 among us, who have any Modesty, give the Matter
 intirely up : but the greater Part, rashly entering
 upon these Debates, mutually confound, and are
 confounded ; and, at last, reviling, and reviled,
 walk off. Whereas it was the principal and
 most peculiar Characteristic of *Socrates*, never to
 be provoked, in a Dispute ; nor to throw out
 any reviling or injurious Expression : but to bear
 patiently with those who reviled him ; and to put
 an End to the Controversy. If you would know
 how

how great Abilities he had in this particular, read *Xenophon's Banquet*, and you will see, how many Controversies he ended. Hence, even among the Poets, that Person is justly mentioned with the highest Commendation,

*Whose lenient Art attentive Crowds await,
To still the furious Clamours of Debate.*

HESIOD.

But what then? This is no very safe Affair now, and especially at *Rome*. For he who doth it, must not do it in a Corner; but go to some rich Consular Senator, for Instance, and question him. “Pray, Sir, can you tell me to whom you intrust your Horses?” — “Yes certainly.” — “Is it then, to any one indifferently, though he be ignorant of Horsemanship?” — “By no means.” — “To whom do you intrust your Gold, or your Silver, or your Clothes?” — “Not to any one indifferently.” — “And did you ever consider, to whom you committed the Care of your Body?” — “Yes, surely.” — “To one skilled in Exercise, or Medicine, I suppose.” — “Without doubt.” — “Are these Things your chief Good; or are you possessed of some thing better than all of them?” — “What do you mean?” — “Something which makes use of these; and proves, and deliberates about each of them?” — “What then, do

“do you mean the Soul?” — “You have
 “guess’d right; for indeed I do mean that.”
 — “I do really think it a much better Possession
 “than all the rest.” — Can you show us, then,
 “in what manner you have taken care of this
 “Soul? For it is not probable, that a Person of
 “your Wisdom, and approved Character in the
 “State, should carelessly suffer the most excel-
 “lent Thing that belongs to you, to be ne-
 “glected, and lost.” — “No certainly.” — “But
 “do you take care of it yourself? And is it by
 “the Instructions of another, or by your own
 “Discovery [how it ought to be done?]” — Here,
 now, comes the Danger, that he may first say,
 Pray, good Sir, what Business is that of yours?
 What are you to me? Then, if you persist to
 trouble him, he may lift up his Hand, and give
 you a Box on the Ear. I myself was once a great
 Admirer of this Method of Instruction, till I fell
 into such kind of Adventures.

C H A P. XIII.

Of Solitude.

§. 1. **W**HEN I see any one solicitous, I say,
 What doth this Man mean? Unless
 he wanted something or other, not in his own
 Power, how could he still be solicitous? A
 Musician, for Instance, feels no Solitude, while
 he

he is singing by himself: but when he appears upon the Stage he doth; even if his Voice be ever so good, or he plays ever so well. For what he wants is not only to sing well, but likewise to gain Applause. But this is not, in his own Power. In short, where his Skill lies, there is his Courage. (Bring any ignorant Person, and he doth not mind him.) But in the Point which he neither understands, nor hath studied, there he is solicitous.

What Point is that?

He doth not understand what a Multitude is; nor what the Applause of a Multitude. He hath learnt, indeed, how to strike Bass and Treble; but what the Applause of the many is, and what Force it hath in Life, he neither understands, nor hath studied. Hence he must necessarily tremble, and turn pale. I cannot, indeed, say, that a Man is no Musician, when I see him afraid; but I can say something else; and that not one, but many Things. And, first of all, I call him a Stranger; and say, This Man doth not know in what Country he is: and though he hath lived here so long, he is ignorant of the Laws and Customs of the State; and what is permitted, and what not: nor hath he ever consulted any Lawyer, who might tell and explain to him the Laws. Yet no Man writes a Will, without knowing how it ought to be written, or consulting some
one

one who doth know: nor doth he rashly sign a Bond, or give Security. But he uses his Desire and Aversion, exerts his Pursuits, Intentions, and Resolutions, without consulting any Lawyer about the Matter.

How do you mean, without a *Lawyer*?

He knows not, that he chuses what is not allowed him; and doth not chuse what is necessary: and he knows not what is his own, and what belongs to others: for if he did know, he would never be hindered; would never be restrained; would never be solicitous.

How so?

Why: doth any one fear Things that are not Evils?

No.

Doth any one fear Things, that are Evils indeed, but which it is in his own Power to prevent?

No, surely.

§. 2. If, then, the Things independent on Choice, are neither good nor evil; and all that do depend on Choice, are in our own Power, and can neither be taken away from us, or given to us, unless we please; what room is there left for Solicitude? But we are solicitous about this paultry Body, or Estate, of ours; or about the Determination of *Cæsar*; and not at all about any thing internal. Are we ever solicitous not
to

to take up a false Opinion? No: for this is in our own Power. Or not to exert our Pursuits, contrary to Nature? No: nor this neither. When, therefore, you see any one pale with Solicitude, as the Physician pronounces from the Complexion, that such a Patient is disordered in the Spleen, another in the Liver; so do you likewise say, this Man is disordered in his Desires and Aversions: he cannot walk steady; he is in a Fermentation. For nothing else changes the Complexion, or causes a Trembling, or sets the Teeth a chattering.

*No Force, no Firmness, the pale Coward shows;
He shifts his Place; his Colour comes and goes.
Terror and Death in his wild Eye-balls stare;
With chattering Teeth he stands, and stiffer'd Hair.*

POPE'S HOMER.

Therefore (a) Zeno, when he was to meet *Antigonus*, felt no Solicitude. For over what he admired, *Antigonus* had no Power; and those Things of which he had the Power, *Zeno* did not regard. But *Antigonus* felt a Solicitude when he was to meet

(a) *Antigonus Gonatas*, King of *Macedon*, had so great an Esteem for *Zeno*, that he often took a Journey to *Athens* to visit him; and endeavoured, by magnificent Promises, to allure him to his Court; but without Success. He gave it as a Reason, for the distinguished Regard which he paid him, that, though he had made him many, and very considerable Offers, *Zeno* never appeared either mean or insolent.

meet *Zeno*; and with Reason: for he was desirous to please him; and this was external. But *Zeno* was not desirous to please *Antigonus*: for no one skilful in any Art, is desirous to please a Person unskilful.

I am desirous [says one of his Scholars] to please *You*.

For what? Do you know the Rules, by which one Man judges of another? Have you studied to understand what a good, and what a bad Man is; and how each becomes such? Why then are not you yourself a good Man;

On what Account am I not?

Because no good Man laments, nor sighs, nor groans: no good Man turns pale, and trembles, and says, "How will such a one receive me; how will he hear me?" — As he thinks fit, Wretch. Why do you trouble yourself about what belongs to others? Is it not *his* Fault, if he receives you ill?

Yes, surely.

And can one Person be in fault, and another the Sufferer (*b*)?

No.

Why

(*b*) This is a Stoic Extravagance. The very Thing that constitutes the Fault of the one in this Case is, that he makes the other suffer. However, if, instead of vainly affecting Insensibility, we extend our View, to the future Rewards of those who bear ill Treatment as they ought, the Position is true and useful.

Why then are you solicitous, about what belongs to others ?

Well: but I am solicitous how I shall speak to him.

What then, cannot you speak to him as you will?

But I am afraid I shall be disconcerted.

If you were going to write the Name of *Dion*, should you be afraid of being disconcerted.

By no means.

What is the Reason? Is it because you have studied how to write?

Yes.

And if you were going to read, would it not be exactly the same?

Exactly.

What is the Reason?

Because every Art hath a certain Assurance and Confidence, in the Subjects that belong to it.

Have you not studied then, how to speak? And what else did you study at School?

Syllogisms, and convertible Propositions.

For what Purpose? Was it not in order to talk properly? And what is that, but to talk seasonably, and cautiously, and intelligibly, and without Flutter and Hesitation; and, in consequence of all this, with Courage?

Very true.

When,

When, therefore, you go into the Field on Horseback, are you solicitous on being matched against one who is on Foot? Solicitous in a Point which you have studied, and another hath not?

Ay, but the Person [with whom I am to talk] hath Power to kill me.

Then speak the Truth, pitiful Wretch, and do not be arrogant; nor take the Philosopher upon you; nor conceal from yourself who are your Masters: but while you may thus be laid hold on by the Body, follow every one who is stronger than you. *Socrates*, indeed, had studied how to speak, who talked in such a manner to Tyrants, and Judges, and in a Prison. *Diogenes* (c) had studied how to speak, who talked in such a manner to *Alexander*, to *Philip*, to the Pirates, to the Person who bought him. This belonged to them who had studied the Point; who had Courage. But do *you* walk off about your own Affairs, and never stir from them. Retire into some Corner, and there sit and weave Syllogisms, and propose them

(c) When *Diogenes* was sailing to *Ægina*, he was taken by Pirates, and carried to *Crete*; and there set to Sale. Being asked what he could do; he answered, *Govern Men*: and pointing to a well-dress'd *Corinthian*, who was passing by, *Sell me* (said he) *to him; for he wants a Master*. The *Corinthian*, whose Name was *Xeniades*, bought him, and appointed him the Tutor to his Children; and *Diogenes* perfectly well discharged his Trust.

them to others. For there is not, in *you*, one able
To rule the sacred Citadel within.

C H A P. XIV.

Concerning N A S O.

§. 1. **W**HEN a certain *Roman* came to him with his Son, and had heard one *Lesſon*, This, ſaid *Epiſtetus*, is the Method of Teaching; and ſtopt. When the other deſired him to go on; Every Art, answered he, is tedious, when it is delivered to a Perſon ignorant and unſkilful in it. Indeed the Things performed by the common Arts, quickly diſcover the Uſe for which they were made; and moſt of them have ſomething engaging and agreeable. Thus the Trade of a Shoemaker, if one would ſtand by, and endeavour to comprehend it, is an unpleaſant Thing: but the Shoe is uſeful; and beſides, not diſagreeable to ſee. The Trade of a Smith is extremely uneaſy to an ignorant Perſon that chances to be preſent (a): but the Work ſhows the Uſefulneſs of the Art. You will ſee this much more ſtrongly in Muſic: for if you ſtand by, while a Perſon is learning, it will appear to you of all Sciences the moſt unpleaſant: but the Effects

(a) The Translation follows Mr. *Upton*. Παταυγχα-
 99771.

Effects are agreeable and delightful, even to those who do not understand it.

§.2. Now here, we imagine it to be the Work of one who studies Philosophy, to adapt his Will to whatever happens. So that none of the Things which happen, may happen against our Inclination ; nor those which do not happen, be wished for by us. Hence they who have settled this Point, have it in their Power never to be disappointed of their Desire, or incur their Averfion ; but to lead a Life exempt from Sorrow, Fear, and Perturbation, in themselves ; and in Society, preserving all the natural and adventitious Relations of a Son, a Father, a Brother, a Citizen, a Husband, a Wife, a Neighbour, a Fellow-Traveller, a Ruler, or a Subject. Something like this, is what we imagine to be the Work of a Philosopher. It remains to inquire, how it is to be effected. Now we see, that a Carpenter by learning certain Things, becomes a Carpenter ; and a Pilot, by learning certain Things, becomes a Pilot. Probably, then, it is not sufficient, in the present Case, merely to be willing to be wise and good ; but it is moreover necessary that certain Things should be learned. What these Things are, is the Question. The Philosophers say, that we are first to learn that there is a God ; and that his Providence directs the whole ; and that it is impossible to conceal from him, not only

only our Actions, but even our Thoughts and Emotions. We are next to learn, what the Gods are: for such as they are found to be, such must *he*, who would please and obey them, to the utmost of his Power, endeavour to be. If the Deity is faithful, *he* too must be faithful: if free, beneficent, and exalted, he must be free, beneficent, and exalted, likewise: and in all his Words and Actions, behave as an Imitator of God.

§ 3. Whence, then, are we to begin?

If you will give me Leave, I will tell you. It is necessary, in the first place, that you should understand Words.

So then! I do not understand them now?

No. You do not.

How is it, then, that I use them?

Just as the Illiterate do written Expressions; and Brutes, the Appearances of Things. For Use is one Thing, and Understanding another. But if you think you understand them, bring whatever Word you please, and let us see whether we understand it, or not.

Well: but it is a grievous Thing for a Man to be confuted who is grown old; and perhaps arrived, through a regular Course of Military Service, to the Dignity of a Senator.

I know it very well: for you now come to me, as if you wanted nothing. And how can it enter
into

into your Imagination, that there should be any thing in which you are defective? You are rich; and perhaps have a Wife and Children, and a great Number of Domesticks. *Cæsar* takes Notice of you: you have many Friends at *Rome*: you render to all their Dues: you know how to requite a Favour, and revenge an Injury. In what are you deficient? Suppose then, I should prove to you, that you are deficient, in what is most necessary and important to Happiness; and that hitherto you have taken care of every Thing, rather than your Duty; and, to complete all, that you understand neither what God or Man, or Good or Evil, means? That you are ignorant of all the rest, perhaps, you may bear to be told: but if I prove to you, that you are ignorant even of *yourself*, how will you bear with me, and how will you have Patience to stay and be convinced? Not at all. You will immediately be offended, and go away. And yet what Injury have I done you; unless a Looking-Glass injures a Person not handsome, when it shows him to himself, such as he is? Or unless a Physician can be thought to affront his Patient, when he says to him; “Do you think, Sir, that you ail nothing? You have a Fever. Eat no Meat To-day, and drink Water.” Nobody cries out here, “What an intolerable Affront!” But, if you say to any one, Your Desires are in a Fermentation;

tion ; your Aversions are low ; your Intentions, contradictory ; your Pursuits, not conformable to Nature ; your Opinions, rash, and mistaken ; he presently goes away, and complains, he is affronted.

§. 4. This is the Nature of our Proceedings. As, in a crowded Fair, the Horses and Cattle are brought to be sold, and the greatest Part of Men come either to buy or sell ; but there are a few, who come only to look at the Fair, and inquire, How it is carried on ; and why in that Manner ; and who appointed it ; and for what Purpose. Thus, in the Fair of the World, some, like Cattle, trouble themselves about nothing but Fodder. For, as to all you, who busy yourselves about Possessions, and Farms, and Domestics, and public Posts, these Things are nothing else but mere Fodder. But there are some few Men, among the Crowd, who are fond of looking on, and considering : “ What then, after all, is the
 “ World ? Who governs it ? Hath it no Gover-
 “ nor ? How is it possible, when neither a City
 “ nor a House can remain ever so short a Time,
 “ without some one to govern and take care of
 “ it, that this vast and beautiful System should
 “ be administered, in a fortuitous and disorderly
 “ Manner ? Is there then a Governor ? What
 “ sort of one is he ? And how doth he govern ;
 “ and what are we, who are under him ? And
 “ for

“ for what design’d? Have we some Connexion
 “ and Relation to him; or none?” In this man-
 ner are the Few affected; and apply themselves
 only to view the Fair, and then depart. Well:
 and are they laugh’d at by the Multitude? Why,
 so are the Lookers-on, by the Buyers and Sellers;
 and, if the Cattle had any Apprehension, they too
 would laugh at such, as admired any thing but
 Fodder.

CHAP. XV.

*Concerning Those who obstinately persevere in what-
 ever they have determin’d.*

§. 1. **SOME**, when they hear such Discourses
 as these, *That we ought to be steady; that
 Choice is by Nature, free and uncompell’d; and that
 all else is liable to Restraint, Compulsion, Slavery, and
 belongs to others*; imagine, that they must remain
 immutably fixed to every thing which they have
 determin’d. But it is first necessary, that the
 Determination should be a sound one. I agree,
 that there should be a Tension of the Nerves in
 the Body; but such as appears in a healthy, an
 athletic Body: for, if you show me, that you
 have the Tension of a Lunatic, and value your-
 self upon that, I will say to you, Get yourself
 to a Physician, Man: this is not the Tension of
 the Nerves; but a Relaxation, of another kind.

Such is the Distemper of Mind, in those who hear these Discourses in a wrong Manner : like an Acquaintance of mine, who, for no Reason, had determined to starve himself to Death. I went the third Day, and inquired what was the Matter. He answered, “ I am determined.”— Well : but what is your Motive ? For, if your Determination be right, we will stay, and assist your Departure : but, if unreasonable, change it.— “ We ought to keep our Determinations.”— What do you mean, Sir ? Not all ; but such as are right. Else, if you should just now take it into your Head, that it is Night, if you think fit, do not change ; but persist, and say, *We ought to keep our Determinations*. What do you mean, Sir ? Not all. Why do not you begin, by first laying the Foundation, in an Inquiry, whether your Determination be a sound one, or not ; and then build your Firmness and Constancy, upon it. For, if you lay a rotten and crazy Foundation, you must not build (a) : and the greater and more weighty the Superstructure is, the sooner will it fall. Without any Reason, you are withdrawing from us, out of Life, a Friend, a Companion, a Fellow-Citizen both of the same greater (b), and lesser City : and while you are committing Murder, and destroying an innocent Person, you say,

We

(a) Instead of οἰκοδομησά τι οὐ, the true Reading seems to be οἰκοδομησέων, and is so translated.

(b) The World.

We must keep our Determinations. Suppose, by any means, it should ever come into your Head to kill me; must you keep such a Determination?

§. 2. With Difficulty this Person was, however, at last convinced: but there are some at present, whom there is no convincing. So that now I think I understand, what before I did not, the Meaning of that common saying, That a Fool will neither bend nor break. May it never fall to my Lot to have a wife, that is an untractable Fool, for my Friend (c). “It is all to no Purpose: I am determined.” So are Madmen too; but the more strongly they are determined upon Absurdities, the more Need have they of Hellebore. Why will you not act like a sick Person, and apply yourself to a Physician? “Sir, “I am sick. Give me your Assistance: consider “what I am to do. It is my Part to follow your “Directions.” So, in the present Case: I know not what I ought to do; and I am come to learn. — “No: but talk to me other about Things: for upon *This* I am determined.” What other Things? What is of greater Consequence, than to convince you, that it is not sufficient to be determined, and to persist. This is the Tension of a Madman; not of one in Health. “I will die, “if you compel me to this.” Why so, Man: what is the Matter? — “I am determined.” I

K 3

have

(c) The Translation here follows Mr. Upton's Copy.

have a lucky Escape, that you are not determined to kill me. “ I take no Money (*d*).” Why so ? “ I am determined.” Be assured, that with that very Tension which you now make use of to refuse it, you may, very possibly, hereafter, have as unreasonable a Propensity to take it ; and again to say, “ I am determined.” As, in a distempered and rheumatic Body, the Humour tends sometimes to one Part, sometimes to another ; thus it is uncertain which Way a sickly Mind will incline. But if, to its Inclination and Bent, an obstinate Tension be likewise added, the Evil then becomes desperate and incurable.

C H A P. XVI.

That we do not study to make use of the Principles concerning Good and Evil.

§. 1. **W**HERE lies Good ? In Choice. Where Evil ? In Choice. Where neither Good nor Evil ? In Things independent on Choice. What then ? Doth any of us remember these Lessons out of the Schools ? Doth any of us study how to answer for himself in Things, as in Questions ? “ Is it Day ? ” “ Yes.” “ Is it Night, then ? ” “ No.” “ Is the Number of Stars even ? ” “ I cannot tell.” When (*a*) Money is offered

(*d*) This, probably, is spoken in the Person of one, who is offered Assistance necessary for his Support, and refuses it.

(*a*) As a Bribe for bad Purposes.

offered you, have you studied to make the proper Answer, That it is not a Good? Have you exercised yourself in such Answers as these; or only in Sophistries? Why do you wonder then, that you improve in Points which you have studied; and in those which you have not studied, there you remain the same? When an Orator knows, that he hath written well; that he hath committed to Memory what he hath written; and that he brings an agreeable Voice with him; why is he still solicitous? Because he is not contented, with what he hath studied. What doth he want, then? To be applauded by the Audience. He hath studied the Power of speaking, then; but he hath not studied Censure and Applause. For when did he hear from any one, what Applause, what Censure, is? What is the Nature of each? What kind of Applause is to be sought, and what kind of Censure to be shunned? And when did he ever apply himself, to study what follows from these Lessons? Why do you wonder then, if, in what he hath learned, he excels others; but, where he hath not studied, he is the same with the rest of the World? Just as a Musician knows how to play, sings well, and hath the proper Dress of his Profession; yet trembles when he comes upon the Stage. For the first he understands: but what the Multitude is, or what the Clamour and Laughter of the Multitude is, he doth not understand.

Nor doth he even know, what Solicitude itself is : whether it be our own Affair, or that of others ; or whether it be possible to suppress it, or not. Hence, if he is applauded, he is puffed up, when he makes his Exit : but, if he is laughed at, the Tumour is pricked, and subsides.

§: 2. Thus are we too affected. What do we admire ? Externals. For what do we strive ? Externals. And are we then in any Doubt how we come to fear, and be solicitous ? What is the Consequence then, when we esteem the Things that are brought upon us, to be Evils ? We cannot but fear ; we cannot but be solicitous. And then we say, “ O Lord God, how shall I avoid Solicitude ! ” Have you not Hands, Fool ? (b) Hath not God made them for you ? (c) Sit down now, and pray, that your Nose may not run. Wipe it rather ; and do not murmur. Well ; and hath he given you nothing in the present Case ? Hath not he given you Patience ?

Hath

(b) The Order of this Passage should be—Sit down now, and pray, that your Nose may not run. Have you not Hands, Fool ? Hath not God made them for you, &c. But *Epictetus*, probably, might speak extempore in this inverted manner : and *Arrian* proposes to deliver what he said, with the greatest Exactness.

(c) Sitting, probably some particular Sort of it, was anciently (see *Judges* xx. 26. 1 *Chr.* xvii. 16.) one Posture of Devotion. Our Ancestors, in Queen *Elizabeth's* Time, called Kneeling, *Sitting* on their Knees. A mixed Posture of Sitting and Kneeling is now used, by some Nations in Prayer.

Hath not he given you Magnanimity? Hath not he given you Fortitude? When you have such Hands as these, do you still seek for Somebody to wipe your Nose (*d*)? But we neither study nor regard these Things. For give me but one, who cares how he doth any thing, who doth not regard the Success of any thing, but his own Manner of acting. Who, when he is walking, regards his own Action? Who, when he is deliberating, the Deliberation itself, and not the Success that is to follow it? If it happens to succeed, he is elated; and cries, "How prudently have we deliberated! Did not I tell you, my dear Friend, that it was impossible, when we considered about any thing, that it should not happen right?" But, if it miscarries, the poor Wretch is dejected; and knows not what to say about the Matter. Who among us ever, upon this Account, consulted a Diviner? Who of us ever slept in a Temple, to be informed concerning his Manner of acting (*e*)? I say, who? Show me one (that I may see what I have long sought)

K 5

who

(*d*) See p. 29. Note *f*.

(*e*) The Heathens had certain Temples, in which it was usual for Persons to sleep, in order to receive Oracles by Dreams. One of the most celebrated Places, appropriated to this Purpose, was the Temple of *Amphiarus*. See *PHILOSTRATUS*, p. 771.

who is truly noble and ingenuous. Show me either a young or an old Man (f).

§. 3. Why then are we still surprized, if, when we waste all our Attention on the Materials of Action, we are, in the Manner of Action itself, low, sordid, worthless, fearful, wretched, and a mere Heap of Disappointment and Misery? For we do not care about these Things, nor make them our Study. If we had feared, not Death or Exile, but Fear itself, we should have studied not to fall into what appears to us to be evil. But, as the Case now stands, we are eager and loquacious in the Schools; and, when any little Question arises about any of these Things, we are prepared to trace its Consequences: but drag us into Practice, and you will find us miserably shipwrecked. Let some alarming Appearance attack us; and you will perceive what we have been studying, and in what we are exercised. Besides this Negligence, we always accumulate somewhat else, and represent Things greater than the Reality. In a Voyage, for Instance, casting my Eyes down

(f) It is observable, that this most practical of all the Philosophers, owns his Endeavours met with little or no Success, among his Scholars. The Apostles speak a very different Language, in their Epistles to the first Converts to Christianity: and the Acts of the Apostles, and all the Monuments of the primitive Ages, bear Testimony to the Reformation of Manners produced by the Gospel. This Difference of Success might indeed justly be expected, from the Difference of the two Systems.

down upon the Ocean below, and looking round me, and seeing no Land, I am out of my Wits; and imagine, that, if I should be shipwrecked, I must swallow all that Ocean: nor doth it once enter my Head, that three Pints are enough to do my Business. What is it then, that alarms me? The Ocean? No: but my own *Principle*. Again: in an Earthquake, I imagine the City is going to fall upon me: but is not one little Stone enough, to knock my Brains out? What is it then, that oppresses, and puts us out of our Wits? Why, what else, but our *Principles*? For what is it, but mere *Principle*, that oppresses him, who leaves his Country, and is separated from his Acquaintance, and Friends, and Place, and usual Manner of Life? When Children cry, if their Nurse happens to be absent for a little while, give them a Cake, and they forget their Grief: Shall we compare you to these Children then?

No, indeed. For I do not desire to be pacified by a Cake; but by right *Principles*. And what are they?

Such as a Man ought to study all Day long, so as not to be attached to what doth not belong to him; neither to a Friend, to a Place, an Academy; nor even to his own Body: but to remember the Law, and to have that constantly before his Eyes. And what is the divine Law? To preserve inviolate what is properly our own: not

thing else, you will, with Sighs and Groans, follow what is stronger than you : always seeking Prosperity without, and never able to find it. For you seek it where it is not, and neglect to seek it where it is.

C H A P. XVII.

How to adapt Pre-conceptions to particular Cases.

§. 1. **W**HAT is the first Business of one who studies Philosophy (a)? To part with Self-Conceit. For it is impossible for any one to begin to learn what he hath a Conceit that he already knows. We all go to the Philosophers, talking at all Adventures upon negative and positive Duties; Good and Evil; Fair and Base. We praise, censure, accuse; we judge and dispute about fair and base Enterprises. And for what do we go to the Philosophers? To learn what we suppose ourselves not to know. And what is this? Theorems. We are desirous to hear what the Philosophers say, for its Elegance and Acuteness; and some with a View only to Gain. Now it is ridiculous to suppose, that a Person will learn any thing, but what he desires to learn; or make an Improvement, in what he doth not learn. But most are deceived, in the same Manner as *Theopompus*, the Orator, when he

(a) See B. II. c. II. §. 1.

he blames *Plato*, for defining every thing. "For, what, says he, did none of us, before you, use the Words *Good* and *Just*: or did we utter them as empty Sounds, without understanding what each of them meant?" Why, who tells you, *Theopompus*, that we had not natural Ideas and Pre-conceptions of each of these? But it is not possible, to adapt Pre-conceptions to their correspondent Subjects, without having minutely distinguished them, and examined what is the proper Subject to each. You may make the same Objection to the Physicians. For who of us did not use the Words, *Wholesome* and *Unwholesome*, before *Hippocrates* was born: or did we utter them as empty Sounds? For we have some Pre-conception of *Wholesome* too; but we cannot adapt it. Hence, one says, Let the Patient abstain from Meat; another, Give it him: one says, Let him be bled; another, Cup him. And what is the Reason, but not being able to adapt the Pre-conception of *Wholesome*, to particular Cases? Thus, too in Life: who of us doth not talk of *Good* or *Evil*; *Advantageous* and *Disadvantageous*: for who of us hath not a Pre-conception of each of these? But is it then a distinct and perfect one? Show me this.

How shall I show it?

§. 2. Adapt it properly to particular Subjects. *Plato*, to go no farther, puts Definitions under the

the Pre-conception of Useful; but you, under that of Useless. Can both of you be right? How is it possible? Again: doth not one Man adapt the Pre-conception of Good, to Riches? Another, not to Riches, but to Pleasure, or Health? Upon the whole, if none of us, who use Words, either utter them without Meaning, or need to take any manner of Care in distinguishing our Pre-conceptions, why do we differ? Why do we wrangle? Why do we censure each other? But what Occasion have I to mention this mutual Contradiction? If you yourself adapt your Pre-conceptions properly, how comes it to pass, that you do not prosper? Why do you meet with any Hindrance? Let us for the present omit the second Topic, concerning the *Pursuits*, and the Duties relative to them: Let us omit the Third too, concerning *Affect*. I make you a Present of all these. Let us insist only on the First (*b*); which affords almost a sensible Proof, that you do not adapt your Pre-conceptions right. You desire what is possible in itself, and possible for you. Why then are you hindered? Why are not you in a prosperous Way? You do not decline what is necessary. Why then do you incur any thing, [which is your Aversion]? Why are you unfortunate? When you desire any thing, why doth it not happen? When you do not desire it, why doth

(*b*) i. e. The Topic of the *Desires* and *Aversions*.

doth it happen? For this is the greatest Demonstration of ill Success, and Misery. I desire something; and it doth not happen: and what is more wretched than I? From an Impatience of this, *Medea* came to murder her own Children: an Action of a noble Spirit in this View; for she had a proper Impression of what it was to be disappointed of one's Desire. "Thus I shall punish him, who hath injured and dishonoured me: and what is so wicked a Wretch good for? But how is this to be effected? I will murder the Children: but that will be punishing myself. And what do I care?" This is the Error of a Soul indued with great Powers. For she knew not where the Completion of our Desires is to be found: that it is not to be had from without; nor by altering the Appointment of Things. Do not desire the Man for your Husband, and nothing which you do desire will fail to happen. Do not desire to keep him to yourself. Do not desire to stay at *Corinth*; and, in a Word, have no Will, but the Will of God; and who shall restrain you; who shall compel you, any more than *Jupiter*? When you have such a Guide, and conform your Will and Inclinations to his, what need you fear being disappointed? Yield up your Desire and Aversion [as Slaves] to Riches, or Poverty; the one will be disappointed, the other incurred. Yield them
up

up to Health, Power, Honours, your Country, Friends, Children, in short, to any thing independent on Choice, you will be unfortunate. But yield them up to *Jupiter*, and the other Gods. Give yourself up to these : let these govern : let both be ranged on the same Side with these ; and how can you be any longer unprosperous ? But if, poor Wretch, you envy, and pity, and are jealous, and tremble, and never cease, a single Day, from complaining of yourself, and the Gods, why do you boast of your Education ? What Education, Man ? That you have learned convertible Syllogisms ? Why do not you, if possible, unlearn all these, and begin again ; convinced, that hitherto, you have not even touched upon the Point ? And, for the future, beginning from this Foundation, proceed, in Order, to the Superstructure ; that nothing may happen which you do not wish, and that every thing may happen which you do. Give me but one young Man, who brings this Intention with him to the School ; who is a Champion for this Point ; and says, “ I yield up all the rest : it suffices
“ me, if once I become able to pass my Life, free
“ from Hindrance and Grief : to stretch out my
“ Neck to all Events, as free ; and to look up
“ to Heaven, as the Friend of God ; fearing no-
“ thing that can happen.” Let any one of you show himself of such a Disposition, that I may
say

say, "Come into the Place, young Man, that
 "is of right your own; for you are destined to
 "be an Ornament to Philosophy. Yours are
 "these Possessions; yours these Books; yours
 "these Discourses." Then, when he hath master'd, and got the better of this first Class, let him
 come to me again, and say; "I desire indeed to
 "be free from Passion, and Perturbation; but I
 "desire too, as a pious, a philosophic, and a
 "carefully attentive Man, to know, what is my
 "Duty to God, to my Parents, to my Relations,
 "to my Country, and to Strangers." "Come
 "into the second Class too; for this likewise is
 "yours." "But I have now sufficiently studied
 "the second Class too; and I would willingly
 "be secure, and (c) unshaken by Error and De-
 "lusion, not only awake, but even when asleep;
 "when warmed with Wine; when diseased with
 "the Spleen." "You are a God, Man: your
 "Intentions are great."

§. 3. "No. But I, for my part, desire to
 "understand what *Chrysippus* says, in his logical
 "Treatise of the (d) *Pseudomenos*."—Go hang
 yourself,

(c) There are several Readings and Conjectures. I have
 followed *Wolfius*; who reads, for *ασιτως, ασιτως*; as agree-
 ing best with the Sense.

(d) The *Pseudomenos* was a famous Problem among the
 Stoics; and it is this. When a Person says, *I lie*; doth he
 lie, or doth he not? If he lies, he speaks Truth: if he
 speaks Truth, he lies. The Philosophers composed many
 Books

yourself, pitiful Wretch; with such an Intention as this: What Good will it do you? You will read the Whole lamenting all the while; and say to others, trembling, “Do as I do.” — “Shall I read to you, my Friend, and you to me?—You write (e) surprizingly, Sir; and you very finely imitate the Stile of *Pato*; and you, of *Xenophon*; and you, of *Anriſthenes*.” And thus, having related your Dreams to each other, you return again to the same State. Your Desires and Aversions, your Pursuits, your Intentions, your Resolutions, your Wishes and Endeavours, are just what they were. You do not so much as seek for one to advise you; but are offended when you hear such Things as these; and cry, “An ill-natured old Fellow! He never wept over me, when I was setting out, nor said; “To what a Danger are you going to be exposed! “If you come off safe, Child, I will illuminate my House.” “This would have been the Part of a good-natured Man.” Truly, it will be a mighty Happiness, if you do come off safe: it

Books on this Difficulty. *Chrysippus* wrote six. *Philetas* wasted himself to Death in studying to answer it. *MENAGE on DIOG. LAERT. L. II. §. 108. BRUCKER Hist. Crit. Philof. vol. i. p. 613, 614.*

(e) This is spoken by *Epictetus*, in the Person of one of his Scholars; to ridicule their complimenting each other on their Writings, while they neglected the more important Concern of moral Improvements.

it will be worth while to make an Illumination. For you (*f*) ought to be immortal, and exempt from Sickness, to be sure.

§. 4. Throwing away then, I say, this Self-conceit, by which we fancy, we have gained some Knowledge of what is useful, we should come to philosophic Reasoning; as we do to Mathematics and Music: otherwise we shall be far from making any Improvement, even if we have read over all the Collection and Compositions, not only of *Chrysippus*, but of *Antipater* and *Archedemus* too.

C H A P. XVIII.

How the Appearances of Things are to be combated.

§. 1. **E**VERY Habit and Faculty is preserved, and increased, by correspondent Actions: as the Habit of Walking, by walking; of Running, by running. If you would be a Reader, read: if a Writer, write. But if you do not read for a Month together, but do somewhat else; you will see what will be the Consequence. So, after sitting still for ten Days, get up and attempt to take a long Walk; and you will find how your Legs are weakened. Upon the whole then, whatever you would make habitual, practise it: and, if you would not make a Thing habitual,

(*f*) *It should be read.*

bitual, do not practise it; but habituate yourself to something else.

§. 2. It is the same with regard to the Operations of the Soul. Whenever you are angry, be assured, that it is not only a present Evil, but that you have increased a Habit, and added Fuel to a Fire. When you are overcome by the Company of Women, do not esteem it as a single Defeat, but that you have fed, that you have increased, your Dissoluteness. For it is impossible, but that Habits and Faculties must either be first produced, or strengthened and increased by correspondent Actions. Hence the Philosophers derive the Growth of all Infirmities. When you once desire Money, for Example, if a Degree of Reasoning sufficient to produce a Sense of the Evil be applied, the Desire ceases, and the governing Faculty of the Mind regains its Authority; whereas, if you apply no Remedy, it returns no more to its former State: but, being again excited by a correspondent Appearance, it kindles at the Desire more quickly than before; and by frequent Repetitions, at last becomes callous (*a*): and by this Infirmary is the Love of Money fixed. For he who hath had a Fever, even after it hath left him, is not in the same State of Health as before, unless he was perfectly cured: and the same thing happens in Distempers of the Soul

(*a*) Hardened against proper Reflections.

Soul likewise. There are certain Traces and Blisters left in it; which, unless they are well effaced, whenever a new Hurt is received in the same Part, instead of Blisters become Sores.

§. 3. If you would not be of an angry Temper then, do not feed the Habit. Give it nothing to help its Increase. Be quiet at first, and reckon the Days in which you have not been angry. I used to be angry every Day; now every other Day; then every third and fourth Day: and if you miss it so long as thirty Days, offer a Sacrifice of Thanksgiving to God. For Habit is first weakened, and then intirely destroyed. "I was not vexed To-day (b); nor the next Day; nor for three or four Months after; but took heed to myself, when some provoking Things happened." Be assured, that you are in a fine Way. "To-day, when I saw a handsome Person, I did not say to myself, O that I could possess her! And, how happy is her Husband (for he who says this, says too, how happy is her Gallant): nor do I go on to represent her as present, as undress'd, as lying down beside me." On this I strook my Head, and say, Well done, *Epictetus*: thou hast solved a pretty Sophism; a much prettier than one very celebrated in the
VOL. I. L Schools.

(b) These several Facts are here supposed, to be recollected at different Times.

Schools (c). But, if even the Lady should happen to be willing, and give me Intimations of it, and send for me, and press my Hand, and place herself next to me; and I should then forbear, and get the Victory; that would be a Sophism beyond all the Subtleties of Logic. This, and not disputing artfully, is the proper Subject for Exultation.

§. 4. How then is this to be effected? Be willing to approve yourself to yourself. Be willing to appear beautiful in the Sight of God: be desirous to converse in Purity with your own pure Mind, and with God: and then, if any such Appearance strikes you, *Plato* directs you: "Have Recourse to Expiations: Go a Suppliant to the Temples of the averting Deities." It is sufficient, however, if you propose to yourself the Example of wise and good Men, whether alive or dead; and compare your Conduct with theirs. Go to *Socrates*, and see him lying by *Alcibiades*, yet slighting his Youth and Beauty. Consider what a Victory he was conscious of obtaining! What an *Olympic* Prize! In what Number did he stand from *Hercules* (d)? So that, by Heaven,

one

(c) In this Place, and the following Lines, the Original mentions particular Forms of Argument, which are now little understood; and could not be at all instructive to the *English* Reader.

(d) *Hercules* is said to have been the Author of the Gymnastic Games; and the first Victor. Those who afterwards conquered

one might justly salute *Him* (e); Hail! incredibly (f) great, universal Victor! not those sorry Boxers and Wrestlers; nor the Gladiators, who resemble them.

§. 5. By placing such an Object over-against you, you will conquer any Appearance, and not be drawn away by it. But, in the first place, be not hurried along with it, by its hasty Vehemence: but say; *Appearance*, wait for me a little. Let me see what you are, and what you represent. Let me try you. Then, afterwards, do not suffer it to go on drawing gay Pictures of what will follow: if you do, it will lead you where-ever it pleases. But rather oppose to it some good and noble Appearance, and banish this base and sordid one. If you are habituated to this kind of Exercise, you will see what Shoulders, what Nerves, what Sinews, you will have. But now it is mere trifling Talk, and nothing more. He is the true Practitioner, who exercises himself

L 2 against

conquered in Wrestling, and the Pancratiun, were numbered from him. UPTON.

(e) Mr. Upton inserts *νικησις*, which he conjectures, should be *νικησας*, into the Text, from his Manuscript: where, probably, it was written merely by an Accident of the Transcriber's casting his Eye upon that Word in the next Line. The Sense needs not this Addition, and perhaps doth better without it.

(f) This pompous Title was given to those, who had been Victors in all the *Olympic Games*.

against such Appearances as these. Stay, Wretch, do not be hurried away. The Combat is great, the Atchievement divine: for Empire, for Freedom, for Prosperity, for Tranquillity. Remember God. Invoke Him for your Aid, and Protector; as Sailors do *Castor* and *Pollux*, in a Storm. For what Storm is greater than that which arises from violent Appearances, contending to overthrow our Reason? Indeed, what is the Storm itself, but Appearance? For, do but take away the Fear of Death, and let there be as many Thunders and Lightnings as you please, you will find, that in the ruling Faculty, all is Serenity and Calm: but, if you are once defeated, and say, you will get the Victory another Time, and then the same thing over again; assure yourself, you will at last be reduced to so weak and wretched a Condition, that you will not so much as know when you do amiss; but you will even begin to make Defences for your Behaviour, and thus verify the Saying of *Hesiod*:

With constant Ills, the Dilatory strive.

C H A P. XIX.

Concerning Those who embrace Philosophy only in Words.

§. I. **T**HE Argument, called The ruling one, concerning which Disputants questioned each other, appears to have its Rise from hence.

hence (a). Of the following Propositions, any Two imply a Contradiction to the Third. They are these. *That every thing past is necessarily true : That an Impossibility is not the Consequence of a Possibility : And, That something is a Possibility, which neither is nor will be true.* Diodorus, perceiving this Contradiction; made use of the Probability of the Two first, to prove, That nothing is possible, which neither is nor will be true. Some again hold the Second and Third; *That something is possible, which neither is nor will be true;* and, *That, an Impossibility is not the Consequence of a Possibility:* and, consequently, assert, *That not every thing past is necessarily true.* This Way Cleanthes, and his Followers, took; whom Antipater copiously defends. Others, lastly, maintain the First and Third; *That something is possible, which neither is nor will be true :* and *That every thing past is necessarily true :* but then, *That an Impossibility may be the Consequence of a Possibility.* But all these Three Propositions cannot be at once maintained, because of their mutual Contradiction. If any one should ask me then, which of them I maintain; I answer him, That I cannot

L 3

tell.

(a) The curious Reader may see this whole Matter explained, with the greatest Acuteness and Accuracy, by the very learned and ingenious Mr HARRIS, in Mr. Up-ton's Notes.

tell. But I have heard it related, that *Diodorus* held one Opinion about them; the Followers of *Panthædes*, I think, and *Cleanthes*, another; and *Chrysippus* a third.

What then is yours (b) ?

(c) None. Nor was I born to examine the Appearances of Things to my own Mind; to compare what is said by others, and thence to form some Principle of my own, as to the Topic [which you mention]. Therefore, [in respect to it,] I am no better than a Grammarian [who repeats what he hath read]. Who was the Father of *Hector*? *Priam*. Who were his Brothers? *Paris* and *Deiphobus*. Who was his Mother? *Hecuba*. This I have heard related. From whom? *Homer*. But I believe *Helianicus*, and other Authors, have written on the same Subject. And what better Account have I of the ruling Argument? But, if I was vain enough, I might, especially at an Entertainment (d), astonish all the Company by an Enumeration of Authors, relating to it. *Chrysippus* hath written wonderfully, in his first Book of Possibilities. *Cleanthes* and

(b) This is spoken to *Epictetus* by one of his Hearers.

(c) With Mr. *Upton*, I read *οὐδὲν*: but it seems necessary, that *οὐδὲν* should likewise stand; and it is so translated.

(d) Some Philosophers affected to show their Learning at such Times; and it is against this idle Ostentation that *Epictetus* points his Discourse: for the Study of Logic itself, under proper Regulations, he often strongly recommends.

and *Archedemus* have each written separately on this Subject. *Antipater* too hath written, not only in his Treatise of Possibilities; but purposely in a Discourse on the ruling Argument. Have you not read the Work? “No.” Read it then. — And what Good will it do him? He will be more trifling and impertinent than he is already. For what else have you gained by reading it? What Principle have you formed upon this Subject? But you tell us of *Helen*, and *Priam*, and the Isle of *Calypso*, which never was, nor ever will be. And here, indeed, it is of no great Consequence, if you retain the Story, without forming any Principle of your own. But it is our Misfortune to do so much more in Morality, than upon such Subjects as these.

§. 2. Talk to me concerning Good and Evil (e).
Heat.

*The Wind from Ilium to the Cicon's Shore
Hath driven me. —*

Of Things, some are good, some evil, and some indifferent. Now the good, are the Virtues, and whatever partakes of them; and the evil, Vices, and what partakes of Vice; the indifferent

L 4

different

(e) This I apprehend to be spoken by one of the Scholars of *Epicletus*; who seeing the Contempt with which his Master treats logical Subtleties, in the foregoing Paragraph, desires him to discourse upon Ethics.

different, lie between these, as Riches, Health, Life, Death, Pleasure, Pain.

Whence do you know this ?

Hellanicus says it, in his *Egyptian History* (f). For what doth it signify, whether one names the History of *Hellanicus*, or the Ethics of *Diogenes*, or *Chrysippus*, or *Cleanthes* ? Have you then examined any of these Things, and formed a Principle of your own ? But show me, how you are used to exercise yourself on Shipboard. Remember this Division (g), when the Mast rattles, and some idle Fellow stands by you, while you are screaming, and says, “ For Heaven’s sake, talk “ as you did a little while ago. Is it Vice to “ suffer Shipwreck ? Or doth it partake of Vice ? ” Would not you take up a Log, and throw it at his Head ? “ What have we to do with you, “ Sir ? We are perishing, and you come and “ jest.” Again : if *Cæsar* should summon you, to answer an Accusation, Remember the Division. If, when you are going in, pale and trembling, any one should meet you, and say, “ Why do “ you tremble, Sir ? What is this Affair you are “ engaged

(f) *Epietetus* gives this absurd Reply to ridicule the Fondness of his Scholars for quoting Authors, and making a Parade of their Reading : and insinuates, that it is not at all material, whether a Person, who on such Subjects, means nothing further than Talk, knows of what he is talking, or blunders about it ever so grossly.

(g) Of Things into good, evil, and indifferent.

“ engaged in ? Doth *Cæsar* within, give Virtue
 “ and Vice to those who approach him ? ” —
 “ What do *you* too insult me, and add to my
 “ Evils ? ” — “ Nay, but tell me, Philosopher,
 “ why you tremble ? Is there any other Danger,
 “ but Death, or a Prison, or bodily Pain, or
 “ Exile, or Defamation ? ” — “ Why what should
 “ there be else ? ” — “ Are any of these Vice ?
 “ Or do they partake of Vice ? What then, did
 “ you yourself use to say of these Things ? ” —
 “ What have you to do with me, Sir ? My
 “ own Evils are enough for me. ” — You say
 “ right. Your own Evils are indeed enough
 “ for you ; your Baseness, your Cowardice, and
 “ that Arrogance, by which you were elated, as
 “ you sat in the Schools. Why did you plume
 “ yourself with what is not your own ? Why did
 “ you call yourself a Stoic ? ”

§. 3. Observe yourselves thus in your Actions,
 and you find of what Sect you are. You will
 find, that most of you are *Epicureans* ; a few *Pe-*
ripatetics, and those but loose ones (*b*). For, by
 what Action will you prove, that you think
 Virtue equal, and even superior, to all other
 Things ? Show me a Stoic, if you have one (*i*).
 Where ? Or how should you ? You can show,
 indeed, a Thousand, who repeat the Stoic Rea-
 sonings.

L 5

(*b*) The *Peripatetics* held other Things besides Virtue to
 be good ; but not in near so high a Degree.

(*i*) See Note *c*. B. ii. c. 16.

sonings. But do they repeat the *Epicurean* worse ? Are they not just as perfect in the *Peripatetic* ? Who then is a *Stoic* ? As we call that a *Phidian* Statue, which is formed according to the Art of *Phidias* ; so show me some one Person formed according to the Principles which he professes. Show me one, who is sick, and happy ; in Danger, and happy ; dying and happy ; exiled, and happy ; disgraced, and happy. Show him me ; for, by Heaven, I long to see a *Stoic*. But you [will say, you] have not one perfectly formed. Show me then one who is forming : one who is approaching towards this Character. Do me this Favour. Do not refuse an old Man a Sight which he hath never yet seen. Do you suppose, that you are [asked] to show the *Jupiter* or *Minerva* of *Phidias*, a Work of Ivory or Gold ? Let any of you show me a human Soul, willing to have the same Sentiments with those of God : not to accuse either God or Man : not to be disappointed of its Desire, or incur its Aversion : not to be angry : not to be envious : not to be jealous : in a Word, willing from a Man to become a God ; and, in this poor mortal Body, aiming to have Fellowship with *Jupiter*. Show him to me. But you cannot. Why then do you impose upon yourselves, and play Tricks with others ? Why do you put on a Dress not your own ; and walk about in it, mere Thieves and Pilferers

Pilferers of Names and Things, which do not belong to you? Here, I am your Preceptor, and you come to be instructed by me. And indeed my Intention is to secure you from being restrained, compelled, hindered: to make you free, prosperous, happy; looking to God upon every Occasion, great or small. And you come to learn and study these Things. Why then do not you finish your Work, if you have the proper Intention; and I, besides the Intention, the proper Qualifications? What is wanting? When I see an Artificer, and the Materials lying ready, I expect the Work. Now here is the Artificer; here are the Materials; what is it we want? Is not the Thing capable of being taught? It is. Is it not in our own Power then? The only Thing of all others that is so. Neither Riches, nor Health, nor Fame, nor, in short, any thing else is in our Power, except a right Use of the Appearances of Things. This alone is, by Nature, not subject to Restraint, not subject to Hindrance. Why then do not you finish it? Tell me the Cause. It must be by my Fault, or yours, or from the Nature of the Thing. The Thing itself is practicable, and the only one in our Power. The Fault then must be either in me, or in you, or, more truly, in both. Well then, shall we now, at last, bring this Intention along with us? Let us lay aside all that is past.

Let us begin. Only believe me, and you will see the Consequence.

C H A P. XX.

Concerning the Epicureans, and Academics.

§. 1. **T**RUE and evident Propositions must, of Necessity, be used even by those, who contradict them. And, perhaps, one of the strongest Proofs, that there is such a Thing as Evidence, is the Necessity which those, who contradict it, are under to make use of it. If a Person, for Instance, should deny, that any thing is universally true, he will be obliged to assert the contrary, that nothing is universally true. What, Wretch, not even this itself? For what is this, but to say, that every thing universal is false. Again: if any one should come, and say, “*Know* that there “ is nothing to be *known*; but all Things are “ uncertain:” or another; “*Believe* me, and it “ will be the better for you, no Man ought to “ be *believed* in any thing:” or a Third, “*Learn* “ from me, that nothing is to be *learned*; I tell “ you this, and will teach the Proof of it, if you “ please.” Now what Difference is there between such as these, and those who call themselves Academics? Who say to us, “ Be *convin-* “ *ced*, that no one ever is *convinced* [on good “ Grounds].

“ Grounds]. Believe us, that no body believes
“ any body.”

§. 2. Thus also, when *Epicurus* would destroy the natural Relation of Mankind to each other, he makes use of the very thing he is destroying. For what doth he say? “ Be not deceived; be
“ not seduced, and mistaken. There is no na-
“ tural Relation between reasonable Beings. Be-
“ lieve me. Those who say otherwise, mislead
“ and impose upon you.”—Why are *you* concerned for us then? Let us be deceived. *You* will fare never the worse, if all the rest of us are persuaded, that there is a natural Relation between Mankind; and that it is by all means to be preserved. Nay, it will be much safer and better. Why do you give yourself any Trouble about us, Sir? Why do you break your Rest for us? Why do you light your Lamp? Why do you rise early? Why do you compose so many Volumes? Is it that none of us should be deceived, concerning the Gods; as if they took any Care of Men? Or that we may not suppose the Essence of Good consists in any thing, but in Pleasure? For, if these Things be so, lie down and sleep, and lead the Life of which you judge yourself worthy; that of a mere Reptile. Eat and drink, and satisfy your Passion for Women, and ease yourself and snore. What is it to you, whether others think right or wrong about these Things? For what have you
to

to do with us? You take care of Sheep, because they afford us their Milk, their Wool, and, at last, their Flesh. And would it not be a desirable Thing that Men might be so lulled and enchanted by the Stoics, as to give themselves up to be milked and fleeced by you, and such as you? Should not these Doctrines be taught to your Brother *Epicureans* only, and concealed from the rest of the World; who should by all means, above all things, be persuaded, that we have a natural Relation to each other: and that Temperance is a good Thing, in order that all may be kept safe for you? Or is this Relation to be preserved towards some, and not towards others? Towards whom then, is it to be preserved? Towards such as mutually preserve, or such as violate it? And who violate it more, than you, who teach such Doctrines?

§. 3. What was it then, that waked *Epicurus* from his Sleep: and compelled him to write what he did; what else, but that which is of all others the most powerful in Mankind, Nature; which draws every one, however unwilling and reluctant, to its own Purposes. For since, says she, you think that there is no Relation between Mankind, write this Doctrine, and leave it for the Use of others; and break your Sleep upon that Account; and, by your own Practice, confute your own Principles. Do we say, that *Orestes* was roused from sleep by the Agitation of the Furies;

ries; and was not *Epicurus* waked by Furies, more cruel and avenging, which would not suffer him to rest; but compelled him to divulge his own Evils, as Wine and Madness do the Priests of *Cybele*? So strong and unconquerable a Thing is human Nature! For how can a Vine have the Properties not of a Vine, but of an Olive Tree? Or an Olive Tree, not those of an Olive Tree, but of a Vine? It is impossible. It is inconceivable. Neither, therefore, is it possible for a human Creature intirely to lose human Affections. But even those who have undergone a Mutilation, cannot have their Inclinations also mutilated: and so *Epicurus*, when he had mutilated all the Offices of a Man, of a Master of a Family, of a Citizen, and of a Friend, did not mutilate the Inclinations of Humanity: for he could not, any more than the idle Academics can throw away, or blind their own Senses; though this be, of all others, the Point they labour most. What a Misfortune is it, when any one, after having received, from Nature, Standards and Rules for the Knowledge of Truth, doth not strive to add to these, and make up their Deficiencies; but, on the contrary, endeavours to take away, and destroy, whatever Truth may be known even by them?

§. 4. What say you, Philosopher? What do you think of Piety and Sanctity? If you please, I will prove that they are good.—Pray do prove it;
that

that our Citizens may be converted (a), and honour the Deity, and may no longer neglect what is of the highest Importance.—Have you the Proofs, then?—I have, and I thank you. Since you are so well pleased with this then, learn the contrary: That there are no Gods; or, if there are, that they take no Care of Mankind; neither have we any Concern with them: that this Piety and Sanctity, which is so much talked of by many, is only an Imposition of boasting and sophistical Men: or, perhaps, of Legislators, for a Terror and Restraint to Injustice.—Well done, Philosopher. Our Citizens are much the better for you. You have already brought back all the Youth, to a Contempt of the Deity.—What! doth not this please you, then? Learn next, that Justice is nothing: that Shame is Folly: that the paternal Relation is nothing; the filial, nothing.—Well said, Philosopher: persist; convince the Youth: that we may have many more, to think and talk like you. By such Doctrines as these, have our well governed States flourished! Upon these was *Sparta* founded! *Lycurgus*, by his Laws, and Method of Education, introduced such Persuasions as these; That it is just as honourable, as it is dishonourable, to be Slaves; and just as dishonourable, as honourable, to be free! They who died at *Thermopylæ*, died from such Principles as these!

And

(a) A New Testament Word.

And from what other Doctrines did the *Athenians* leave their City (b)?

§. 5. And yet, they who talk thus, marry, and produce Children; and engage in public Affairs, and get themselves made Priests and Prophets (of whom? Of Gods that have no Existence); and consult the *Pythian* Priestesses, only to hear Fals-hoods, and interpret the Oracles to others. What monstrous Impudence and Imposture!

§. 6. (c) What are you doing Man? You contradict yourself every Day; and yet you will not give up these paultry Cavils. When you eat, where do you carry your Hand? To your Mouth, or to your Eye? When you bathe, where do you go? Do you ever call a Kettle, a Dish; or a Spoon, a Spit? If I were a Servant to one of these Gentlemen, were it at the Hazard of being flayed every Day, I would plague him. "Throw some Oil into the Bath, Boy." I would take Pickle, and pour upon his Head. "What is this?" Really, Sir, an Appearance struck me so perfectly alike, as not to be distinguished from Oil. "Give
" me

(b) When the *Athenians* found themselves unable to resist the Forces of the *Persians*, they left their City; and, having removed their Wives and Children, and their moveable Effects, to *Træzen* and *Salamis*, went on board their Ships, and defended the Liberty of *Greece* by their Fleet. UPTON from CICERO, &c.

(c) What follows is against the Academics, who denied the Evidence of the Senses.

“ me the Soup.” I would carry him a Dish full of Vinegar. “ Did not I ask for the Soup ? ” — Yes, Sir, this is the Soup. — “ Is not this Vinegar ? ” Why so, more than Soup ? “ Take it and smell to it, take it and taste it.” “ How do you know then, but our Senses deceive us ? ” If I had three or four Fellow-servants to join with me, I would make him either choke with Passion, and burst, or change his Opinions. But now they insult us, by making use of the Gifts of Nature, while in Words they destroy them. Grateful and modest Men, truly ! Who, if there were nothing else in the Case, while they are eating their daily Bread, dare to say, “ We do not know whether there be any *Ceres*, or *Proserpine*, or *Pluto*(*d*). ” Not to mention, that while they enjoy the Night and Day, the Seasons of the Year, the Stars, the Earth and Sea, they are not the least affected by any of these Things ; but only study to throw out some idle Problem ; and, when they have cleared their Stomachs, go and bathe : but take not the least Care what they say ; nor on what Subjects ; nor to whom ; nor what may be the Consequence of their Talk : whether any well-disposed young Man, by hearing such Doctrines, may not be affected by them, and so affected, as entirely

(*d*) By these Terms, the Stoics meant ; intelligent Powers, joining, to bring the Fruits of the Earth to Maturity, and to carry on the Course of Nature,

entirely to lose the Seeds of his good Disposition : whether they may not furnish an Adulterer with Occasions of growing shameless in his Guilt : whether a public Plunderer may not find Excuses from these Doctrines : whether he, who neglects his Parents, may not gain an additional Confidence from them—(e). “ What then, in your
“ Opinion, is good and evil, fair and (f) base ;
“ such Things, or such Things ? ”—Why should one say any more against such Creatures as these, or give them any Account, or receive any from them, or endeavour to convince them ? By Jupiter, one might sooner hope to convince the most unnatural Debauchees, than those, who are thus deaf and blind to their own Evils (g).

(e) These seem to be the Words of the Academic, desirous of beginning a Dispute with *Epictetus*, to revenge himself by puzzling him, for the severe Things which he had been saying against that Sect. But *Epictetus* refuses to enter into it, and gives his Reason.

(f) I have followed Mr. *Upton*'s Addition of *αιεχρον* ; but, perhaps, even *καλον* may be an Addition, first arising from writing *η καλον* twice over.

(g) This resembles what our Saviour saith to the Jewish Rulers ; *Verily I say unto you, that the Publicans and the Harlots go into the Kingdom of God before you.* Matt. xxi. 31.

C H A P. XXI.

Of Inconsistency.

§. 1. **T**HERE are some Things which Men confess, with Ease; others, with Difficulty. No one, for Instance, will confess himself a Fool, or a Blockhead; but, on the contrary, you will hear every one say, “I wish my Fortune was equal to my Mind.” But they easily confess themselves fearful; and say, “I am somewhat timorous, I confess: but in other respects you will not find me a Fool.” No one will easily confess himself intemperate in his Desires; upon no Account dishonest, nor absolutely very envious, or meddling: but many confess themselves to have the Weakness of being compassionate. What is the Reason of all this? The principal is, an Inconsistency and Confusion in what relates to Good and Evil. But different People have different Inducements. In general, whatever they imagine to be base, they do not absolutely confess. Fear and Compassion, they imagine to belong to a well-meaning Disposition; but Stupidity, to a Slave. Offences against Society they do not own: but, in most Faults, they are brought to a Confession, chiefly from imagining, that there is something involuntary in them; as in Fear and Compassion. And, though a Person

son (a) should in some Measure confess himself intemperate in his Desires, he accuses his Passion, and expects Forgiveness, as for an involuntary Fault. But Dishonesty is not imagined to be, by any means, involuntary. In Jealousy too, there is something, they suppose, of involuntary; and this likewise, in some Degree, they confess.

§. 2. Conversing among such Men, therefore, thus confused, thus ignorant what they say, what are, or are not, their Evils, whence they have them, and how they may be delivered of them; it is worth while, I think, to ask one's self continually, " Am I too one of these? What do I imagine myself to be? How do I conduct myself? As a prudent, as a temperate Man? Do I too, ever talk at this Rate, That I am sufficiently instructed for what may happen? Have I that Persuasion, That I know nothing, which becomes one that knows nothing? Do I go to a Master, as to an Oracle, prepared to obey; or do I, as well as others, like a stupid Driver (b), enter the School, only to learn the History [of Philosophy], and understand Books, which I did not understand before; or, perhaps,

" to

(a) Mr. Upton's Copy.

(b) We have no Expression exactly like that in the Greek. The Translation comes the nearest to it of any I could think on.

“ to explain them to others ? ” (c) You have been fighting at Home, with your Servant, Sir : you have turned the House upside-down, and alarmed the Neighbourhood : and do you come to me with a pompous Show of Wisdom, and sit and pass Judgment how I explain a Sentence ? How I prate whatever comes into my Head ? Do you come, envious and dejected, that nothing is brought you from Home ? And, in the midst of the Disputations, sit thinking on nothing, but how your Father or your Brother may behave to you ? “ What are they saying about me at Home ? ” “ Now they think I am improving, and say, “ He will come back with universal Knowledge. “ I wish I could learn every Thing before my Return : but this requires much Labour ; and nobody sends me any Thing. The Baths are very bad at *Nicopolis* ; and Things go very ill both at Home, and here.”

§. 3. After all this, it is said, nobody is the better for the philosophic School. Why, who comes to the School ? I mean, who comes to be reformed ? Who, to submit his Principles to Correction ? who, with a Sense of his Wants ? Why do you wonder then, that you bring back from the School, the very Thing you carried there ?
For

(c) This seems to be spoken by *Epictetus* to one of his Scholars.

For you do not come to lay aside, or correct, or change, your Principles. How should you? Far from it. Rather consider this, therefore, whether you have not what you come for. You come to talk about Theorems. Well: and are not you more impertinently talkative than you were? Do not these paultry Theorems furnish you with Matter for Ostentation? Do not you solve convertible and hypothetical Syllogisms? Why then, are you still displeased, if you have the very Thing for which you came?—"Very true: but, if my Child, or my Brother should die; or if I must die, or be tortured myself, what Good will these Things do me?"—Why, did you come for *this*? Did you attend upon me for *this*? Was it upon any such Account, that you ever lighted your Lamp, or sat up at Night? Or did you, when you went into the Walk, propose any Appearance to your own Mind to be discussed, instead of a Syllogism? Did any of you ever go through such a Subject jointly? And, after all, you say, Theorems are useless. To whom? To such as apply them ill. For Medicines for the Eyes are not useless to those, who apply them when, and as, they ought. Fomentations are not useless: Poisers are not useless: but they are useless to some; and, on the contrary, useful to others. If you should ask me now, are Syllogisms useful? I answer, that they are useful: and, if you please, I will show you

you how (*d*)—"Will they be of Service to me, "then?"—Why: did you ask, Man, whether they would be useful to *you*, or in general? If any one in a Dysentery should ask me, whether Acids be useful; I answer, They are. "Are they "useful for *me*, then?"—I say No. First try to get the Flux stopped, and the Exulceration healed. Do you too first get your Ulcers healed; your Fluxes stopped. Quiet your Mind, and bring it free from Distraction, to the School; and then you will know what is the Force of Reasoning.

C H A P. XXII.

Of Friendship.

§. 1. **T**O whatever Objects a Person devotes his Attention, these Objects he, probably loves. Do Men ever devote their Attention then, to Evils?—By no Means.—Or even to what doth not concern them?—No: nor this.—It remains then, that *Good* must be the sole Object of their Attention; and, if of their Attention, of their Love too. Whoever, therefore, understands *Good*, is capable likewise of Love: and he who cannot distinguish Good from Evil, and Things indifferent from both, how is it possible, that he can love? The prudent Person alone then, is capable of loving.

How

(*d*) The *Greek* is pointed at ἀποδιξω; but the Sense requires the Stop at πω;

How so? I am not this prudent Person, yet I love my Child.

I protest it surprizes me, that you should, in the first Place, confess yourself imprudent. For in what are you deficient? Have not you the Use of your Senses? Do not you distinguish the Appearances of Things? Do not you provide such Food, and Cloathing, and Habitation, as are suitable to you? Why then do you confess, that you want Prudence? In Truth, because you are often struck, and disconcerted by Appearances, and their Speciousness gets the better of you; and hence you sometimes suppose the very same Things to be good, then evil, and, lastly, neither: and, in a Word, you grieve, you fear, you envy, you are disconcerted, you change. Is it from hence, that you confess yourself imprudent? And are you not changeable too in Love? Riches, Pleasure, in short, the very same Things, you at some times esteem good, and at others, evil: and do not you esteem the same Persons too, alternately good and bad? And, at one time, treat them with Kindness, at another, with Enmity? One time, commend, and at another, censure them?

Yes. This too is the Case, with me.

Well then, can he who is deceived in another, be his Friend, think you?

No, surely.

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M

Or

Or doth he, who loves him with a changeable Affection, bear him genuine Good-will ?

Nor he, neither.

Or he, who now vilifies, then admires him ?

Nor he.

Do you not often see little Dogs caressing, and playing with each other, that you would say, nothing could be more friendly : but, to learn what this Friendship is, throw a Bit of Meat between them, and you will see. Do you too throw a Bit of an Estate, betwixt you and your Son, and you will see, that he will quickly wish you under Ground, and you *him* : and then you, no doubt, on the other Hand, will exclaim ; What a Son have I brought up ! He would bury me alive ! Throw in a pretty Girl, and the old Fellow and the young one will, both, fall in Love with her : or let Fame or Danger intervene, the Words of the Father of *Admetus* will be yours (a) :

You

(a) *Admetus*, King of *Theffaly*, being destined to die, *Apollo* obtained a Reversal of his Sentence from the Fates, on Condition, that some Person could be found to die in his stead. *Admetus* tried all his Friends, and among the rest, his Father, *Pheres* ; but no one chose to be his Representative, but his Wife, *Alceftis*. After her Death, *Pheres* is introduced preparing Honours for her Funeral, and condoling with his Son, on her Loss. *Admetus* rejects his Presents, with great Indignation ; and makes him the severest Reproaches, on his Cowardice and Mean-spiritedness, in not parting

You hold Life dear : Doth not your Father too ?

Do you suppose, that he did not love his own Child, when he was a little one ? That he was not in Agonies, when he had a Fever ; and often wished to undergo that Fever in his stead ? But, after all, when the Trial comes home, you see what Expressions he uses. Were not *Eteocles* and *Polynices* born of the same Mother, and of the same Father ? Were they not brought up, and did they not live, and eat, and sleep, together ? Did not they kiss and fondle each other ? So that any one, who saw them, would have laughed at all the Paradoxes, which Philosophers utter

M 2

about

parting with a few remaining Years of Life to save his Son from an untimely Death ; and in suffering *Alcestis* to descend to the Grave for him, in the Bloom of Youth. The Quotation made by *Epictetus*, is Part of the Answer of *Pheres*, to the Reproaches of his Son.

Some of the finest and most touching Parts of the Dialogue, in *Edward* and *Eleonora*, are taken from the *Alcestis* ; but Mr. *Thomson* is much happier, in the Conduct of his Story, than *Euripides*. *Eleonora* exposes herself to Death, against the Consent, and without the Knowledge, of her Husband ; which by no means appears to have been the Case of *Alcestis*. This Circumstance renders *Admetus* a most despicable Character, throughout the Play ; and the Reproaches which he throws upon *Pheres* appear absurd, and shocking. It is a little remarkable, that *Epictetus* should treat the Father with so much Contempt, and bestow none on the Son, to whom it was, at least equally, due. See B. III. c. 20. §. 1. and VAL. MAX. L. IV. c. 6. §. 1.

about Love. And yet, when a Kingdom, like a Bit of Meat, was thrown betwixt them, see what they say, and how eagerly they wish to kill each other (*b*). For universally, be not deceived, no Animal is attached to any thing so strongly, as to its own Interest. Whatever therefore, appears a Hindrance to that, be it Brother, or Father, or Child, or Mistress, or Friend, is hated, abhorred, execrated; for, by Nature, it loves nothing like its own Interest. This is Father, and Brother, and Family, and Country, and God (*c*). Whenever therefore, the Gods seem to hinder this, we vilify even them, and throw down their Statues, and burn their Temples; as *Alexander* ordered the Temple of *Esculapius* to be burnt, because he had lost the Man he loved.

§. 2. Whenever therefore, any one makes his Interest to consist in the same thing with Sanctity, Virtue, his Country, Parents, and Friends, all these are secured: but, where-ever they are made to interfere, Friends, and Country, and Family, and Justice itself, all give way, borne down by the Weight of Self-interest. For where-ever *I* and *mine* are placed, thither must every Animal gravitate. If in Body, that will sway us; if in Choice,

(*b*) The Original quotes some Verses from *Euripides*, of a Dialogue between *Eteocles* and *Polynices*, before the Walls of *Thebes*; of which the Translation gives the general Sense.

(*c*) See *Matt.* xii. 50.

Choice, that; if in Externals, these. If therefore, I be placed in a right Choice, then only, I shall be a Friend, a Son, or a Father, such as I ought. For, in that Case, it will be for my Interest to preserve the faithful, the modest, the patient, the abstinent, the beneficent, Character; to keep the Relations of Life inviolate. But, if I place my *self* in one Thing, and Virtue in another, the Doctrine of *Epicurus* will stand its Ground. That Virtue is nothing, or mere Opinion (d).

§. 3. From this Ignorance it was, that the *Athenians* and *Lacedemonians* quarrelled with each other; and the *Thebans* with both: the *Persian King*, with *Greece*; and the *Macedonians*, with both: and now the *Romans*, with the *Gates*. And, in still remoter Times, the *Trojan War* arose from the same Cause. *Paris* was the Guest of *Menelaus*; and whoever had seen the mutual Proofs of Good-will, that passed between them, would never have believed, that they were not Friends. But a tempting Bit, a pretty Woman,

M 3 . was

(d) By *self* is here meant the proper Good, or, as *Solomon* expresses it, *Eccl. xii. 13. The Whole of Man*. The Stoic proves excellently, the Inconvenience of placing this, in any thing but a right Choice (a right Disposition and Behaviour): but how it is the Interest of each Individual, in every Case, to make that Choice, in Preference to present Pleasure, and in Defiance of present Sufferings, appears only from the Doctrine of a future Recompence.

was thrown in between them; and for this they went to War. At present, therefore, when you see dear Brothers have, in Appearance, but one Soul, do not immediately pronounce upon their Friendship; not though they should swear it, and affirm it was impossible to live asunder. (For the governing Faculty of a bad Man is faithless, unsettled, injudicious; successively vanquished by different Appearances). But inquire, not as others do, whether they were born of the same Parents, and brought up together, and under the same Preceptor: but this Thing only, in what they place their Interest; in Externals, or in Choice. If in Externals, no more call them Friends, than faithful, or constant, or brave, or free; nay, nor even Men, if you are wise. For it is no Principle of Humanity, that makes them bite and vilify each other; and take Possession of public Assemblies, as wild Beasts do of Solitudes and Mountains; and convert Courts of Justice into Dens of Robbers: nor that prompts them to be intemperate, Adulterers, Seducers; or leads them into other Offences, that Men commit against each other, from the one single Principle, by which they place themselves, and their own Concerns, in Things independent on Choice.

§. 4. But, if you hear, that these Men, in reality suppose Good to be placed only in Choice, and in a right Use of the Appearances of Things;

no longer take the trouble of inquiring, if they are Father and Son, or old Companions and Acquaintances; but as boldly pronounce, that they are Friends, as that they are faithful and just. For where else can Friendship be met, but with Fidelity and Modesty, and a Communication (e) of Virtue; and of no other Thing?

Well: but such a one paid me the utmost Regard, for so long a Time; and did not he *love* me?

How can you tell, Wretch, if that Regard be any other than he pays to his Shoes, or his Horse, when he cleans them? And, how do you know, but when you cease to be a necessary Utensil, he may throw you away, like a broken Stool?

Well: but it is my Wife; and we have lived together many Years.

And how many did *Eriphyle* live with *Amphiaræus*; and was the Mother of Children, and not a few? But a Bracelet fell in between them. What was this Bracelet? The Principle [she had formed] concerning such Things. This turned her into a savage Animal: this cut asunder all Love; and suffered neither the Wife, nor the Mother, to continue such (f).

M. 4

§. 5.

(e) Perhaps *σοφία*, in the *Greek*, should be *διάνοια*.

(f) *Amphiaræus* married *Eriphyle*, the Sister of *Adrastus*, King of *Argos*. He was an excellent Soothsayer; and, by his

§. 5. Whoever therefore, among you, studies to be, or to gain a Friend, let him cut up all these Principles by the Root; hate them; drive them utterly out of his Soul. Thus in the first place, he will be secure from inward Reproaches, and Contests; from Change of Mind, and Self-torment. Then, with respect to others; to every one, like himself, he will be unreserved. To such as are unlike, he will be patient, mild, gentle, and ready to forgive them, as failing in Points of the greatest Importance; but severe to none; being fully convinced of *Plato's* Doctrine, That the Soul is never willingly deprived of Truth. Without all this, you may, in many Respects, live as Friends do; and drink, and lodge, and travel together, and be born of the same Parents; and so may (g) Serpents too: but neither they, nor you, can ever be Friends, while you have these brutal and execrable Principles.

C H A P.

his Skill, foresaw, that it would prove fatal to him, if he engaged himself in the *Theban* War. Wherefore, to avoid inevitable Destruction, he hid himself: but was discovered by his Wife *Eriphyle*, whom *Polynices* had corrupted, with a Present of a golden Chain. STATIUS's *Thebais*, L. VI.

(g) Mr. Upton's Copy.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the Faculty of Speaking.

§. 1. A BOOK will always be read with the greater Pleasure, and Ease too, if it be written in a fair Character: therefore every one will the more easily attend to Discourses likewise, ornamented with proper and beautiful Expressions. It (a) ought not then to be said, that there is no such Thing as the Faculty of Elocution: for this would be at once the Part of an impious and fearful Person (b). Impious; because he dishonours the Gifts of God; just as if he should deny any Use in the Faculty of Sight, Hearing, and Speech itself. Hath God then given you Eyes in vain? Is it in vain, that he hath infused into them, such a strong and active Spirit; as to be able to represent the Forms of distant Objects (c)? What Messenger is so quick and diligent?

(a) These are the Words of *Epictetus*; to which there are others equivalent afterwards. His Meaning, probably, is, that the Value and Usefulness of the Faculty of Elocution ought not to be denied: in Opposition to the Doctrine of *Epicurus*, who declared all the liberal Arts and Sciences to be useless and mischievous. See *DIOG. LAERT. L. X. §. 6.* and *MÉNAGE's* Notes there.

(b) He proves the Timidity at the Beginning of §. 3.

(c) It was an old Notion, that Vision was performed by the Emission of Rays from the Eye to the Object, not the

diligent? Is it in vain, that he hath made the intermediate Air, so yielding, and elastic, that Sight penetrates through it? And is it in vain, that he hath made the Light; without which all the rest would be useless? Man, be not ingrateful; nor, on the other Hand, unmindful of your superior Advantages (*d*): but for Sight, and Hearing, and indeed for Life itself, and the Supports of it, as Fruits, and Wine, and Oil, be thankful to God: but remember, that He hath given you another Thing, superior to them all; which makes use of them, proves them, estimates the Value of each (*e*). For what is it that pronounces upon the Value of each of these Faculties? Is it the Faculty itself? Did you ever perceive the Faculty of Sight or Hearing, to say any thing concerning itself? Or Wheat, or Barley, or Horses, or Dogs? No. These Things are appointed as Instruments and Servants, to obey that which is capable of using the Appearances of Things. If you inquire the Value of any thing; of *what* do you inquire? What is it that answers you?

Admission of Rays from the Object into the Eye; and to this *Epicætetus* here refers.

(*d*) Mr. *Upton* gives a different Sense to *πρσισσομεν*; but I think, that both *παλιν*, and what afterwards follows, justifies the *English* Translation.

(*e*) See B. I. c. 1.

you (*f*)? How then can any Faculty be superior to this; which both uses all the rest as Instruments, and tries and pronounces concerning each of them? For which of them knows, what itself is; and what is its own Value? Which of them knows, when it is to be used, and when not? Which is it, that opens and shuts the Eyes, and turns them away from improper Objects? Is it the Faculty of Sight? No: but that of *Choice*. Which is it, that opens and shuts the Ears? What is it, by which they are made curious and inquisitive; or, on the contrary, deaf, and unaffected by what is said? Is it the Faculty of Hearing? No: but that of *Choice*. Will this then, perceiving itself to exist in [Man amidst] the other Faculties, [which are] all blind and deaf, and unable to discern any thing, but those Offices, in which they are appointed to minister, and be subservient to it; and that itself alone sees clearly, and distinguishes the Value of each of the rest; will this, I say, inform us, that any thing is supreme, but itself? What doth the Eye, when it is opened, do more, than see? But whether we ought to look upon the Wife of any one, and in what manner, what is

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(*f*) The Hearer is understood in this Place to say, The Faculty of Choice. It is not improbable, however, that the Greek Word *ωραίστην*, may have been omitted in transcribing.

it that tells us? The Faculty of *Choice*. Whether we ought to believe, or to disbelieve what is said; or whether, if we do believe, we ought to be moved by it, or not, what is it that tells us? Is it not the Faculty of *Choice*? Again: the very Faculty of Elocution, and that which ornaments Discourse, if there be any such peculiar Faculty, what doth it more, than merely ornament and arrange Expressions, as Curlers do the Hair? But whether it be better to speak, or to be silent; or better to speak in this, or in that Manner; whether this be decent, or indecent; and the Season and Use of each; what is it that tells us, but the Faculty of *Choice*? What then, would you have it appear, and bear Testimony against itself? What means this? If the Case be thus, that which serves, may be superior to that to which it is subservient; the Horse to the Rider; the Dog, to the Hunter; the Instrument, to the Musician; or Servants to the King. What is it that makes use of all the rest? *Choice*. What takes care of all? *Choice*. What destroys the whole Man, at one time, by Hunger; at another by a Rope, or a Precipice? *Choice*. Hath Man, then, any thing stronger than this? And how is it possible, that what is liable to Restraint should be stronger, than what is not? What hath a natural Power of hindering the Faculty of Sight? Both *Choice*, and what depends

pends on Choice. And it is the same of the Faculties of Hearing and Speech. And what hath a natural Power of hindering Choice? Nothing independent on itself, only its own Perversion. Therefore *Choice* alone is Vice: *Choice* alone is Virtue.

§. 2. Since, then, Choice is such a Faculty, and placed in Authority over all the rest, let it come forth and say to us, that the Body is, of all Things, the most excellent. If even the Body itself pronounced itself to be the most excellent, it could not be borne. But now, what is it, *Epicurus*, that pronounces all this? What was it, that composed Volumes concerning (g) the End of [Being], the (g) Nature of Things, the (g) Rule [of Reasoning]; that assumed a philosophic Beard; that, as it was dying, wrote, that it was *then spending its last and happiest Day* (h)? Was this, Body, or was it the Faculty of Choice? And can you then, without Madness, confess any thing superior to *this*? Are you in reality so deaf and blind? What then, doth any one, dishonour the other Faculties? Heaven forbid! Doth any one deny, that the Faculty of Sight (i)

is

(g) Celebrated Treatises on these Subjects, composed by *Epicurus*.

(h) These Words are Part of a Letter written by *Epicurus*, when he was dying, to one of his Friends. See *DIOG. LAERT. L. X. §. 22.*

(i) Probably for *ωραιστηριον* should be read *ορατηριον*; which Word is used by *Epictetus*, but a little more than a Page before.

is useful, and preferable [to the Want of it]? Heaven forbid! It would be stupid, impious, and ungrateful to God. But we render to each its Due. There is some Use of an Ass, tho' not so much as of an Ox; and of a Dog, though not so much as of a Servant; and of a Servant, though not so much as of the Citizens; and of the Citizens, though not so much as of the Magistrates. And, though some are more excellent than others, those Uses, which the last afford, are not to be despised. The Faculty of Elocution, hath its Value, though not equal to that of Choice. When therefore I talk thus, let not any one suppose, that I would have you neglect Elocution, any more than your Eyes, or Ears, or Hands, or Feet, or Clothes, or Shoes. But if you ask me, what is the most excellent of Things, what shall I say? I cannot say, *Elocution*; but a right *Choice*: for it is that which makes use of this, and all the other Faculties, whether great or small. If this be set right, a bad Man becomes good; if it be wrong, a good Man becomes wicked. By this we are unfortunate, fortunate; we disapprove, or approve each other. In a word, it is this, which, neglected, forms Unhappiness; and, well cultivated, Happiness.

§. 3. But to take away the Faculty of Elocution: and to say, that it is in reality nothing, is not

not only ingrateful to those who gave it, but cowardly too. For such a Person seems to me to be afraid, that, if there be any such Faculty, we may not, on occasion, be able to treat it with Contempt. Such are they too, who deny any Difference between Beauty, and Deformity. Was it possible then, to be affected in the same Manner by seeing *Thersites*, as *Achilles*; or *Helen*, as any (k) other Woman? These also are the foolish and clownish Notions of those, who are ignorant of the Nature of Things; and afraid, that, whoever perceives a Difference, must presently be carried away, and overcome. But the great Point is to leave to each Thing its own proper Faculty; and then to see what the Value of that Faculty is, and to learn what is the principal Thing, and, upon every Occasion, to follow that, and to make it the chief Object of our Attention: to consider other Things as trifling in Comparison of this; and yet, as far as we are able, not to neglect even these. We ought, for Instance, to take care of our Eyes; but not as of the principal Thing, but only on account of the Principal: because *that* will no otherwise preserve its own Nature, than by making a due Estimation of the rest, and preferring some to others. What is the usual Practice then? That of a Traveller, who returning into his

(k) Mr. Upton's Reading in *STOICS*.

his own Country, and meeting on the Road with a good *Inn*, being pleased with the *Inn*, should remain at the *Inn*. Have you forgot your Intention, Man? You were not travelling *to* this Place, but only *through* it. “But this is a fine Place.” And how many other fine Inns are there, and how many pleasant Fields? But only to be past through in your Way. The Business is, to return to your Country; to relieve the Anxieties of your Family; to perform the Duties of a Citizen; to marry; have Children; and go through the public Offices. For you did not set out, to chuse the finest Places; but to return, to live in that where you were born, and of which you are appointed a Citizen.

§. 4. Such is the present Case. Because by Speech, and verbal Precepts, we are to arrive at Perfection; and purify our own Choice; and rectify that Faculty, of which the Office is, the Use of the Appearances of Things: and, because, for the Delivery of Theorems, a certain Manner of Expression, and some Variety and Subtilty of Discourse, becomes necessary; many, captivated by these very Things, one, by Expression; another, by Syllogisms, a third, by convertible Propositions, just as our Traveller was by the good Inn, go no further: but sit down and waste their Lives shamefully there, as if amongst the Sirens. Your Business, Man, was to prepare yourself

for such an Use of the Appearances of Things; as Nature demands: Not to be frustrated of your Desires, or incur your Aversions: never to be disappointed, or unfortunate: but free, unrestrained, uncompelled; conformed to the Administration of *Jupiter*; obedient to that; finding Fault with nothing: but able to say, from your whole Soul, the Verses which begin,

Conduct me, Jove; and thou, O Destiny.

While you have such a Business before you, will you be so pleased with a pretty Form of Expression, or a few Theorems, as to chuse to stay and live with them, forgetful of your Home; and say, "They are fine Things!" Why, who says they are not fine Things? But only as a Passage; as an Inn. For, could you speak like *Demosthenes*, what hinders, but that you might be a disappointed Wretch? Could you resolve Syllogisms like *Chrysippus*, what hinders, but that you might be miserable, sorrowful, envious, in short, disturbed, unhappy? Nothing. You see then, that these are mere Inns, of small Value; and that your Point in View, is quite another Thing. When I talk thus to some, they suppose, that I am overthrowing all Care about Speaking, and about Theorems: but I do not overthrow that; only the resting in these Things without End, and placing our Hopes there. If any one, by maintaining this, hurts an Audience,

ence, place me amongst those hurtful People : for I cannot, when I see one Thing to be the principal and most excellent, call another so, to gain your Favour.

C H A P. XXIV.

Concerning a Person whom he treated with Disregard.

§. I. **W**HEN a certain Person said to him ;
 “ I have often come to you, with a
 “ Desire of hearing you ; and you have never
 “ given me any Answer ; but now, if possible, I
 “ intreat you to say something to me :” Do you
 think, replied *Epicætetus*, that, as in other Things,
 so in Speaking, there is an Art, by which he,
 who understands it, speaks skilfully, and he, who
 doth not, unskilfully ?

I do think so.

He then, who, by speaking, both benefits himself, and is able to benefit others, must speak skilfully ; but he who rather hurts, and is hurt, must be unskilful in this Art of speaking. For you may find some Speakers hurt, and others benefited. And are all Hearers benefited by what they hear ? Or will you find some benefited, and some hurt (a) ?

Both.

Then those who hear skilfully are benefited, and those who hear unskilfully, hurt.

Granted.

Is

(a) 2 Cor. ii, 16.

Is there any Art of Hearing, then, as well as of Speaking?

It seems so.

If you please, consider it thus too. To whom do you think, the Practice of Music belongs?

To a Musician.

To whom the proper Formation of a Statue?

To a Statuary.

And do you not imagine some Art necessary, to view a Statue skilfully?

I do.

If, therefore, to *speak* properly belongs to one who is skilful, do not you see, that to *hear* with Benefit belongs likewise to one who is skilful? For the present, however, if you please, let us say no more of doing Things perfectly, and with Benefit, since we are both far enough, from any thing of that Kind: but this seems to be universally confessed, that he, who would hear Philosophers, needs some Kind of Exercise in Hearing. Is it not so? Tell me then, on what I shall speak to you? On what Subject are you able to hear me (b)?

On Good and Evil.

The Good and Evil of what? Of a Horse?

No.

Of an Ox.

No.

What?

(b) See John viii. 43.

What then, of a Man?

Yes.

Do we know, then, what *Man* is? What is his Nature; what our Idea of him is; and how far our Ears are open in respect to this Matter (c). Nay, do you understand what Nature is; or are you able, and in what Degree, to comprehend me, when I come to say; "But I must use Demonstration to you?" How should you? Do you comprehend what Demonstration is; or, how a Thing is demonstrated; or by what Methods; or, what resembles a Demonstration, and yet is not a Demonstration? Do you know what True, or False is? What is consequent to a Thing, and what contradictory? Or unsuitable, or dissonant? But I must excite you to Philosophy. How shall I show you that Contradiction, among the Generality of Mankind, by which they differ, concerning Good and Evil, Profitable and Unprofitable, when you know not what *Contradiction* means? Show me then, what I shall gain, by discoursing with you? Excite an Inclination in me, as a proper Pasture excites an Inclination to eating, in a Sheep: for if you offer him a Stone, or a Piece of Bread, he will not

(c) *κατα ωσπον, ωςτι του*, should be *κατα ωσπον ωςτι τουτου*. There is no Need of altering *τα οτα τετενημενα*. *Opening the Ear*, is a Phrase of Scripture. *Job xxxiii. 16, xxxvi. 10, l. xlii. 20. Mark vii. 34, 35.* And even digging open the Ear. *Pf. xl. 6. in the Hebrews.*

not be excited. Thus we too have certain natural Inclinations to speaking, when the Hearer appears to be somebody; when he gives us Encouragement: but if he sits by, like a Stone, or a Tuft of Grass, how can he excite any Desire in a Man? Doth a Vine say to an Husbandman, "Take care of me?" No: but invites him to take care of it, by showing him, that, if he doth, it will reward him for his Care. Who is there, whom engaging sprightly Children do not invite to play, and creep, and prattle, with them? But who was ever taken with an Inclination to divert himself, or bray, with an Ass; for, be the Creature ever so little, it is still a little Ass.

§. 2. Why do you say nothing to me, then?

I have only this to say to you: That, whoever is ignorant what he is, and wherefore he was born, and in what kind of a World, and in what Society; what Things are good, and what evil; what fair, and what base: who understands neither Discourse, nor Demonstration; nor what is true, nor what is false; nor is able to distinguish between them: such a one will neither exert his Desires, nor Aversions, nor Pursuits, conformably to Nature: he will neither intend, nor assent, nor deny, nor suspend, his Judgment, conformably to Nature: but will wander up and down, intirely deaf and blind, supposing himself
to

to be somebody (*d*) ; while he is in reality, nobody. Is there any thing new, in all this ? Is not this Ignorance the Cause of all the Errors that have happened, from the very Original of Mankind ? Why did *Agamemnon* and *Achilles* differ ? Was it not for want of knowing what is advantageous, what disadvantageous ? Doth not one of them say, It is advantageous to restore *Chryseis* to her Father : the other, That it is not ? Doth not one say, That he ought to take away the Prize of the other ; the other, that he ought not ? Did they not, by these means, forget who they were, and for what Purpose they had come there ? Why, what did you come for, Man : to gain a Mistress, or to fight ? — “ To fight.” — With whom ? With the *Trojans*, or *Greeks* ? — “ With the *Trojans*.” — Leaving *Hector*, then, do you draw your Sword upon your own King ? And do you, good Sir, forgetting the Duties of a King,

Intrusted with a Nation, and its Cares,

go to squabbling, about a Girl, with the bravest of your Allies ; whom you ought, by every Method, to conciliate and preserve ? And will you be inferior to a subtle Priest, who pays his Court, with

(*d*) *Διόνυσος μὲν τις εἶναι, οὐδ' οὐδὲν*, is very near to *Διόνυσος τις, μὴδὲν οὐ*, *Gal. vi. 3*. There is a similar Expression of *Plato*, at the End of the *Apology of Socrates*.

with the utmost Care, to you fine Gladiators?— You see the Effects, which Ignorance of what is advantageous, produces. — “ But I am rich “ [you may say], as well as other People.” — What, richer than *Agamemnon*? — “ But I am “ handsome too.” — What, handsomer than *Achilles*? — “ But I have fine Hair too.” — Had not *Achilles* finer and brighter? Yet he never combed it nicely, nor curled it. — “ But I am “ strong too.” — Can you lift such a Stone then, as *Hector*, or *Ajax*? — “ But I am of a noble “ Family too.” — Is your Mother a Goddess, or your Father descended from *Jupiter*? And what Good did all this do *Achilles*, when he sat crying for a Girl? — “ But I am an Orator.” — And was not he? Do not you see how he treated the most eloquent of the *Greeks*, *Phœnix* and *Ulysses*? How he struck them dumb? This is all I have to say to you; and even this, against my Inclination.

Why so?

Because you have given me no Encouragement. For what can I see in you, to encourage me, as spirited Horses do their Riders? Your Person? That you disfigure. Your Dress? That is effeminate. Your Behaviour? Your Look? Absolutely nothing. When you would hear a Philosopher, do not say to him, “ You tell me no “ thing;” but only show yourself worthy, or fit,

to *hear* ; and you will find how you will move him to *peak*.

C H A P. XXV.

That Logic is necessary.

WHEN one of the Company said to him, “ Convince me that Logic is necessary ? ” Would you have me demonstrate it to you, says he ? — “ Yes. ” — Then I must use a demonstrative Form of Argument — “ Granted. ” — And how will you know then, whether I argue sophistically ? On this, the Man being silent ; You see, says he, that, even by your own Confession, Logic is necessary ; since without its Assistance, you cannot learn so much as whether it be necessary or not.

C H A P. XXVI.

What is the Property of Error in Life.

§. 1. **E**VERY Error in Life implies a Contradiction : for, since he who errs, doth not mean to err, but to be in the Right, it is evident, that he acts contrary to his Meaning. What doth a Thief mean ? His own Interest. If, then, Thieving be against his Interest, he acts contrary to his own Meaning. Now every
rational

rational Soul is naturally averſe to Self-contradiction : but ſo long as any one is ignorant, that it is a Contradiction, nothing reſtrains him from acting contradictorily : but, whenever he diſcovers it, he muſt as neceſſarily renounce and avoid it, as any one muſt diſſent from a Falſhood, whenever he perceives it to be a Falſhood : but, while this doth not appear, he aſſents to it, as to a Truth.

§. 2. He then is an able Speaker, and excels at once in Exhortation and Conviction, who can diſcover, to each Man, the Contradiction by which he errs, and prove clearly to him, that what he would, he doth not ; and what he would not do, that he doth (a). For, if that be ſhown, he will depart from it, of his own accord : but, till you have ſhown it, be not ſurpriſed that he remains where he is : for he doth it on the Appearance, that he acts rightly (b). Hence *Socrates*, relying on this Faculty, uſed to ſay, “ It
“ is not my Cuſtom to cite any other Witneſs
“ of my Aſſertions ; but I am always contented
“ with my Opponent. I call and ſummon him
“ for my Witneſs ; and his ſingle Evidence

(a) For that which I do, I allow not : for what I would, that do I not ; but what I hate, that I do. *Rom. vii. 15,*

(b) See B. I. c. 18. Note. (a).

